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ABSTRACT
The British left has confronted a dilemma in forming its attitude towards Israel in the 
postwar period. The establishment of the Jewish state seemed to force people on the left 
to choose between competing nationalisms - Israeli, Arab and later, Palestinian. Over 
time, a number of key developments sharpened the dilemma. My central focus is the 
evolution of thinking about Israel and the Middle East in the British Labour Party. I 
examine four critical periods: the creation of Israel in 1948; the Suez war in 1956; the 
Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and the 1980s, covering mainly the Israeli invasion of Lebanon 
but also the intifada. In each case, entrenched attitudes were called into question and 
longer-term shifts were triggered in the aftermath. The evolution of Labour’s debates 
shows important contrasts with thinking in the Communist Party over the same period. 
There are also continuities and differences between developments in both British parties 
and their French equivalents.
Within the Labour Party (and the French Socialist Party) the virtual consensus of 
support for Israel was maintained in 1956; was tested but not completely broken in 1967 
and more or less collapsed in the early 1980s. Within the British and French communist 
parties, the initial support for the formation of the Jewish state broke down by the 1956 
crisis and the parties adopted a consistently pro-Arab perspective thereafter. However, 
in the 1980s the extreme anti-zionism of earlier periods was replaced with a more 
tolerant approach to Jewish nationalism. The left’s attitudes did not derive directly from 
democratic socialist or communist principles. Non-ideological factors including 
political expediency, linkages between the left and the nationalist movements, intra­
party organisational developments and the campaigning activities of certain individuals 
were critical to understanding the left’s policy positions.
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Part One: Introduction and the 
British Labour Party
CHAPTER ONE
ZIONISM, ISRAEL AND THE LEFT: AN INTRODUCTION
Socialists have found the question of nationalism particularly intractable. In theory, 
the universalist principles of socialism are antithetical to the particularist principles of 
nationalism. The left has responded to this opposition in two ways. Some, like 
Hobsbawm, have rejected outright the integrity of nationalism.' Others, like Debray, 
believe that socialists have failed fundamentally to understand nationalism and need to 
confront the question.2 However, the second solution gives way to a further problem, 
namely, how to reconcile competing nationalist aspirations. This thesis considers the 
way in which the left, principally the British Labour Party, has dealt with the 
particular conflict between Jewish, Arab and later, Palestinian nationalism. In this 
chapter I review socialist attitudes towards Zionism and the development of the 
Israel/Arab conflict. Section one surveys far left attitudes, including those of the 
classical socialists, communists and the new left. Section two examines the attitudes 
of the social democratic left, especially the Labour Party. Section three outlines the 
principal objectives and structure of this study and section four looks briefly at the 
particular dilemmas this project raised for its author.
1.1 Far Left Attitudes
The legacy of M arx’ efforts to reconcile the universalist principles of socialism with 
the particularism of nationalism was ideological ambivalence. Marx initially believed 
that national differences and conflicts would disappear under the universalising 
impact of capitalism. Later, Marx understood nationalism as an expression of the 
capitalist need for bigger markets. Since nationalism was the 'building block' of 
capitalism and socialism was the successor of capitalism, Marx favoured the national 
movements that he felt were most conducive to the development of the forces of 
production, such as German and Italian unification.3 In accordance with this premise,
1 Hobsbawm , 1977:3-23; see also, Hobsbawm and Ranger, eds., 1983.
Debray, 1977: 25 -41 .
1 Avineri in Reinharz and M osse, eds., 1992:285-286.
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it was not even the case that movements of colonial liberation could always depend on 
Marx for support: In 1857-59, he refused to back Indian independence on the grounds 
that the entry of British capitalism into India was a progressive development.4
If socialists have found nationalism taxing, Jewish nationalism and modern 
political zionism have created an even greater source of dilemma. While Jewish 
nationalism has a long history, zionism as a political movement did not properly 
emerge until the late nineteenth century, largely at the initiative of Theodor Herzl, 
who helped establish the World Zionist Organisation (WZO).5 Even then, Jews were 
ambivalent about the attractions of zionism, with critics arguing that the movement 
for the creation of a Jewish state was utopian because Jewish assimilation was 
unstoppable and with thousands of Jews in western and central Europe joining left- 
wing movements.6 An important historical tie between Jews and socialist movements 
has existed. The classical socialists Marx, Trotsky and Rosa Luxemburg were all 
Jewish. Moreover, Jews have numbered disproportionately in communist parties 
such as the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB')7 and they have played a
8 9
significant role in the social democratic left and the new left. Nevertheless, the 
universalist and internationalist principles of socialism have tended to militate against 
recognition of a Jewish national identity. Marx, Trotsky and Luxemburg all distanced 
themselves from their Jewish origins, to the extent that some commentators have 
described them as 'self-hating Jews'.10 A more fitting description, perhaps, would be 
that of the 'non-Jewish Jew'.1' Whatever the label, it is certain that these people had 
little time for the concept of Jewish national identity.
Confronted with Jewish nationalism, the classical socialists typically responded 
in a negative way. They considered this form of nationalism reactionary since it was 
based on the idea of Jewish separateness. For Marx, Jewish emancipation did not 
depend on a national solution. Jewish oppression was rooted in the historical role 
Jews had been forced to play; the emancipation of the Jews therefore depended upon
* D avis, 1965:26-31.
6 Peters in F oley , ed., 1994:155.
7 See Laqueur, 1971:161-165.
8 Alderman, 1992:293.
9 See Rubinstein, 1982.
See Cohen, 1980.
10 Rubinstein, 1982:99-104.
11 See D eutscher, 1968.
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the disappearance of the Jew as historically defined.'2 More fundamentally, classical 
socialists did not believe that Jewish nationalism had any potential for speeding up the 
break-down of feudalism and consequently objected to the idea that it represented a 
progressive form of nationalism.'3
This unwillingness to credit Jewish nationalism with any legitimacy carried on 
into the international communist movement. Like their mentors, Lenin and Stalin 
believed that the Jewish problem could be solved through the assimilation of the Jews. 
They viewed zionism as a reactionary movement because it opposed this process. 
Lenin objected to zionism on the grounds that it identified Jews as a separate caste 
and hence dovetailed with anti-semitism. Stalin disapproved of Jewish nationalism on 
the grounds that the Jews did not possess what he regarded as all the criteria of 
nationhood: a common language, territory, economic life and culture. Most 
importantly, Lenin and Stalin rejected Jewish nationalism because they thought it had 
no revolutionary potential. Indeed, they characterised zionism as a bourgeois form of
14nationalism that divided the Jews.
Based on a genuine commitment to ending anti-Jewish practices, opposition to 
Jewish nationalism within the classical socialist tradition was fairly benign.'5 
However, left-wing anti-zionism has not always been so innocuous. The anti-zionist 
campaigns initiated by the Soviet Union took on particularly brutal contours. The 
alliance between Soviet communism and zionism between 1945 and 1949, when the 
USSR supported Zionist aspirations for statehood in an effort to undermine British 
interests in the Middle East,'6 collapsed with the escalation of the cold war. 
Communist anti-zionism was brought into cruel relief in the early 1950s. The Slansky 
trials took place in Prague in 1952 when fourteen Czech politicians, eleven of whom 
were Jews, were charged with involvement in a ‘world-wide Jewish-nationalist-zionist 
imperialist’ conspiracy against Czechoslovakia. Under torture, the deputy premier 
Rudolf Slansky, confessed to being a Zionist and American agent. The so-called 
'Doctors' Plot' took place in 1953 when nine Russian doctors, seven of whom were
Marx, K., 'On the Jewish Question' in M cLellan, D ., ed., Karl Marx Selected  W ritings, 1977: 39-62. 
W istrich in W istrich ed., 1979:3-11.
14 Ibid: 12-13; Gitelman in W istrich ed., 1990:16.
15 W istrich in W istrich ed., 1990:46-48.
16 Wistrich in W istrich ed., 1979:283; Gitleman in W istrich ed., 1990:20.
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Jews, were accused of collaboration with the western intelligence service. Russia’s
recognition of Israel in the post-1948 period was invariably accompanied by
denouncements of zionism. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)
identified zionism with the 'Jewish bourgeoisie', imperialism and fascism and
18condemned Israel as the 'base and bridgehead of imperialism'.
The various national communist parties have tended to mirror the CPSU’s stand. 
Despite the sense of mutual identification between British Jews and communism in 
the 1930s and 1940s as a result of the rise of fascism and the communists' role in
19anti-fascist activities, the Communist Party of Great Britain (CP) has consistently 
and mechanically adopted an anti-zionist stand. The party saw zionism as the weapon 
of the bourgeoisie, a reactionary movement which divided the Jewish working class. 
In the context of the cold war, the British communists proclaimed that zionism was an 
agent of American imperialism. In France, where the Parti Communiste Frant^ais 
(PCF) was more important to the political process than in Britain, the communists
also espoused anti-zionist ideas. Like the British party, the PCF held that zionism was
“>0a bourgeois form of nationalism which divided the working class.” At the time of the
Slansky trials and the Doctors' Plot, the party spoke of Israeli and zionist espionage
21working for American imperialism. Former Jewish members of the party have
22testified to the PCF's uncompromising line on zionism. Faced with criticism, the 
party regularly persuaded prominent Jewish members such as Maxime Rodinson or
? 3
Annie Besse (later Kriegel) to defend its view of zionism."
Anti-zionism, which refers to opposition to Jewish national aspirations and, 
more recently, hostility towards the state of Israel, has a long tradition in socialist 
thought. The predisposition towards universalism and internationalism inherent in 
marxism made for an intolerance towards expressions of Jewish particularism and 
provided the basis for socialism's antipathy towards modern political zionism. While 
the marxist left offered its support to national movements regarded as progressive, it
Caute, 1964:202; Gitelman in W istrich in W istrich ed., 1990:19-21.
18 G itelm an in W istrich ed., 1990:21-24.
19 See Alderm an, 1992:293.
20 Caute, 1964:202.
21 Cohen and W all in M alino and W asserstein eds., 1985:92-93.
22 See Kriegel, 1984.
23 Caute, 1964:202; Cohen and W all in M alino and W asserstein, eds., 1985:93.
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did not count Jewish nationalism among these." Recent trends in the contemporary 
left indicate both a continuity with this tradition and a departure from it. Various 
historical movements and events, including the rise of Palestinian nationalism, a shift 
to the right in Israel and developments in the United Nations such as the 1976 General 
Assembly resolution stating that zionism was a form of ‘racism and racial
15
discrimination’,- provided the background to a resurgence of anti-zionism. The new 
left, which identified with Third World national liberation movements, began to adopt 
the Palestinian nationalist cause and to articulate an anti-zionist stand. The new 
anti-zionists no longer portrayed zionism as the weapon of the bourgeoisie. Rather, 
they depicted zionism as a form of racism and colonialism and the state of Israel as 
inherently racist on the grounds that it was built on the idea of a purely Jewish state.26 
This strand characterised Israelis as 'aggressive, expansionist, fascist colonisers'. 
The contemporary anti-zionist left’s language reflected broader changes in socialist
ideology. The new left differed from the traditional left because it envisaged a society
?8
free not only from class divisions but also gender and ethnic divisions.
The developments that led to a resurgence of left anti-zionism impacted upon 
related movements such as the women's movement. The rise of feminist movements 
in the Third World and trends in the UN had a particular effect. During the United 
Nations Decade for Women (1975-1985), western and Third World feminists came 
together at the three conferences held in Mexico City, Copenhagen and Nairobi. At 
the meetings of the non-governmental organisations, zionism was denounced as a 
form of racism. Combined with the influence of the new left on western feminism, 
these developments produced a shift in attitudes towards zionism on the part of 
women's movements in the west and in Britain, a trend accentuated by Israel's 
invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Feminist journals such as Spare Rib and Outwrite 
portrayed Zionist ideology as racist, imperialist and anti-feminist. The effect was to 
split the women’s movement. Some Jewish feminists in particular objected to the 
parallels being drawn between zionism and racism or antisemitism.- Others, like Gill
24 W istrich in W istrich ed., 1979:1-15.
25 See L ew is, 1976-1977:54.
26 For a good exam ple o f  this position, see W einstock, 1979.
27 W istrich in W istrich ed., 1990:48.
28 Caute, 1988:20-21.
29 Pope, 1986:13-25.
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Seidel, dealt with the dilemmas raised by the invasion by distinguishing sharply 
between Israeli government policies and zionism.30
The historical relationship between Jews and socialism has therefore been 
paradoxical. While there has been a significant tie between Jews and left-wing 
movements, socialists have not always been free from anti-Jewish sentiment. For 
example, they have sometimes identified Jews with capitalism in their opposition to 
capitalism generally. Despite Marx’ professed support for Jewish emancipation, it 
cannot be denied that he associated Jews with capital and held negative stereotypes 
about them as well as other national groups.3' The French socialist tradition has been 
equally culpable. One of the founders of French socialism, Charles Fourier, objected 
to Jewish emancipation (which followed the 1789 revolution) on the grounds that it 
represented a new individualism. Fourier characterised Jews as ‘parasites, merchants 
[and] usurers’, although, he later supported zionism when he began to believe that it 
was a communitarian project. M arx’ contemporaries in France, such as Pierre-Joseph
32
Proudhon, also linked Jews with usury and capitalism.
The recent appearance of anti-zionism within the contemporary left has raised 
again the question of socialist anti-semitism. Billig has suggested that 
characterisations of the state of Israel as essentially racist, colonialist or imperialist are
33
premised on a failure to accord Jewish national identity any legitimacy. Avineri has 
argued that anti-zionism, which contests the idea of the Jewish state, is necessarily 
anti-Jewish in so far as it refuses to allow for the secular (national) expression of
34Jewish identity. Avineri’s contention is an overstatement because it is possible
analytically to distinguish between anti-zionism and anti-semitism. His conclusion 
does not take account of Jewish hostility towards zionism on religious grounds. Some 
ultra-orthodox Jews opposed zionism because as a secular movement it contravened 
the messianic message of the bible.35 Moreover, as Billig has noted, socialists who 
reject zionism as part of a general hostility towards all forms of nationalism, are not 
guilty of singling out Jewish nationalism for criticism.36
30
See Bourne, 1987:6.
;; W istrich, 1975:1-6; D avis, 1965:33.
^ Lichtheim , 1968:316-323.
B illig , 1984a:3-4.
^ A v in er i, 1982:3-4.
36 See Laqueur, 1971:169-170.
B illig, 1984a:8-9.
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In practice, however, anti-zionism has frequently incorporated traditional anti- 
Jewish themes, expressed in references to ‘bourgjpis Zionist Jews’ and the conspiracy 
theory of zionism. In response to events such as Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, 
the modern anti-zionist left used typical anti-Jewish themes. In Britain, Trotskyist 
groups such as the Socialist Workers' Party (SWP) portrayed zionism as an all- 
powerful movement, responsible for reactionary policies everywhere, constructing a 
conspiracy theory of zionism that touched on the traditional anti-semitic stereotypes of
37 18
the Jews.' The far left also equated Israelis with Nazis or fascists. Although not 
necessarily anti-semitic, these parallels understandably offended some Jews. So, in 
continuation with the traditional left, contemporary far left ideology contained a 
reluctance to acknowledge the legitimacy of a Jewish national identity.
39The controversy surrounding Jim Allen's play Perdition brought out the 
significance of the issues surrounding the emergence of a left-wing anti-zionism in 
Britain. The play was supposed to have been staged at the Royal Court Theatre 
Upstairs but was cancelled at the last moment. Based on a libel case held in Israel in 
the 1950s, Allen’s play elaborated views characteristic of the anti-zionist left. 
Perdition centred principally on the theme of zionist/Nazi collaboration in wartime 
Hungary. In the resulting furore, the divisions within the left over Israel and the 
Palestinians came into sharp relief. Lining up with Allen were people like the radical 
intellectuals Noam Chomsky and Maxime Rodinson. Lining up against Allen were
40people like the enigmatic playwright Steven Berkoff.
The play provoked a storm of protest. The historians Martin Gilbert and David 
Cesarani condemned Allen for misusing history and for exploiting anti-semitic
41
themes. Cesarani argued that Perdition belonged 'to a strand of left-wing 
anti-zionism that regards the accepted history of the Holocaust as an ideological prop
42for Israel's survival'. He claimed that a conspiracy theory of zionism lay at the centre 
of the play in the accusation that Zionist leaders in Hungary colluded with Nazi leaders 
like Eichmann in order to facilitate the emigration of Zionists to Palestine. Cesarani
37 B illig , 1984b:28-34.
38 W istrich in W istrich ed., 1990:48.
39 A llen, 1987.
40 See A llen, 1987.
41 Ibid: 123-124.
42 Cesarani, 1987:7.
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also felt that the conspiracy theory was manifest in the play’s contention that Zionists 
in Germany had secret meetings with the Nazis and that the American Jewish 
leadership remained silent when confronted with information about the extermination 
of the Jews.43
Political coromen'U'bi'y on the right exploited the left’s difficulties with the 
Israel/Arab conflict and zionism. New right thinkers such as Roger Scruton 
complained of the anti-racists’ failure to tackle anti-semitism, which he saw as the 
principal manifestation of racism in Europe. Scruton suggested that in the postwar 
period Israel became an obstacle to Soviet policy in the Middle East, resulting in 
socialists dropping anti-semitism from their agenda. He argued that left-wing anti-
44Zionism was an ill-concealed form of anti-Jewish prejudice. Scruton’s concern with 
anti-Jewish views did not fit comfortably with the fact that his own attitude towards
45ethnic minorities was at best ambivalent. Entering the debate, Auberon Waugh 
asserted that the left's solution to the Jewish question would be 'extermination', in line
46with the ideas of Marx. The acrimony surrounding the debate over the left and Israel 
and the ‘Perdition affair’ testifies to the importance of the issues addressed in this 
study and points to the need for a less heated look at left-wing attitudes.
1.2 Social Democratic Attitudes and the Labour Party
The social democratic left’s attachment to the principles of internationalism and 
anti-imperialism has also created a source of tension between mainstream socialism 
and zionism. In Britain members of the Independent Labour Party (ILP) such as
47
James Maxton regarded zionism as an instrument of British imperialism. Key 
figures on the anti-colonialist left such as Fenner Brockway confessed to being 
completely bemused by the complexity of the Palestine question.48 Nevertheless, the 
social democratic left has tended to be less hostile to zionism and Israel than the 
marxist and communist left and has been more sympathetic to the idea of a Jewish
43 Ibid; Cesarani in W istrich in W istrich ed., 1990:53-60.
44 The Times, 3 April 1984:14.
45 See various issues o f  the Salisbury R e v i e w Swdtal iv) lev»'h»S .' 1 0 ? -  >
46 The S pecta tor, 1 D ecem ber 1984:6.
4j| Gorny, 1983:154-155.
H ow e, 1993:149.
national identity. In the period after the First World War in particular, reformist 
socialists began increasingly to acknowledge Jewish national self determination. 
Indeed, they thought that zionism was compatible with democracy and progress. 
British socialists like George Lansbury and Ramsay MacDonald and French socialists
49like Leon Blum sympathised with Zionist aims for this reason.
Since its establishment, Israel has generally been able to count on the support of 
parties such as the Labour Party and the French Socialist Party. Harold Wilson in 
Britain and Guy Mollet in France expressed a strong attachment to the Jewish state. 
According to Rubinstein, the social democratic left’s identification with Israel rests on 
three main factors: First, the influence of nineteenth century liberalism on social 
democratic thought. Liberalism opposed the religious persecution of the Jews and 
fought for the removal of legal restrictions on Jewish participation in western society. 
Second, the tradition of reformism that enabled social democrats to reject aspects of 
marxist doctrine and to view Israel as historically justified. Third, the historically 
close association between western Jews and social democratic parties.50 The Israeli 
Labour Party’s dominance from 1948 to 1977 also contributed to this sense of unity. 
Starting off as Mapai in 1930, the Labour Party was formed in 1965 when three left- 
wing groups, including Mapai, merged. ' Like the British Labour Party, the Israeli 
one was a member of the Socialist International.
However, the identification between Israel and social democracy has recently 
deteriorated. Rubinstein suggests that two particular developments underpin this shift. 
First, the view of the Palestinians as victims of Israeli policy that challenged the 
conception of Israel as the state of a persecuted minority. Second, the growing 
influence of what he describes as extreme socialist elements in the social democratic 
parties combined with a decline of consensus politics and economic affluence in the 
1970s." Changes in Israeli policy also contributed to this deterioration, including the 
disenfranchisement of Palestinians living in the occupied territories and the rise of the 
Likud right, which adopted a series of uncompromising policies in the West Bank and 
Gaza and annexed the Golan Heights.
49 W istrich in W istrich ed., 1979:11-12.
^ R u bin stein , 1982:103-104.
O vendale, 1989:242.
^ R u bin stein , 1982:112-113.
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This picture of the social democratic left is based on impression rather than 
systematic research. Compared with the work done on the marxist left, few scholars 
have looked carefully at the mainstream left’s attitude towards zionism and Israel in 
the post-state period. Only a single volume considers the Labour Party and zionism in 
a methodical and detailed way, looking at Labour's policy in the post First World War
53
period and through various crises until 1948. Gorny provides an account of the 
views of various strands of the party: the leadership, from Arthur Henderson to 
Clement Attlee; the Fabians through a consideration of the Webbs; and the Labour 
left, including the ILP. A critical limitation of this volume is its failure to grapple 
with the moral and political issues at stake for the Labour Party in its assessment of 
zionism and the genuine sense of dilemma within the labour movement over the
54conflicting claims to Palestine. Indeed, most of the literature on socialism and 
zionism has failed to understand just how perplexing the Israel/Arab conflict has been 
for the left.
This failure has created a climate of polemicism rather than reasoned research. 
For instance, Wistrich has gone as far as to say that:
'"anti-zionism" has...become an integral part of the 
political culture of the left as a whole, contaminating the 
mainstream social democratic parties, the trade unions, 
the liberal-left intelligentsia as well as the traditionally 
receptive student milieu'.
Rubinstein has asserted that:
‘the main enemies of the Jews and Israel are almost 
exclusively on the political left...Within the Western 
democracies, the main danger to contemporary Jewish 
interests comes from left-socialist anti-zionists, 
especially if they can wrest control of the social 
democratic parties’. ’
53 See Gorny, 1983.
54 Lockman, 1984:135-136.
33 W istrich in W istrich ed., 1990:49.
Rubinstein, 1982:77.
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The starting-point of these studies is that zionism has a monopoly over justice 
whereas Palestinian nationalism has no legitimate basis.57 Billig’s contribution to the 
debate is a notable exception to this pattern.58
In the 1940s, socialists were confronted with two movements for national self- 
determination: Jewish and Arab. The question of Palestine divided the left in an 
unprecedented manner and cut across the division between colonialists and anti-
59
colonialists. As the Israel/Arab conflict intensified, especially in the post-1967 
period, the dilemmas facing the left were sharpened. Sartre has succinctly expressed 
this sense of predicament. As a result of his experience of the war, Sartre strongly
identified with the Jews. He reported his horror at anti-semitism in a short book on
60the question. However, the Algerian national liberation movement also made him 
sensitive to the Arab cause. When the 1967 war broke out, Sartre felt torn by a sense 
of conflicting loyalties and he suggested that the conflict had paralysed the left. He 
dealt with this tension by devoting an entire volume of Les Temps Modemes to the 
hostilities and placing the opposing views of the Jews and Arabs side by side. 
However, Sartre still concluded that the two cases were virtually irreconcilable.6'
This brief review of the literature on the left, zionism and the Arab/Israel conflict 
shows the need for a systematic account of the social democratic left’s attitudes. With 
obvious exceptions such as the material on the Soviet Union and the PCF, the existing 
literature has focused principally on left-wing groups and movements that are not part 
of mainstream politics. The marxist and new left play a vital role in bringing issues 
on to the political agenda, but their main goal is not to obtain office. These groups are 
relatively free to give full rein to their ideological position. What about left-wing 
parties that are ideologically committed to socialist principles but also constrained by 
their objective to gain power? How have they dealt with the dilemmas posed by the 
Israel/Arab conflict? Has there been a shift in the social democratic left’s ideas and if 
so, what are the dynamics behind the change?
The Labour Party, like other socialist parties and groups, has a deeply rooted 
ideological tradition of internationalism. Labour's attitude towards international
7,1 See for exam ple, W istrich in W istrich ed., I979:viii-xi.
58 See B illig , 1984a; 1984b.
59 H ow e, 1993:148-149.
60 Sartre, 1948.
61 Les Temps M odem es, V o l.22 .3 , 1967.
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issues cannot simply be read off Marx or other classical socialists. Movements as 
diverse as liberalism, Fabianism and r'lethodism influenced Labour thought.62 
Nevertheless classical socialism’s affect on the party has not been insignificant. 
Labour was a member of the Second International in the early 1900s. It later became 
a member of the Socialist International. First formed in 1923 and then reformed in 
1951 after its wartime postponement, the Socialist International was based on 
reformist rather than revolutionary principles, having a membership of social 
democratic parties. Nevertheless, Labour tried to develop a distinctively socialist 
approach to foreign affairs that incorporated the principles of internationalism, 
international working-class solidarity, anti-imperialism and pacifism.63 The view that 
socialist principles should govern international policy as much as domestic policy has
64been an important part of Labour thought, constituting Labour's ethos in relation to 
international matters.
In practice, the party's ethos and the actual policies adopted or implemented 
when in office have often clashed. In the area of international affairs, Labour has 
traditionally been divided between those committed to a radical transformation of 
international relationships and those committed to a more pragmatic stand. This split 
has tended to reflect the cleavage between left and right.65 In the 1940s the Keep Left 
group put pressure on the Labour government to pursue socialist policies abroad. In 
the 1960s a younger generation of left-wing activists campaigned vigorously against 
aspects of Wilson’s foreign policy, especially his tacit support for American 
intervention in Vietnam. In both cases, the left felt that the leadership had abandoned 
the aim of pursuing a socialist agenda abroad. Whether the party's ethos is translated 
into policy at any given moment depends upon a variety of factors including whether 
Labour is in office, the particular balance of power held by the competing ideological 
strands, changes in the party's social base and an assessment of how British interests 
should be pursued.
62 Elliot, 1993:3.
63 Gordon, 1969: l-30;43 .
64 A ccording to Drucker the ideology o f  the Labour Party contains two dim ensions: doctrine and ethos. 
W hereas the party's doctrine refers to exp licitly  formulated policies, its ethos alludes to a set o f  values 
not alw ays spelled out (Drucker, 1979:8-9).
65 Seyd, 1987:2.
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From the end of the Second World War, Labour's approach to international 
affairs has gone through several radical phases. By radical I mean a commitment to 
the pursuit of specifically socialist principles, such as internationalism or anti­
colonialism. In the 1940s, Labour's radicalism was expressed in its commitment to 
decolonisation embodied most notably in the case of India. However, the party’s 
principled support for decolonisation was gradually undermined in the course of 
office, manifest chiefly in the government's desire to hold on to Britain’s non-Indian 
empire. The Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, thought about extending British control 
in parts of Africa and he wanted to strengthen Britain’s military and economic role in 
the Middle East.66 In the mid-1950s a more socialist approach to foreign affairs re- 
emerged. Despite Gaitskell’s hard-headed approach to international issues, as the 
Labour left gained strength and put pressure on the leadership to take on board some 
of its ideas, the party re-asserted its commitment to anti-colonialism. The campaign
67
against the Suez war was a clear example of this new trend.
The Wilson governments reverted to a more pragmatic approach, re-instituting 
the Atlanticism of other Labour leaders, manifest principally over Wilson’s reluctance 
to criticise American involvement in Vietnam. The leadership’s failure to condemn
the USA generated a good deal of internal criticism and contributed to the collapse of
68consensus politics in the 1970s and 1980s. In the early eighties the party embraced 
a new kind of radicalism in international affairs. Under the leadership of Michael 
Foot, Labour took on board a range of left-wing issues, including unilateral
69disarmament and opposition to American neo-imperialism. The party began to take 
up causes such as anti-racism, anti-apartheid and opposed American involvement in 
the Third World. This trend ended in the late 1980s when the new leadership tried to 
make the party more electable after Labour’s resounding defeat in 1983. How did 
shifts in Labour’s internal politics and approach to international affairs interact with 
its position on Zionism and the Israel/Arab conflict?
66
67 M organ, 1989:191-193.
68 Kavanagh and Morris, 1989:98-99.
Ibid: 102-103.
69
Ibid: 107-108.
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1.3 The Structure of the Thesis
This thesis principally considers the evolution of the Labour Party's position from the 
postwar period to the late 1980s. Using a narrative style, I look at Labour’s responses 
to four critical turning points in the history of the Middle East: the period surrounding 
the establishment of the Jewish state; the 1956 Suez war; the 1967 Arab/Israeli war 
and the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and its aftermath. I have chosen to organise the 
thesis around these events for two reasons. First, they triggered debate within the left. 
Second, they represent important turning-points in the history of the Israel/Arab 
conflict and called into question entrenched attitudes, forcing socialists to confront 
rival national claims. Although the 1973 war was important, I have not included it 
because the debates centred principally over the oil crisis rather than the rival 
nationalist claims. The study seeks to shed light on the way Labour’s ideology 
interacted with these developments and the process of policy formulation and 
ideological change. The thesis is divided into two parts. Part one examines Labour 
Party policy and part two considers the British Communist Party and the French left 
and ends with a general conclusion.
When Labour came to power in 1945 it was ostensibly committed to a process of 
decolonisation. Although ambivalent on the question of political change in the 
colonies, the party explicitly favoured Indian independence.70 Immediately before 
entering government, Labour was overwhelmingly committed to zionism,7' opposing 
the Conservatives’ restrictions on Jewish immigration into Palestine and supported the 
development of a Jewish state. Chapter two examines a number of issues. It 
considers the construction of a consensus of support for zionism and the way the party 
reconciled its anti-colonialist ethos with its pro-zionist position; the process by which 
Labour threw aside its commitment to zionism once in office, generating intra-party 
conflict as a consequence, and finally, the way the party reverted to its pro-zionist 
position in 1949-1951, this time in the form of a pro-Israel orientation.
By the time of the Suez war in 1956, Labour contained a strong current of 
anti-colonialist ideology, partly as a result of the rise of the left. The Movement for
70
H ow e, 1993:143.
71 Alderman, 1983:125.
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Colonial Freedom (MCF), formed in 1954, was dominated by Labour people. The 
organisation opposed the economic exploitation of the colonies and supported 
independence. The Labour left put pressure on the right to adopt a more critical 
approach to a range of foreign policy issues, including Atlanticism and American neo-
72  73
colonialism. Also by 1956, the party was a staunch supporter of the state of Israel. 
Given Labour’s anti-colonialist ideology, Israel's role in the war against Egypt 
represented a particular challenge. How did the party reconcile its identification with 
Israel with its part in the anti-war campaign? Chapter three looks at the way Labour 
resolved this challenge to its previous consensus of support for Israel, showing how 
this consensus was maintained despite the party's impassioned opposition to British 
and French military interventions in alliance with Israel. I also identify the sources of 
dissent that emerged as a result of the war and investigate their dynamics.
Labour’s ostensible commitment to decolonisation continued during the 1960s. 
Between 1964 and 1970 a number of countries gained independence, including
74Northern Rhodesia, the Gambia and British Guyana. At the time of the 1967 
Arab/Israeli war the party's identification with Israel was deeply entrenched. Wilson 
was notably pro-Israel and the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) was similarly 
inclined. Israel's role in the conflict, especially its decision to maintain a military 
occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights, provided a major 
challenge to this pro-Israel orientation, as did the rise of an independent Palestinian 
nationalism stimulated by the defeat of the Arab states.75 These developments forced 
Labour to confront the opposing claims of the rival nationalisms. Chapter four 
considers the way Labour leaders, MPs and factions dealt with the dilemmas raised by 
the war. Was the party able to stand by its identification with Israel while it was in 
government? Did the growing divisions within the party over foreign policy affect 
attitudes towards Israel? Did 1967 stimulate a break-down in Labour's consensus of 
support for Israel and if so, who were the key dissenters?
In the early 1980s, Labour’s approach to international issues was radicalised. 
The invasion of Lebanon in 1982 symbolised the rise of the right in Israel, taking
72 Kavanagh and Morris, 1989:98-99.
72 Kyle, 1991:89.
Kavanagh and Morris, 1989:100.
75 Ajam i, 1992:140-141.
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place under the government headed by Menachem Begin. Begin personified Israel's 
post-1977 shift to the right.76 The invasion seemed to unleash a torrent of left-wing 
anti-zionism in general. Chapter five explores how Labour responded to this further 
challenge to its pro-Israel tradition and the tensions that resulted from the invasion. It 
investigates how a new consensus emerged around support for Palestinian national 
rights. It identifies the major sources of the movement for Palestinian national rights 
within the party and assesses the movement’s success in getting Labour to adopt a 
pro-Palestinian platform. It asks whether sections of the Labour Party, like other 
strands of the left, became anti-zionist or even anti-semitic. Finally, the chapter 
examines the ways in which the pro-Israel strand of the party tackled this new 
development and the eventual policy compromise.
A secondary aim is to compare Labour’s position with the British Communist 
Party’s and the French left’s. I have chosen these comparisons mainly because the 
existing literature tends to neglect differences over Israel within and between left- 
wing parties and groups. With respect to the communist left, the literature assumes 
that its position was unchanging and static, determined by ideological heritage and 
Soviet policy. The question of whether the communist parties’ stance generated 
internal dissent and whether national political factors influenced their policy positions 
needs to be considered. For example, was the British party less circumscribed than 
the French party, given the former’s marginal position in the political system? With 
respect to the British/French comparison, the part played by its particular historical 
and political needs to be addressed. Did French socialists’ experience of Nazism 
produce a specific effect? Did the fact that France had a different colonial experience 
in the Middle East than Britain play a part in shaping left attitudes? Unlike in Britain, 
moreover, the French left has a history of fragmentation and rivalry between two large 
parties. Did this affect its approach to the Arab/Israel conflict?
Chapter six provides an account of the evolution of attitudes within the British 
Communist Party (CP). The CP has never been a major political force. After a brief 
spell of some popular sympathy in the 1930s and 1940s, its history had been 
characterised by a sharp decline in its membership and electoral base. Consequently, 
it has not constituted a serious rival to the Labour Party, a situation stemming partly
76 For a fuller account o f the subordination o f  the moderate strand o f  zionism  to the activist and 
fundam entalist strand see Shanin (1988:232-242).
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from the nature of the political system. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for 
including the party in this study. First, although the communists’ relationship with
78
Labour has been difficult, there have been significant links between the parties, 
operating principally through the trade unions and the constituency parties. Second, 
the CP’s relative distance from the formal political system provides the opportunity to 
delineate the effects of freedom from the political establishment on policy positions. 
Third, it is worthwhile including the CP for intrinsic reasons, namely, the historical tie 
between communism and the Jews.
The literature shows that the communists’ position on zionism, Israel and the 
Palestinians largely mirrored the Soviet Union’s and fundamental communist 
principles. However, following the chronology of the thesis, this chapter considers 
internal dissent over the question of zionism, Israel and the Palestinians and changes 
in the party's attitudes. Whereas in the case of the Labour Party there was a 
break-down in the consensus of support for zionism and Israel, the CP developed in a 
different direction. It ended up supporting Palestinian national rights but also 
adopting a more accommodating approach to Jewish nationalism for the first time. 
This chapter therefore focuses on the break-down in the consensus of opposition to 
zionism and Israel.
Chapter seven centres on the French left. The French left differs from the British 
left because it comprises two major parties, both competing for electoral support. The 
French Socialist Party started off as the Section Fran^ais de l’lnternationale Ouvriere 
(SFIO) in 1905 and ended up as the Parti Socialiste (PS), formed in 1969. Like the 
Labour Party, French socialists have a strong tradition of support for zionism and 
Israel. Leon Blum was actively involved in the Zionist effort to establish a Jewish 
state. In 1956 France allied itself with Israel in the war against Egypt under Guy 
Mollet’s socialist government. In 1967 the SFIO remained one of Israel’s strongest 
supporters. This consensus dramatically broke down in 1982, giving way to a 
significant pro-Palestinian current. Why did this break-down occur? How did the 
French socialists’ attitudes compare with Labour’s? Formed in 1920, the Parti 
Communiste Frangais (PCF) enjoyed considerable electoral support until the 1970s, 
and was a serious rival to the Socialist Party. As a member of the international
7R N ew ton, 1969:1.
See Pelling, 1991:49-54;79.
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communist movement, it persistently adopted an anti-zionist stand. In 1967, the two 
parties clashed over their respective responses to Israel's role in the war. Even so, was 
it the case that the PCF's position never changed? Was the PCF’s ideology unaffected 
by the constraints imposed by its incorporation into the formal political process? 
Chapter seven examines the evolution of the French left’s approach to Israel. In 
chapter eight, the conclusion, I describe the main themes concerning changes in the 
left’s attitudes and then go on to draw some conclusions about the theoretical question 
of policy change in political parties.
1.4 A Note on Research Method, Terminology and Sensitivity
The nature of the research topic and the kinds of questions asked should direct the 
way the researcher conducts her research. This study’s focus on policy and attitude 
change over time led me towards qualitative documentary research. Pre-existing 
documents of the parties under investigation were the only means by which I could 
access past policy positions and trends within the left’s attitude towards Israel. My 
sources included both published and unpublished documents such as conference 
reports, biographies, political diaries, party newspapers and journals, parliamentary
79
reports and Early Day Motions (EDMs), interviews and internal policy
80
documentation where available or appropriate. The problems associated with
archival research are numerous. Unlike other forms of research, such as questionnaire
81
surveys, it does not generate evidence but depends upon finding it. This gives rise to 
a series of difficulties, including: document availability, sampling problems when
confronted with a profusion of documents and making inferences from documents
82
other than their factual statements. Moreover, once documents have been dug out,
83
they can turn out to be ‘unyieldingly barren’.
During the course of my research, I encountered some of these difficulties. 
Formal government rules, such as the thirty-year rule, meant that I had no access to
79
An EDM  is a parliamentary m em ber’s motion for which no date has been fixed for debate and, in 
m ost cases, never gets debated. Its function is to record m em bers’ opinion and to canvass support from  
PJher mem bers (Factsheet N o. 30, Early Day M otions, Public Information O ffice).
See appendix one. 
g7 Goldthorpe, 1991:213-214.
8“ Platt, 1981 a:33.
G oldsw orthy, 1971:4-5.
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Cabinet documents on the 1967 hostilities and the subsequent conflicts. Moreover, 
although the Labour government’s Palestine policy in the 1940s has been well 
researched, some relevant documents have not been released on the grounds of
84
sensitivity. The Labour Party itself operates a fifteen-year rule covering its internal 
documentation, which meant that documents relating to the early 1980s were 
unavailable. I also came across incomplete archives. Neither Labour Friends of 
Israel (LFI) nor the Labour Middle East Council (LMEC) appeared to have complete 
records of their membership over the years, prohibiting a systematic analysis of trends 
in participation in these organisations. The British CP’s archives, moreover, turned 
up some interesting internal documentation relating to the 1956 crisis, but very little 
on the other wars. Rather dubiously, the PCF claimed that it had no internal 
documents whatsoever relating to Israel. Dryness was another problem. It was not 
unusual to trawl through several years’ conference reports from the Labour Party, 
TUC or Labour Women, only to discover no reference at all to Israel. Alternatively 
the references were sometimes very dull. After discovering ‘Israel’ in the index to one 
of Tony Benn’s diaries, I was disappointed only to find that Benn had had ‘a long talk
85
with Messaoud about Israel’. Such experiences were not atypical.
These difficulties in turn gave rise to the question of bias and the plausibility of 
inferences. I tried to resolve these problems by using a plurality of sources in the 
hope that a consistent picture of party attitudes and policies would emerge. With this 
in mind, I interviewed some people directly involved in the parties’ debates over Israel 
and, although they came from different perspectives, some consistency in their 
accounts of policy changes did emerge. With respect to the Labour Party in particular, 
I carried out a quantitative analysis of EDM signatures to show trends in the PLP’s
attitudes. The use of EDMs is itself problematic, with parliamentary members signing
86them sometimes in an arbitrary way. Nevertheless, groups of MPs have tended to
87
unite around particular issues. My own use of them certainly confirmed my 
perception of opinion changes towards Israel derived from other sources.
84
Stephen Bird, Labour Party archivist, M useum o f Labour History. 
86 Benn, 1987:83.
g7 Berrington, 1973:6-11; Norton, 1981:89.
Berrington, 1973:7-9.
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A further issue that needs to be addressed here is the use of the categories pro- 
Israel or pro-Arab in this study. I attribute a 'pro-zionist/Israel' category to individuals 
or groups who show a slightly more favourable attitude towards Israel than to the 
Palestinians or a definite sympathy in this direction. This orientation may be 
expressed in assertions about Israel's right to exist, opposition to pro-Palestinian 
elements in the party and opposition to recognition of the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO). A ‘pro-Arab/Palestinian’ label is attributed to those individuals 
or groups who show some sympathy for Arab and Palestinian national goals. This 
may be expressed in criticism of Israel's policies with respect to the Arab countries or 
the occupied territories, outright anti-zionism or declarations of support for 
Palestinian statehood and for the PLO. Such a simple classification obviously 
obscures subtle differences in positions within both strands. It lumps Michael Foot 
and David Watkins together as pro-Palestinian but obscures the fact that their views 
are different in important respects. However, it is justified on the grounds that it gives 
a feel for shifts in opinion. In fact, I have used these categories throughout the study 
and in different contexts. The categories are useful only as summaries and I have 
drawn out the more subtle distinctions in the text.
Finally, the sensitivity of the topic being examined should be considered.
Research takes place in a political context, either institutional or interpersonal, which
88can affect the outcome of the work. According to Lee and Renzetti, a topic is 
sensitive when it is potentially threatening to the researcher or the researched or both
89
and when this has problematic consequences in relation to the research. The 
sensitive nature of the topic in this study certainly had serious repercussions for the 
outcome of the project. As a researcher who did not belong to any of the 
constituencies being studied (I am neither Palestinian, Jewish nor a member of any 
political organisation), I had been unprepared for the consequences of tackling the 
issue. My motives for engaging in the research were constantly questioned, with some 
direct implications for access to crucial material. For example, Poale Zion refused to 
allow me access to its internal documentation on the grounds that the question being 
addressed in my thesis was 'too fundamental'. A Palestinian who worked closely with 
the labour movement in Britain said that he would give me access to campaigning
Bell and N ew by, 1977:10.
89 Renzetti and Lee, eds., 1993:5.
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activities amongst the constituency parties only if I allowed him to read my work first 
of all. Finally, a former editor of the Tribune newspaper, who had agreed to provide 
me with material on contacts between the newspaper and Palestinians, became less co­
operative after I indicated that my interest in the topic had originally been motivated 
by an interest in the relationship between anti-zionism and anti-semitism. I do not 
blame these organisations or individuals for their defensive attitudes. Given the way 
people unsympathetic to their goals can exploit their respective positions, they are 
entirely understandable.
More importantly, however, the sensitivity of the topic was manifest in the way I 
often felt that I was walking on a tightrope in my efforts not to offend either Jews or 
Palestinians, or sometimes even the left. In relation to the first two groups, the effect 
of reading, firstly an account of the suffering of the Jews under Nazism and then an 
account of the problems experienced by the Palestinians, was very disorientating. I 
have tried to resolve the dilemmas raised as a result of dealing with a topic such as 
this by being as neutral as possible. Part of this has been achieved by describing the 
views of the left instead of entering into the debates that rage over the nature of 
zionism, Israel and the Palestinians. However, even description can be infused with 
values and I do not deny that some of the accounts could seem biased. In conclusion, 
although I have been systematic and rigorous in my treatment of data, I do not pretend 
that the story I tell will be complete and impartial. This is for two reasons. Firstly,
90the thesis is based primarily on 'relics of the past' with all their attendant difficulties. 
Secondly, the sensitive nature of the topic has limited the possibility of total 
impartiality.
90 Goldthorpe, 1991:213.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF
ISRAEL
The conflicting aspirations of the Jews and the Arabs in the period leading up to the 
formation of Israel were a problem for Labour. For the Jews, Palestine was to be the 
national home promised by the Balfour Declaration in 1917.' The country offered a 
territorial basis, rich with historic and religious symbolism, for a distinctive national 
identity and freedom from persecution. For the Arabs, Palestine was to be the 
independent Arab state promised by the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement.2 Zionism was not 
a straightforward form of colonialism, representing an oppressed people’s nationalist 
aims.3 Nevertheless, as far as the Palestinian Arabs were concerned, Jewish 
colonisation of Palestine represented an unwanted 'import'4 at a time when the Middle 
East sought independence from external domination. Both movements therefore 
appealed to the party’s support for national self-determination and anti-colonialism.5 
Having a long internationalist tradition that was radicalised in the early 1940s with a 
demand for full social, political and economic rights for colonial peoples,6 Labour came 
to power in 1945 committed in principle to anti-colonialism and decolonisation.7
In this chapter I shall consider, first, the construction of a consensus of support for 
zionism and why Labour identified with Jewish national aspirations over the Arabs’. 
Second, I shall discuss the collapse of this consensus in the post-1945 government and 
the leadership's adoption of a pro-Arab policy. Finally, I shall look at the resulting intra­
party conflict and the re-emergence of a consensus of support for zionism in the 
leadership's gradual acceptance of the new Jewish state.
1 Laqueurand Rubin, eds., 1984:17-18.
2 Ib id:12.
3 See Shanin in Halliday and A lavi, eds., 1988:222-255.
4 Said, 1992:57.
5 H ow e, 1993:149.
6 Ibid: 138.
7 See Gordon, 1969.
32
2.1 The Construction of a Consensus of Support for Zionism
Despite the d i f f i c u l t  nature of the Jewish/Arab conflict, there is not much evidence 
that Labour did a lot of soul-searching over the rival nationalist movements in the period 
running up to the 1945 general election. As Denis Healey recalls, the labour movement 
was 'overwhelmingly pro-zionist' by the end of the Second World War.8 Between 1936 
and 1945, the party’s annual conference repeatedly confirmed its support for a Jewish 
national home or state.9 Successive TUC conferences also accepted this policy, arguing 
for Jewish refugees to be admitted to Palestine.10 Although the Labour leader, Clement 
Attlee, was personally anti-zionist, believing that this particular nationalist movement 
was irrational and romantic, he publicly endorsed Labour’s pro-zionist policy in 1945." 
Right-wing members of the leadership like Hugh Dalton and Herbert Morrison were 
pro-zionist. Even Bevin backed Zionist goals during the war. On the left, Arthur Creech 
Jones,12 Aneurin Bevan and Richard Crossman strongly supported Jewish nationalist 
aims. The radical left also favoured the establishment of a Jewish state. The leader of 
the Socialist League, Stafford Cripps, welcomed Jewish developments in Palestine as a 
just response to Germany’s persecution of the Jews.13 Fenner Brockway and most of the 
Independent Labour Party defended Zionist goals.14 Labour Women also supported the 
construction of a Jewish national home in Palestine.15 Why, given the party’s 
commitment to anti-colonialist politics, did it choose so overwhelmingly to support 
Jewish aims over Arab ones?
One of the reasons was Labour’s political identification with zionism. Seeing the 
Jewish nationalist movement as a progressive form of nationalism, the party 
incorporated it into its anti-colonialist vision. An important aspect of Labour’s attitude 
towards colonialism was based on social engineering or 'modernising imperialism'.16
8 H ealey, 1989:90.
9 Alderman, 1983:124-125.
10 Ibid: 124; 128; Levenberg, 1945:198-19 9 ;2 6 0 -2 6 1.
11 Gorny, 1983:131 ;206-207.
12 Colonial Secretary, 1946-1950.
13 Gorny, 1983:152-153.
14 Ibid: 185-187.
13 The L abour Woman, Septem ber 1937:136-137.
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Leading party members saw zionism as a means by which the Middle East region could 
be modernised. Dalton, for example, believed that Jewish immigration into Palestine 
would facilitate the economic development of the area, largely through the introduction
I 7of advanced irrigation techniques. Labour’s Advisory Committee on Imperial 
Questions used these ideas in its internal policy documents.18 Even Bevin said that:
'there would be a great welcome for many more Jewish 
brains and ability throughout the Arab world. They 
possess the scientific, cultural and other abilities which 
the Middle East requires'.19
This attitude was not confined to the right. The Labour left’s identification with 
internationalism had previously made it sceptical about zionism. Non-zionist Jews like 
Lucjan Blit,20 who represented the Bund21 in London, influenced this faction. The Bund 
was a marxist and anti-zionist party that believed that the Jewish problem could be 
solved without resorting to a territorial solution.22 Nevertheless, the left began to believe 
that Jewish immigration would enhance the economic potential of Palestine. This
faction argued that the Middle East was a region of 'vital imperial communications'
which had been held back by 'a medieval land system', claiming that there was a need for 
a:
'unified development plan for the Middle East, based on 
irrigation, land reform and new industries...a sort of 
Tennessee Valley Authority for the whole Middle 
East...Into such a plan, Jewish colonisation in part of
Palestine...could be fitted without real difficulty'.23
Left-wingers felt that Jewish colonisation of Palestine would facilitate the development 
of that country, encourage industrial development and raise the Arabs’ standard of
17 Correspondence, Hugh Dalton to Herbert Morrison, 28 October 1944. Hugh Dalton’s Private Papers, 
File 8/1.
18 'Economic Approach to the Palestine Problem', International Department, N o. 276A , October 1944.
19 Labour Party, Foreign Affairs, 1946-1947:9.
20 Interview with M ichael Foot, 1 N ovem ber 1990.
21 The General Jewish Labour A lliance in Russia, Poland and Lithuania (Alderm an, 1983:53).
22 Alderman, 1983:53.
23 Tribune, 25 May 1945:8.
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living.24 They maintained that the Jews in Palestine were 'spiritually and physically 
virile, a progressive, civilised society' whose place in Palestine was of 'paramount 
importance in relation to the fate of democracy'.25 Indeed, many saw zionism as a 
revolutionary movement that would bring Palestine into the modem world. Reflecting 
on the dilemmas posed by the contending nationalisms, Crossman commented:
'Looking at the position of the Palestinian Arab, I had to 
admit that no other western colonist had done so little
harm. Arab patriotism and Arab self-respect had been
deeply affronted...by the development of a national home; 
but if  I believed in social progress, I had to admit that the 
Jews had set going revolutionary forces in the Middle 
East which, in the long run, would benefit the Arabs'.26
The ELP also supported Jewish immigration for this reason. Disaffiliated from Labour
in the early 1930s as a party committed to revolutionary politics,27 the ILP contained
ethical socialists28 like H.N. Brailsford and Fenner Brockway who both were principled 
anti-imperialists. However, they supported zionism on socialist grounds, with 
Brailsford enthusing about the movement’s potential for introducing socialism into the 
region and with Brockway welcoming the Jewish labour movement in Palestine as a 
‘constructive contribution to socialism’.29
Developments in Palestine reinforced this position. The Zionist movement was 
politically heterogeneous, but contained two basic elements: the fundamentalist strand 
represented by the revisionists and the moderate or liberal strand including people like 
Chaim Weizmann and Labour Zionists. Based on the principle of nationalist exclusivity, 
the Revisionist Party30 led by Jabotinsky adopted a maximalist position towards the 
Jewish state, opposing any co-operation with the Arabs. In contrast, the moderate strand 
was based on more universalist principles and favoured co-operative policies. These
24 Tribune, 25 May 1945:8.
25 Tribune, 31 July 1942:8.
26 Crossman, 1946:176; my emphasis.
27 Foote, 1986:151.
28 Ibid: 17.
29 Gorny, 1983:154-155.
30 The R evisionist Party was formed in 1925 in opposition to Chaim W eizm ann’s and labour Zionism’s 
practical approach to the establishment o f a Jewish state (Lucas, 1974:131).
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two elements were in conflict in the period running up to Israel’s formation, however, 
the moderates dominated both the international Zionist movement and Palestine Jewry. 
This situation stemmed from the social characteristics of Palestine Jewry. In the pre­
state era, the majority of the Palestine Jewish community was from eastern Europe and 
steeped in socialist traditions.31 The Labour Zionist party, Mapai, which was formed in 
1930 and led by David Ben-Gurion, dominated institutions in Palestine such as the 
quasi-governmental Jewish Agency in the 1940s. Moreover, organisations like the 
Histadrut (the General Federation of Jewish Workers) were integral to the state-building 
process.32 This situation produced an alliance between the Palestine zionist movement 
and the British labour movement. Ian Mikardo believed that the 'great friendship' 
between Labour and Israel was based on the fact that:
'Israel, the Yishuv, [had been] started by people who had 
immigrated to Israel mostly from eastern Europe, not 
entirely but mostly, with socialist ideals. Hence the 
formation of the Kibbutzim...the whole of the leadership 
of the Yishuv, virtually the whole...was of the left - Ben- 
Gurion, Eshkol, Golda Meir...and all the ideologues'.33
For people like Bevan and other left-wingers in particular, the idea that Jewish 
settlement of Palestine was a socialist enterprise was important: 'for these people
[Bevan, Foot and others], those Jews in Palestine were socialists...socialists were 
creating Israel. The Labour left could not help but be excited'.34
Moreover, the wartime atrocities against the Jews gave zionism a moral 
legitimacy. Dalton adopted zionism as a 'personal cause' after his experience of the 
war,35 claiming that the case for a limitation on Jewish immigration into Palestine had 
collapsed in the face of the 'cold and calculated German Nazi plan to kill all Jews in 
Europe', and the 'horror of the Hitlerite atrocities'.36 The war also profoundly affected 
Bevan. When he became the editor of Tribune he appointed Jon Kimche and the former
31 This account derives from Shanin in Halliday and A lavi, eds., 1988:222-229.
32 See Lucas, 1974:119-138,456.
33 Interview with Ian Mikardo, 1 May 1990.
34 Interview with Richard Clem ents, 19 May 1990.
35 Pimlott, 1985:389-390.
36 Dalton, 1957:426.
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German Social Democrat and anti-Nazi refugee, Evelyn Anderson,37 as his chief 
assistants.38 As a result of the Nazi crimes, the left believed that the Jews’ claim to 
Palestine was morally justified, contending that their right to Palestine lay:
'not only from an urge to act as a nation state, but perhaps 
even more from a primeval desire for a place where they 
[the Jews] can settle down and feel sure that in a few 
years they will not be treated as "aliens" and hounded 
out..:.39
Crossman reasoned that anti-semitism had prevented the Jews from committing 
themselves wholeheartedly to either Jewish nationalism or to assimilation and that anti­
semitism provided the historical justification for zionism. For Crossman, ‘history, 
reaching its climax in the Nazi persecutions, had made these few survivors of the Polish, 
Hungarian and Rumanian Jewish communities into the members of a Jewish nation'.40 
Other left-wingers like Harold Laski converted to zionism after the war. As a marxist 
and Jewish, Laski had objected to the idea that Jews were a separate national group, 
envisaging a world with "'neither Jew nor Gentile, bondman nor free'".41 After the Nazi 
genocide of the Jews, he began to attend Poale Zion meetings,42 and in early 1945 Laski 
said that he felt like 'a prodigal son returning home'. Rejecting his earlier view that 
religion was the opium of the masses and his belief in Jewish assimilation, Laski 
became 'firmly and utterly convinced of the need for the rebirth of the Jewish nation in 
Palestine'.43
The war created a groundswell of sympathy for zionism throughout the labour 
movement. Parties in areas with a significant Jewish community such as Finchley and 
Friem Barnet, North Hackney, the City of Leeds Labour Party, Central Leeds CLP and 
Lewisham Central Labour Party and Trades Council made a considerable contribution to 
this 44 The North Eastern Federation of the Labour Party at Newcastle Upon Tyne
37 Jenkins, 1979:37;Crick, 1982:445.
38 Foot, 1962:302.
39 Tribune , 17 N ovem ber 1944:1-2; see also Tribune , 9 April 1943:10.
40 Crossman, 1946:175.
41 Martin, 1953:207; see also Kramnick and Sheerman, 1993: 4;54.
42 Kramnick and Sheerman, 1993:462.
43 Jew ish C hronicle, 11 May 1945:10. See also Kramnick and Sheerman, 1993 :476 -477 .
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unanimously passed a resolution which endorsed the demand that the Jewish Agency be 
given authority to develop to the full capacity of Palestine to absorb immigrants and 
called upon the NEC to combat anti-semitism.45 The Liverpool Labour Party and 
Trades Union Council pledged 'the wholehearted support of the Labour movement in the 
fight against anti-Semitism and for safeguarding the Jewish future in Palestine'46
Moreover, there was a political alliance between Labour and the Jews. Jews who 
came to Britain in the late nineteenth century brought with them not only zionism, but 
also socialism and trade unionism. These east European immigrants concentrated in 
urban areas such as London’s East End, parts of Manchester and Leeds, forming a 
significant Jewish working class. The socialist zionist organisation, Poale Zion, 
developed out of this population and affiliated to Labour in 1920, introducing leading 
Labour politicians such as Ramsay MacDonald to the movement in Palestine.47 In the 
mid-1930s, the Jewish community increasingly turned away from the Liberal Party 
towards Labour. This shift occurred partly because of the Liberals’ decline, but also 
because of the Jews’ economic position. Alderman has suggested that by this time 
Labour ‘had become the normal political home of the mass of poor working class Jews 
in Great Britain’ and probably of many middle class Jews too.48
In the run-up to the 1945 general election, political opportunism played a part in 
Labour’s pro-zionist platform.49 The party, especially the leadership, saw that it was 
politically advantageous to adopt a pro-zionist position. The concentration of Jews in 
particular parliamentary constituencies opened up the way for a situation of mutual 
electoral rewards.50 Labour candidates in areas with a high number of Jewish 
constituents made very explicit appeals to the Jewish vote. In Hackney North, for 
example, Harry Goodrich took great pains to inform the Jewish community of Labour's 
pro-zionist stand.51 Two Jewish candidates stood for constituencies with substantial 
Jewish electorates: Maurice Orbach for East Willesden and David Weitzman for Stoke
45 Jew ish Telegraphic A gency, London, 15 Septem ber 1943.
46 Jew ish Telegraphic A gency, London, 22 N ovem ber 1943.
47 A lderm an, 1983:55-65.
48 Ibid: 115.
49 Ibid: 124-125.
50 See L aw son, ed., 1980:14.
51 Jew ish  Chronicle, 29 June 1945:1.
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Newington.52 Orbach made his sympathy for the Zionist cause known at a meeting 
organised by the Barcai Zionist Society.53 Both candidates won their seats, although it is 
not certain that their victory resulted from Jewish votes or the party’s pro-zionist 
credentials. Candidates who tried to court Jewish voters in Hendon South and 
Prestwich54 failed to win their seats.55 Just before the election the Labour leadership 
tried to influence Jewish opinion. In May 1945, Dalton declared at the party conference 
that it was 'morally wrong and politically indefensible to restrict the entry of Jews 
desiring to go [to Palestine].56 Attlee had always objected to 'the reconsolidation of 
Jewish nationalism on a political basis'.57 However, in the period before the election, he 
emphasised that Labour was the party which would enable the Jews to fulfil their 
nationalist ambitions. From the other side, Poale Zion acted as a 'powerful pressure 
group’ in the labour movement.58 In the period running up to the election, it mobilised 
electoral support for Labour by stressing the party’s Palestine policy.59 Non-socialist 
organisations such as the Leeds Zionist Council, the General Election Bureau of the 
New Zionist Organisation in Great Britain60 and the Jewish press61 also informed Jewish 
voters of the record of the respective parties on zionism, suggesting that to vote Labour 
was to vote for Jewish interests.
These factors combined to put Arab nationalism at a disadvantage. Unlike 
zionism, Arab nationalism had no ideological or political ties with Labour. Left-wing 
movements, either socialist or communist, have traditionally played only a marginal role 
in Arab nationalism and nationalist movements such as Nasser’s have tended to be anti­
communist in theory and in practice, implementing severely repressive policies to deal 
with communist elements.62 In the 1940s pan-Arabists based in Syria made appeals to 
socialist principles, but their socialism was ‘vague and mild’.63 Healey has remarked
52 Alderman, 1983:126-127.
53 Jew ish  C hronicle, 29 June 1945:1.
54 Jew ish  C hronicle, 29 June 1945:1.
x5 See Alderman, 1983:127.
56 Jewish Chronicle, 18 May 1945:1.
57 Gorny, 1983:137.
58 Alderman, 1992:315.
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that Labour’s overriding pro-zionism sprang partly from the fact that neither the party 
nor the trade unions knew much about the Arab countries and that there were no 
socialist movements in the Middle East to draw attention to the Arab case.64 It was not 
until the rise of Nasser and Ba’athism in the 1950s and 1960s that Arab nationalism 
began significantly to draw on socialist ideals and to make inroads into western liberal 
or left opinion.
Nor did the Arabs have the moral legitimacy zionism enjoyed, resulting from the 
Arab states’ role in the war. As a result of the German occupation of France, Syria and 
Lebanon came under Vichy control and in 1941 Iraq became 'pro-Axis'.6S The British 
wartime government, which included a number of Labour figures such as Attlee, Dalton, 
Morrison and Bevin, was eager to check pro-German feeling in Arab countries and 
engaged in considerable propaganda of a dubious quality to this end.66 Moreover, 
during the war thousands of British troops were stationed in the Middle East. At the 
time, constituents’ views on foreign and colonial affairs significantly constrained Labour 
MPs’ positions. People like Bevan almost certainly took account of popular feeling on 
this issue. Tribune for instance, made a clear link between the Arab states’ behaviour in 
the war and a refusal to recognise Arab demands. It suggested that the rival claims to 
Palestine had to be understood in terms of the Arabs' record against Britain and its allies:
'In the present war the Arab leaders, the Mufti, Rashid Ali 
(both now in Berlin), and their gang have sold themselves 
for cash to Mussolini, who exterminated thousands of 
their Libyan co-religionists. They have also sold 
themselves to Hirohito...Hitler's agents were more 
difficult to trace, but we know there were many, 
including some of the most prominent Arabs'.67
Moreover, a fundamental ambivalence in Labour’s thought on colonial issues,68 
shaped the party’s understanding of Arab nationalism. Labour’s anti-colonialism was
64 H ealey, 1989:90.
65 O vendale, 1992:15-17.
66 The G uardian , 8 September 1994:22.
67 Tribune, 10 December 1943:11.
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‘fragmentary’ and ‘fragile’69 and confronted with the rival nationalist movements, this 
fragility came to the surface. Said has shown that west European colonialism in the 
Middle East and North Africa produced a belief system which conceptualised Arabs as 
backward, feudalistic and reactionary, lasting well into the post-Second World War 
period.70 In relation to the Palestinian Arabs in particular, colonial history rendered 
them invisible. Although Palestine contained a sizeable Arab population, which, as a 
result of living under Ottoman rule and then the British mandate, had a significant 
national consciousness, western politicians persistently denied the validity of this 
consciousness.71 Despite having achieved paradigmatic status in the study of non- 
European history,72 Said has been accused of being theoretically inconsistent73 and of 
overstating his case.74 Although these comments have some purchase, Said’s insights 
are of considerable empirical value and applicable to the case of the Labour Party, many 
of whose members succumbed to these popular images of Arabs.
For prominent party members, Arab nationalism did not have the same status as 
Jewish ones on a number of levels: economic, political and moral. Labour spokespeople 
on colonial affairs regarded the Arabs as backward and feudalistic. Arthur Creech 
Jones75 was fairly progressive on colonial affairs, having links with organisations such as 
the Anti-Slavery Society and the Fabian Colonial Bureau.76 However, he did not extend 
his empathy for colonial peoples to the Arabs, portraying the conflict over Palestine as 
one ‘between the new order for which the Jews stand in Palestine and the crumbling 
feudal system for which a few rich Arab landlords stand'.77 The extra-parliamentary left 
similarly viewed the Arab/Jewish conflict in terms of the Arabs’ cultural, technological 
and political backwardness, saying that:
‘the great majority of the Arabs does not really know
what Democracy stands for...They were allowed to be led
69 M organ, 1994:40.
70 Said, 1985:15-19.
71 Said, 1992:11-19.
72 O ’Hanlon and W ashbrook, 1992:141.
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by a few half-educated landowners and greedy politicians 
who soon enough made their contacts with Fascism.
Rashid Ali of Iraq, Haj Amin of Palestine, and Ahmed 
Maher of Egypt, are not unrepresentative specimens of 
the Arab ruling classes.78
Labour was largely ignorant of the Palestinian people’s aspirations. Leading Labour 
figures took no account of the Palestinians’ views on Jewish immigration or their 
identification with Palestine. Dalton proposed a total transfer of the Palestinians 
suggesting that 'the Arabs be encouraged to move out, as the Jews move in', a policy 
which he thought would make the Palestinians happier.79 This proposal was not merely 
an expression of Dalton's idiosyncrasy. Labour’s annual conference unanimously 
accepted the policy in 1944.80 Moreover, the Labour left shared these ideas. In 'A 
Palestine Munich?', Richard Crossman and Michael Foot envisaged the transfer of the 
Palestinians from certain parts of Palestine. They claimed that this policy would give 
the Palestinians Transjordan citizenship making them 'as they demand, citizens of an 
Arab state'.81
So, by the time of the 1945 general election Labour was, for a number of reasons, 
overwhelmingly supportive of the Zionist aim to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. 
Despite its commitment to anti-colonialism, it had very little sympathy for Arab 
nationalist aspirations. In July 1945 Labour entered office with an impressive electoral 
victory, having gained nearly twice as many seats as the Conservatives. The extent of 
the victory produced a new optimism within the party, raising hopes for radical reforms 
in both domestic and international policy. With Ernest Bevin as Foreign Secretary, the 
party believed that the government would break with past traditions and create a new 
international order based on stability and peace. Bevin dominated nearly all aspects of 
the government’s foreign policy, including Palestine.82 In the following section, I shall 
look at what happened when Labour won office.
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2.2 The Government and Palestine83
Despite this groundswell of sympathy for Jewish nationalist aims and opposition to Arab 
nationalism, the new government’s policies broke sharply with the party’s pre-election 
commitments. Immediately after taking up his new position as Foreign Secretary, Bevin 
told Attlee, ‘we’ve got it wrong. W e’ve got to think again.’84 As soon as Labour came 
to power, the leadership decided not to repeal the central clauses of the 1939 White 
Paper, opposition to which was central to Labour's pre-1945 stand.85 In November, the 
government announced the establishment of an Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry 
to investigate the conditions of Jewish refugees in Europe and the potential for mass 
Jewish immigration to Palestine. In 1946, the Commission recommended the 
immediate immigration of one hundred thousand Jewish D.P.s in Germany, a policy 
sanctioned by President Truman.86 Despite the PLP’s support for the Commission’s 
proposals, Attlee and Bevin ignored its recommendations.87 In February 1947, Bevin 
told the Commons that the government intended to hand the Palestine Mandate back to 
the United Nations. The leadership later refused to support the UN's proposal for 
Palestine’s partition.88 Finally, in contrast to America's decision immediately to grant 
Israel de facto recognition on its formation, the Labour government refused to recognise 
the new state. Even some of Zionism's most outspoken supporters in the leadership, 
such as Dalton and Herbert Morrison, sanctioned the anti-zionist policy.89 Creech 
Jones, who felt great sympathy for the aims of moderate zionism, accepted Bevin's 
position.90 Why did Labour, once in power, deviate so sharply from its pre-election 
stand?
Opponents of the government's policy have explained the departure from party 
policy in terms of Bevin's personal antagonism towards Jews. Crossman, Mikardo and
83 The Labour government's Palestine policy has been thoroughly documented (Bullock, 1983; Gorny, 
1983; Louis, 1984; Morgan, 1989). I shall therefore provide only a brief account o f  the policy.
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Jon Kimche all believed that anti-semitism played a part.91 Other commentators have 
been more cautious. Morgan ambivalently suggested that Bevin was not anti-semitic 
but 'without doubt emotionally prejudiced against the Jew s'/2 While Louis denied that 
Bevin was anti-Jewish at all.93 Nevertheless, the Palestine conflict did bring out Bevin's 
(in particular) anti-Jewish ideas. In a contradictory way, anti-semitism has traditionally 
portrayed Jews as both capitalists and communists. It has also put forward a theory of a 
world-wide Jewish conspiracy and presented Jews as excessively powerful. Bevin drew 
on these traditional stereotypes. According to Kimche:
'Bevin found often that his bitterest opponents in the 
union were communists who happened to be Jews or 
Jews who happened to be communists. Either way, the 
connection became firmly planted in his mind'.94
Bevin also appeared to believe in a Jewish conspiracy, claiming that the Jews were 
involved in a world conspiracy against Britain.95 The Foreign Secretary explained the 
outcome of the 1948 Arab/Israeli war in terms of the role of 'international Jewry'.96 He 
also made anti-Jewish jokes, attributing America's pro-zionist policy to the 'purest of 
motives': the fact that the Americans 'did not want too many Jews in New York'.97 He 
was also offensive about Jewish members of the party, claiming that the idea of a Jewish 
state gave him nightmares of 'thousands and thousands of Harold Laskis pursuing him 
down the road'.98 Even the party's most prominent pro-zionists held anti-Jewish 
attitudes. Dalton, for example, was 'a Zionist who could lapse into anti-Semitism',99 
referring to Laski as an 'under-sized Semite' and mocking him for his left-wing 
'yideology'.100 These examples reveal a deeply rooted ambivalence towards Jews even
91 Crossman, 1960:69; Kim che, 1960:21-22; Mikardo, 1988:4.
92 M organ, 1989:208.
93 L ouis, 1984:384.
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amongst people who were philosemitic. Herbert Morrison showed this clearly when he 
said that:
'I have met many Jews in many countries. I know the 
London Jews very well. But the Palestinian Jews were to 
me different; so different that a large proportion of them 
were not obviously Jews at all',101
implicitly introducing a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable Jews. It is 
therefore clear that leading Labour people succumbed to popular stereotypes of the Jews, 
confirming the thesis that anti-Jewish ideas are not restricted to actively racist groups.102 
Such ambivalence had a long history, evident in Ben Tillett’s, the nineteenth century 
unionist, qualification of his welcome to a group of Jewish immigrants as brothers with 
the remark that ‘we wish you had not come to this country’.103
However, it would be a mistake to conclude that these personal convictions 
dictated the government's policy. While the Palestine conflict exacerbated Bevin's anti- 
Jewishness, it is unlikely that anti-semitism determined his position. If this had been the 
case, one would have expected a consistently anti-zionist stand. In fact, Bevin’s attitude 
towards zionism was instrumental. He moved from a pro-zionist position to an anti- 
zionist position and back again to a pro-zionist one in a relatively short space of time. 
Like Attlee, Bevin tended to have personal reservations about Jewish nationalism, 
believing that the Jews were a religious group and not a nation. However, he adopted a 
utilitarian approach to the question and this explained his support for the movement in 
the late 1930s and early 1940s. As a member of Churchill’s wartime Cabinet, for 
example, Bevin was a ‘champion’ of the Zionist cause.104
Labour’s pro-zionist policy was constructed in the ‘luxury of opposition’,105 when 
its aim was above all to compete with the Conservatives. With respect to Jewish issues, 
Labour had been at a distinct advantage over the Conservative Party. However hard 
Churchill tried to show that the Conservatives had Jewish interests at heart, his efforts
101 Quoted in Gorny, 1983:125.
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fell on deaf ears given the party’s track-record on zionism, most notably, with the 1939 
White Paper restricting Jewish immigration into Palestine. Moreover, the Conservatives 
did not have an anti-fascist current like Labour and even contained anti-semitic 
elements. Furthermore, the Jewish population’s socio-economic status led it to be more 
drawn to Labour than to the Conservatives, a situation which continued until the 1970s 
and 1980s.
It was not a sudden change of heart about the merits of Arab nationalism that 
determined the government’s position. Above all, an instrumental assessment of how 
British interests could best be served underpinned Labour’s postwar refusal to 
implement its pre-election promises. Once in power, the leadership jettisoned the idea 
of a socialist foreign policy in favour of realism. From the outset, Bevin made clear that 
he wished to maintain Britain’s international status.106 Moreover, the Cabinet contained 
a number of prominent right-wingers who shared this approach. Dalton, for example, 
was unrelentingly hostile to socialist foreign policy, campaigning against those in the 
party who did believe in such a notion.107 The International Secretary, Denis Healey, 
also favoured a 'tough, unsentimental' approach and became a 'belligerent supporter of 
Bevin's stance in foreign affairs"08 and worked to bridge the gap between government 
policy and the Labour Party.109 At the time, support for Jewish nationalism was linked 
with socialist foreign policy.
In the postwar period, Britain continued to have substantial financial and strategic 
interests across the world, but particularly in the Middle East.110 The Foreign Secretary 
thought that Britain’s economic well-being depended on maintaining British interests in 
the region. Bevin’s belief in the link between international policy and domestic 
prosperity was explicit when he said, in relation to Palestine, that Britain:
'must maintain a continuing interest in the [Middle East] 
area, if only because our economic and financial interests 
in the Middle East are of vast importance to us and to 
other countries as well. I would like this faced squarely.
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If those interests were lost to us, the effect on the life of  
this country would be a considerable reduction in the 
standard o f living...British interests in the Middle East 
contributed substantially not only to the prosperity o f the 
people there, but also to the wage packets o f the workers 
in this country'.111 (emphasis added).
The government's approach to the Middle East turned on a policy of non-intervention on 
the grounds that intervention would undermine rather than strengthen British influence 
in the area. Bevin felt that to alienate the Arabs would jeopardise British interests. His 
priority was to appeal to the Arab leaders by refusing to use force and to replace the 
traditionally unequal relationship between Britain and the Arabs with one based on 
alliances and partnership.112
Moreover, the government implemented its policy against the background of the 
cold war. Bevin and the rest of the leadership took on board the cold war consensus, 
adopting a sharply anti-communist stance. The Foreign Secretary wanted to curb the 
Middle East’s revolutionary potential and to avoid provoking extreme nationalist 
sentiment.113 He believed that a Jewish state could be a revolutionary socialist state and 
that Russia's support for partition was based on the idea that:
'by immigration they [the Russians] can pour in sufficient 
indoctrinated Jews to turn it into a communist state in a 
very short time. The New York Jews have been doing 
their work for them'.114
Developments in Palestine also contributed to the government's back-tracking. 
After the war, revisionist Zionists began to challenge labour Zionism’s dominance in 
Palestine, aiming to replace moderate demands with maximalist territorial claims.115 
Terrorist groups such as the Stern Gang and Irgun, headed by Menachem Begin, 
engaged in a series of anti-British attacks including the bombing of the King David
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Hotel in July 1946‘16 and, more significantly, the hanging of two British sergeants in 
1947. The latter incident caused outrage in the British public and a rise in popular anti­
semitism.117 British soldiers rampaged in Palestine and anti-semitic riots broke out in 
London, Liverpool, Manchester and Glasgow.118 Attlee announced that while he 
appreciated:
'the natural intensity of the feelings of those who 
experienced the atrocities of the Hitler regime....this 
[could] not condone the adoption by Jews in Palestine of 
some of the very worst of the methods of their oppressors 
in Europe'.119
In this context, the government thought it would be politically popular to adopt an anti- 
zionist position. Bevin needed to pacify people whose relatives were located in the 
Middle East (especially Egypt and Palestine) at a time of considerable economic 
austerity. Hundreds of thousands of British troops were stationed in the region in the 
immediate postwar period at considerable cost to Britain, leaving the government 
susceptible to the opposition’s jibes. Churchill constantly exploited this theme.120 
Moreover, the rise of Jewish terrorism limited people’s tolerance of the idea of British 
soldiers being based in Palestine.121
Nevertheless, Labour’s Palestine policy came to be known as one of the 
government’s major failures. Despite the anti-Jewish incidents in the main cities, the 
popular mood was generally sympathetic to the idea of a Jewish national home. Morgan 
has suggested that, in the war’s aftermath, Bevin fundamentally misunderstood popular 
sentiment and that he failed to understand the political ramifications of Truman’s 
sensitivity to the Jewish vote.122 Truman put pressure on the British government to allow 
Jewish immigration into Palestine almost as soon as Attlee took office. The USA 
condemned British policy, exploiting in particular Bevin’s decision to force Jewish
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refugees arriving in Palestine to return to refugee camps in Germany.123 The 
Jewish/Arab conflict undermined the government’s efforts to forge a strong relationship 
with America at a time of mounting tensions between the west and the Soviet Union.
How did the government succeed in implementing a policy that broke with the 
party’s commitments and ideals? One factor was the extent of internal loyalty the 
leadership was able to command. In Cabinet, Attlee and Bevin 'made an unbreakable 
combination'.124 Bevin dominated most of the Cabinet and the Colonial Secretary, 
Creech Jones, worked very much in the Foreign Secretary’s shadow, leading Zionists to 
portray him as a sycophant.125 Only a few Cabinet Ministers challenged the policy. 
Aneurin Bevan argued forcefully for partition and questioned the view that Britain's 
interests would be damaged if the government did not comply with the Arab states’ 
wishes.126 He even threatened to resign over the matter.127 Bevan and John Strachey 
argued that the Jewish socialist movement would rejuvenate the Middle East, but they 
and other pro-zionists like Emmanuel Shinwell were not sufficiently knowledgeable 
about foreign policy effectively to oppose the Palestine policy.128
The leadership also depended on a fairly submissive PLP. Throughout much of 
Attlee’s governments, the parliamentary party was not particularly rebellious, a loyalty 
springing chiefly from a sense of shared purpose with the leadership. However, 
organisational strategies, including the leadership’s decision to divide the PLP into a 
number of policy-making groups, also played a part. Moreover, many of Labour’s MPs 
came from the professional classes, helping to dampen down rebellions.129 Furthermore, 
despite the fact that around one third of the PLP objected to aspects of Bevin’s foreign 
policies, these discontented elements did not want to do anything to jeopardise the 
government’s standing in its early years.130
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The government’s strength also rested on its relationship with the trade unions, 
which backed the leadership on most issues in the postwar period.131 Bevin’s Ministerial 
position made him one of the most powerful trade unionists and as a Minister, he 
maintained critical links with the unions.132 The unions controlled over 80 per cent of 
the total conference vote and a reciprocal relationship existed, where Bevin could count 
on union support for his foreign policy in return for the representation of union interests 
in Cabinet.133 Despite the TUC’s previous pro-zionism, it supported Bevin’s Palestine 
policy. When the Histadrut asked the TUC General Council to pressurise the 
government into implementing the Anglo-American Commission's recommendations, 
the General Council refused and ‘strongly urged’ acceptance of British policy.134 At the 
party conference, the leadership consistently defeated the pro-zionist strand. Bevin 
succeeded in getting oppositional motions withdrawn, including Poale Zion’s.135 When 
he advised the conference not to carry any resolution on the matter, the conference 
complied.136
Labour Women also backed the leadership’s foreign policy. Mary Sutherland, the 
Chief Woman Officer, wrote that despite divisions over international affairs:
'we can be sure that our Foreign Secretary will continue 
to work with patience, firmness and frankness, to reach 
decisions on the issues before the Conference that are in 
harmony with the Charter of the UNO'.137
In a later editorial on international affairs, Labour Woman commented that if there was 
no unity among the big powers 'it is fair to claim that the fault does not lie with Ernest 
Bevin and his colleagues'.138 This section’s reluctance to criticise the leadership 
reflected its historically weak role. Despite the fact that thousands of women entered the 
labour movement after women’s suffrage in 1918, they remained marginal to policy­
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making. Consequently, Labour Women tended traditionally to take an uncritical stance 
towards the leadership.119
So, once in office Labour abandoned its principles in favour of a policy which was 
broadly in line with a Conservative approach. By the end of the war, Zionism was 
closely associated with the left’s international agenda, but Attlee and Bevin rejected it, 
displaying the tendency for Labour to move rightwards once in office. It was not anti­
imperialist politics which led the leadership to adopt a pro-Arab stance. Bevin’s 
decision to favour the Arabs over the Jews was rooted in a ‘late Forties imperialism,’ an 
approach which aimed to preserve Britain’s strategic position and oil interests in the 
Middle East through a policy of partnership rather than domination.140 The Foreign 
Secretary’s primary goal was to maintain British economic and strategic influence in the 
Middle East,141 and the left’s hopes for radical changes in foreign policies were dashed. 
The government managed to implement a basically unpopular policy because of the 
extent of internal loyalty it could command in the immediate postwar period. 
Nevertheless, the policy did stimulate some dissent. In the following section, I shall 
consider the sources of dissent and the leadership’s later return to Labour’s pro-zionist 
tradition.
2.3 Intra-Party Conflict and a Return to the Old Consensus
Only a minority was willing to oppose the government’s policy, principally, the Labour 
left and Jewish party members. These groups overlapped because the Jewish members 
tended predominantly to come from the party’s left-wing, including people like Sydney 
Silverman, Ian Mikardo, Maurice Orbach and Harold Laski. Other Jewish MPs, such as 
Barnett Janner and Barbara Ayrton-Gould untiringly criticised government policy both 
in parliament and in public demonstrations.142 Crossman and Foot were also vocal 
critics of the policy in parliament, in public and in the left-wing press. Local parties 
such as Glasgow City Labour Party,143 the Southport Trades Council and Labour
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Party,144 and Hackney North, Manchester Exchange and Leeds Central145 all condemned 
the government’s policy. At the 1946 annual conference, five critical resolutions called 
on the government to revert to its pre-election pledges, but were withdrawn at Bevin's 
request.146 On the whole, the critics represented the oppositional voice of the left with 
Crossman and Foot belonging to the Keep Left group of MPs,147 and Silverman and 
Laski having a history of rebelliousness.148
The dissenters condemned the government for refusing to implement the Anglo- 
American Commission’s recommendations. Silverman described the decision as a 
'plain, naked war upon the Jewish National Home'.149 Michael Foot appealed to the 
government to implement every item of the report in order to avoid a war which would 
'leave an indelible and black stain on this country'.150 They also held the government 
responsible for the rise of Jewish terrorism. Crossman suggested that the increase in 
terrorist activities was the 'direct result' of the government's continuation with the policy 
embodied in the 1939 White Paper. He attacked the government for arresting leaders of 
socialist and trade union organizations and others on the ‘political left’ in Palestine.151 
In A Palestine Munich?',152 Crossman and Foot systematically rejected the government's 
justification for the policy. They recalled the party's pledges of support for Zionism, 
including those made by Labour leaders such as Morrison and Dalton, and condemned 
the policy as 'appeasement of the Arabs'.153 They objected to the Palestine policy as one 
which put expediency before questions of justice and morality. Recognising the 
impossibility of pleasing both sides, Crossman and Foot commented that:
‘either course...involves the risk of bloodshed; either 
course involves a measure of injustice for one side. The 
question to be decided is which course involves the lesser
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injustice, the lesser amount of bloodshed and the lesser 
risk to world peace.’154
Crossman’s intervention exasperated Bevin who observed that the former’s ideas 
derived from 'his lack of judgement and his intellectual arrogance'.155
The 1948 Palestine Bill, introduced to deal with the termination of the British 
mandate, precipitated some parliamentary rebellion. During the Bill’s second reading, 
William Warbey moved an amendment for rejection on the grounds that it failed to 
make provision for the 'independence of Jewish and Arab States in Palestine as provided 
by the United Nations decision'. Silverman seconded the amendment and thirty Labour 
MPs supported it, including: R. Acland; H.L. Austin; J. Baird; A. Bramall; F.F. 
Cocks; V.J. Collins; L. Comyns; W.G. Cove; R.H.S. Crossman; H.J. Delargy; M. 
Edelman; W.J. Field; B. Janner; J. Lee; N. H. Lever; B.W. Levy; J. Lewis; J.D. 
Mack; R.W.G. Mackay; I. Mikardo; E.R. Millington; M. Orbach; J.F.F. Platts- 
Mills; J. Silverman; S. Silverman; G. Thomas; W.Vernon; W.N. Warbey; L. 
Wilkes; K. Zilliacus, together with one Communist MP and Denis Pritt, an ILP 
member.156 On 2 December 1948 Alice Bacon; Richard Crossman; Harold Davies; 
Barnett Janner; Ian Mikardo; George Porter and David Weitzman signed an EDM 
which criticised the government for the 'continued unsatisfactory situation in Palestine' 
and called for the government to 'support at the United Nations a settlement which 
would ensure the speedy international recognition of Israel'.157
The left's objection to the Palestine policy turned on the view that it represented a 
continuation of conservative policy and a rejection of socialist principles as the main 
directive of policy. Keep Left regarded the government’s approach to the Middle East 
as an attempt to create 'an anti-Bolshevik bloc of reactionary Arab states', seeing the 
Palestine policy in terms of this wider objective.158 The opponents consistently claimed 
that a conservative and traditionally pro-Arab Foreign Office had dictated the policy in 
order to preserve British interests, stating that:
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'It [was] no accident that the Labour Government's 
outstanding failure...occurred in the one field of action 
where there has been less change of personnel since the 
Chamberlain era than in any other sphere of the national 
life. The Middle East has remained untouched by the 
Labour revolution: the men, the practice and the policy 
throughout the Middle East...continue entirely with the 
accents of 1939 predominating'.159
The left believed that the government's Palestine policy was based on 'narrow strategic 
calculations which would make the Middle East a strategic centre and base'.160 In an 
unconcealed attack on the leadership, Laski said that:
'neither Arab blackmail nor the strategy on which our 
policy in the Middle East was based should make these 
homeless wanderers the victims of hesitation or timidity 
in Downing Street. A British statesman who sacrificed 
the Jews who escaped from the tortures of Hitlerism to 
the Arab leaders did not understand the elementary 
principles o f the socialism he professed} 61 (emphasis 
added).
According to Kimche, the Foreign Office had initiated a 'new look' in terms of its 
attitude towards the region, involving the establishment of treaties such as the one 
signed with Iraq in January 1948,162 aimed at achieving a balance between the removal 
of British troops and the maintenance of British power. Kimche concluded that a 
Jewish state had no part in this scheme because the government assumed that Soviet 
influence would 'seep' into such a state through immigration.163
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The left’s opposition to the Palestine policy stemmed from its broader disillusion 
with the government’s foreign policy. Divisions within Labour during Attlee’s 
government centred principally on foreign affairs. From the beginning, two groups of 
left-wingers, Keep Left and a small faction of pro-Soviet fellow-travellers, began 
systematically to condemn Bevin’s approach to international issues, disagreeing over 
ties between Britain and the Soviet Union and specific questions like Indonesia. Keep 
Left was the most significant group, including Crossman, Foot and Mikardo, favouring a 
neutralist, third force position, whereby Britain would stand between the two major 
powers. 164 Silverman also belonged to the third force movement,165 and advocated a 
socialist foreign policy.166 This element felt that the leadership had jettisoned its 
commitment to the principle of socialist foreign policy.167 In a sense, the Jewish 
leadership in Palestine appealed to both of these groups. Its claim to neutrality in the 
conflict between west and east appealed to Keep Left’s neutralism and to the 
communists, who saw such a stance as potentially pro-communist.
However, during most of the debates over Palestine, the dissenters failed to make 
an impact. This was because the left was relatively weak at the time, having no 
significant base within the constituency parties or the trade unions.168 Moreover, the 
Labour left was internally divided, consisting of a number of separate elements 
including pacifists as well as Keep Left and the fellow-travellers.169 The parliamentary 
left was also numerically small. Keep Left had only fifteen members and did not remain 
cohesive throughout the government. Moreover, the leadership formed an organised 
response to the group, with Hugh Dalton, Morgan Phillips and Denis Healey launching a 
campaign against the left’s idea of a socialist foreign policy. Other party members 
joined in this campaign, rendering the left incapable of influencing policy.170
Nevertheless, once Israel was established, the gap between the leadership and its 
opponents narrowed. Attlee and Bevin maintained a publicly hostile attitude towards 
the Jewish state, criticising the Jewish lobby in America and making anti-Israel speeches
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in the Commons.171 Yet behind the scenes Bevin started to make a series of gestures of 
friendship. As early as May 1948, the Foreign Secretary spoke of the need to secure 
Arab acceptance of the Jewish state and tried to convince Arab governments that the 
new state was permanent. In October, he initiated the opening of a British Consulate in 
the Jewish part of Jerusalem; an action which anticipated recognition.172 In January 
1949, the government responded in a restrained way to the shooting down of five British
1 7 7aircraft over Egypt. ' At the same time, Bevin began to take a more relaxed approach 
to Jewish immigration, announcing that Jewish immigrants of military age detained in 
Cyprus could leave as soon as transport was provided. Bevin's critics took this 
statement as an indication of a modification of policy towards Israel.174 At the end of 
January 1949 Britain gave de facto recognition to Israel and, in April 1950, the 
government conceded de jure recognition, although refrained from acknowledging 
Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish part of Jerusalem.175
4
The party also began to build bridges with Israel through a spate^networking with 
zionist groups in Israel. In December 1949 an official party delegation, including TUC 
representatives, representatives from the Co-operative movement, Alice Bacon, and the 
party’s Chair, Sam Watson, visited Israel where they met the Israeli president, Chaim 
Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion, the Prime Minister, Moshe Sharett, the Foreign 
Minister, Golda Myerson, Minister of Labour and Social Insurance and Eliezer Kaplan, 
Minister of Finance as well as Histadrut representatives and other members of the Mapai 
Party. In their report, Alice Bacon and Sam Watson recommended full recognition of
176Israel, assistance with its economic recovery and the establishment of strong relations. 
Later, Herbert Morrison and Morgan Phillips joined the Labour delegation at a reception 
held by the Israel Histadrut Committee in London. At the reception Morrison said that
177'Jewish Palestine was one of the greatest experiments in the modern world'. What 
precipitated this policy shift?
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One factor was a change in the relationship between the leadership and the PLP.
As the government proceeded, the parliamentary party began to challenge the former’s
dominance. The prospect of a general election made the leadership more vulnerable to
internal criticism and the possibility of a divided party. A shift in the party’s internal
dynamics began, portending a decade of intra-party conflict and dissent, a decline in
Labour’s popularity, and the rise of the Bevanite left.178 The opposition exploited these
difficulties and, over Israel, persistently called for the government to recognise the new
state. Churchill engaged in a fierce debate with Bevin in the Commons over how best
British interests could be served, arguing forcefully for recognition of Israel.179 The
Israel
PLP's growing impatience with the government overcame to light at the end of January 
1949 when at least fifty Labour members abstained from voting on what Attlee saw as a 
vote of confidence in the government's policy. Although the government won the 
motion of adjournment, defeating its critics by two hundred and eighty-three votes to 
one hundred and ninety-three, Labour’s increasing dissatisfaction was expressed in the 
abstentions.180
With the new state in existence, recognised by both the USA and the Soviet Union,
a new international context existed. Internal opponents of the policy were in a stronger
position to voice their dissent and the impact on the leadership was greater. The
dissenters enjoyed a new legitimacy since Britain was now clearly out of step with wider
international developments and especially America. The critics’ claim that the
181government's policy had created a cleavage between American and Britain, hit a raw 
nerve with a leadership which was keen to forge a strong relationship with America. 
Bevin and Attlee were still bitter about the division between the two countries over 
Palestine, which they saw as damaging to the Anglo-American alliance.182
However, Bevin’s policy change stemmed principally from his concern to forge a 
strong alliance with America in the context of the heightening cold war. After the 
Korean crisis, the division between countries falling within the western alliance and 
neutral ones sharpened. Israel’s support for the UN in Korea was the first sign of a
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179 Pappe, 1990:568.
180 The Tim es. 27 January 1949:4.
181 Tribune, 28 May 1948:7; The Times, 20 May 1948:2; Jew ish  Chronicle, 21 M ay 1948:11.
182 Pappe, 1990:565.
57
desire to ally with the west. The Israeli leadership’s earlier displays of neutrality, 
designed not to alienate the Soviet Union while getting arms supplies from the eastern 
bloc, began to give way to a shift towards the west. Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett 
both wanted Israel to be included in the western bloc.183 The Foreign Office started to 
see Israel as a country which shared Britain's interests in the Middle East and rejected 
ideas about Israel moving into the communist camp.184 The Foreign Office and the 
American State Department wanted to put the differences between the two countries 
over Palestine into the past in favour of a co-ordinated defence strategy. Bevin's aim to 
secure Anglo-American collaboration to combat the Soviet Union’s influence overrode 
his fears about the Arab/Jewish conflict.185
By the early 1950s then, Bevin’s return to Labour’s traditionally pro-zionist stance 
was essentially complete. He even told the Israelis that his Palestine policy had been a 
failure.186 However, practical considerations and not a sudden spurt of pro-Israeli 
altruism determined the leadership’s policy change. As Pappe has observed, ‘the 
dynamism and logic of pragmatic policy...ignores past prejudices, psychological 
barriers, preconceptions or emotions’.187 Bevin’s return to a pro-zionist stance resulted 
from his desire to check internal dissent in a climate of mounting unpopularity and, most 
importantly, to establish a strong Anglo-American alliance in the cold war period.
2.4 Conclusion
Confronted with the rival nationalist claims to Palestine, Labour was fundamentally 
predisposed towards Jewish nationalism over Arab nationalism. Internationalist and 
anti-colonialist principles played very little part in policy positions. Indeed, the party 
was not immune from ideas hanging over from Britain’s colonial history, making use of 
a dichotomy whereby the Jews stood for progress and civilisation and the Arabs stood 
for feudalism and reaction. Far from being impartial when faced with the contending 
nationalist movements, Labour’s choices reflected ‘prior patterns of personal contact as
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well as ideological considerations heavily coloured by British experience and 
alignments’.188 Forced to choose between the Jews and the Arabs, Labour settled for the 
movement with which it had the closest political ties and which, as a result of wartime 
experiences, had won considerable moral legitimacy. Moreover, Labour’s perception of 
the political advantages of a pro-zionist policy led Attlee and Bevin unreservedly to 
abandon their doubts about the formation of a Jewish state in the pre-election campaign.
Once in office, the Labour leadership moved right, implementing policies which 
are continuous with traditional foreign policy. In the 1940s, Zionism was associated 
with a left-wing agenda abroad, fitting in with Labour’s anti-colonialist ethos which 
included a desire to modernise and democratise post-colonial countries. It was 
traditionalism and not anti-colonialism which led the leadership to pursue policies more 
favourable to the Arabs than the Jews. Bevin wanted above all to protect British 
interests in the Middle East and he thought that they would be jeopardised by the 
formation of a Jewish state in the face of Arab hostility. Having a loyal Cabinet, PLP 
and TUC, the government was able to run rough shod over the party’s ‘conscience’,189 
that is, those who wanted the leadership to pursue a distinctively socialist approach to 
international affairs.
Even so, pro-zionist sympathies remained latent throughout this time, ready to re- 
emerge in the right circumstances. These circumstances came about very soon after 
Israel’s formation. Under mounting international pressure in the context of the cold war, 
the Jewish state’s obvious desire to ally with the west and increasing pressure from 
inside the party, the government returned to Labour’s pro-zionist principles and the party 
embarked on a series of measures designed to improve relations with the Israeli Labour 
government. By 1951, the pro-zionist consensus re-emerged in the shape of a new pro- 
Israeli consensus. However, the formation of a Jewish state in the Middle inevitably
r
provided a source of tension with the Arab countries and it was not long before this 
tension expressed itself in a new set of hostilities, the Suez war, forcing Labour to make 
choices again. In the next chapter I shall look at how the party dealt with the dilemmas
188 H ow e, 1992:236.
189 Schneer, 1988.
59
posed by a war which pitted anti-colonialist Arab nationalism against Israeli 
nationalism.
60
CHAPTER THREE
LABOUR, SUEZ AND ISRAEL: THE END OF A ’SPECIAL 
RELATIONSHIP’1?
The 1956 war was the first major test of Labour’s pro-Israel loyalties. As an expression 
of demands for full equality and freedom from colonial domination in the postwar era,2 
Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal appealed to Labour’s anti-imperialist 
principles, which had been sharpened during the 1950s. However, by 1956, the Labour 
front-bench was the most pro-Israel of the political parties.' Indeed, all sections of the 
labour movement shared this sentiment, expressed at successive party conferences,4 at 
the TUC conferences,5 in party publications such as Tribune6 and by Labour Women.7 
Israel's action against Egypt presented Labour with a predicament. For sympathisers 
with Israel, opposition to the war 'called for a less critical view of Britain's action, if not 
for outright advocacy, than that which was implied by the Labour Party's all-out 
opposition to Eden'.8 Yet under the leadership of Hugh Gaitskell, Labour engaged in a 
vigorous campaign against the war and the previously divided party united behind the 
leader in all-out condemnation of the war, sponsoring a ‘Law Not War’ rally in 
Trafalgar Square. Alderman has suggested that Labour’s stance ended the 'special 
relationship' between the party and the Jews.9 To what extent does this claim capture 
what actually happened? This chapter looks at how Labour reconciled its pro-Israel and 
anti-govemment stance. In section one I shall show that the war did not produce a 
collapse in pro-Israeli feeling. In section two I shall show that most of the party, 
especially the leadership, maintained a negative attitude towards Arab nationalism. In
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section three I shall consider the reasons for the maintenance of Labour’s traditional 
position on the Israel/Arab dispute and in the fourth section I shall describe the way 
some members of the left started to question Labour’s pro-Israel and anti-Arab stance.
3.1 Attitudes Towards Israel
To some extent the war did produce criticism of Israeli policy. Gaitskell said that if 
Labour had been in government he would have warned Israel against aggression and he 
supported the UN Security Council’s resolution against the state’s attack on Egypt.10 In 
response to one of Eden’s speeches, the Labour leader remarked that the Prime Minister, 
instead of acting as a policeman, had gone in to 'help the burglar and shoot the 
householder',11 a comment implying that Israel was the 'burglar' and, as such, went down 
badly within Anglo-Jewry.12 However, the conflict did not generate deep anti-Israel 
feeling. In fact, the party exonerated the Jewish state by distinguishing Israeli actions 
from British and French ones.13 Holding the image of Israel as a small, embattled state 
surrounded by hostile Arab neighbours, the party depicted the Anglo-French alliance as 
aggressive and portrayed Israel’s part as defensive. Throughout his attack on 
government policy, Gaitskell contrasted Israeli policy with British policy, saying that:
'the devastating mistake that the Government have made 
in this matter is to mix up the Arab-Israeli conflict with 
the Suez conflict...I warn them that until and unless they 
make a sharp distinction between these two 
problems...they will never get themselves right with 
world opinion'.14
Hugh Dalton similarly excused Israel, arguing that the Jewish state’s action was a 
legitimate reaction to provocation from Egypt and refusing to accept the view that 'Israel
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[was] a wicked aggressor and Egypt an innocent victim of aggression'. Dalton’s support 
for Israel was so strong that he supported the Conservative government's rejection of a 
UN Security Council resolution stating that Israel was an aggressor.15 This exonerative 
attitude was not confined to the right. Tony Benn believed that the British government’s 
denial of arms to Israel had made the state feel insecure and was responsible for Ben- 
Gurion’s policy.16 He and five other Labour MPs cabled the Israeli Prime Minister 
asking him to confirm that Israel's action was limited to the 'protection of Israeli 
frontiers and elimination of Egyptian marauders' and that it had 'no connection with 
British action'. The message was signed by 'six lifelong friends of Israel'.17
Labour did not view the Jewish state as an equal partner in the tripartite attack on 
Egypt, believing that Britain and France had exploited the Jewish state for their own 
purposes. The NEC claimed that while Britain's desire to maintain control over the 
region and France's aim to deal with Egyptian 'subversion' in Algeria lay behind their 
actions, the establishment of 'a unified Syrian-Jordan-Egyptian Command' had provoked 
Israel into taking defensive action.18 Nor did the Labour lert see Israel as colluding with 
the west, claiming that the ‘imperial powers’ had exploited country’s vulnerability:
'They [Britain and France] exploited Israel's difficulties, 
and the tragic error by which that small nation tried to 
resolve them, in order to launch a war against Egypt and 
secure control of the Suez Canal'.19
The left believed that Britain’s cold war policy made Israel vulnerable because it 
excluded the country from defence pacts like the Baghdad Pact, exacerbating the 
Arab/Israel conflict.20 The Baghdad Pact was a treaty based on mutual defence and co­
operation between Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran and Britain.21
15 Parliamentary D ebates, C om m ons, V ol.561 , 1956-57, Col. 1296.
16 Parliamentary D ebates, C om m ons, V o l.570 , 1956-57, C ols.472-473 .
17 Adams, 1992:121-122.
18 NEC, 28 N ovem ber 1956:1-2.
19 Tribune, 14 D ecem ber 1956:1.
20 Foot and Jones, 1957:90-92.
21 O vendale, 1989:200.
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After the war, Labour tried to re-establish its pro-Israel credentials, suggesting that 
the Jewish state should force Egypt to grant it recognition. Gaitskell stated that while 
Israel should withdraw from the occupied territories, the UN ought to guarantee Israeli 
shipping through the Canal and the Gulf of Akaba and protection from raids from Egypt, 
concluding that:
'While we are completely opposed to the Anglo-French 
attack on Egypt, we in the Labour Party have always said 
that Israel could not be expected just to go back to the 
status quo existing at the end of October. The essential 
point is that Egypt should recognise publicly that the state 
of war is now at an end and that she therefore cannot 
exercise her so-called belligerent rights. The United 
Nations should insist upon this just as much as on the 
withdrawal of the Israeli forces'.22
The Labour leader did not believe that Israel should compromise with the Arab 
countries, maintaining that if the Arabs had accepted partition in 1947 Israel would have 
been smaller.23 Aneurin Bevan, Labour’s foreign affairs spokesperson, objected to 
American pressure on Israel to withdraw from the Sinai and wanted Israel's position to 
be used as a bargaining counter to secure Arab recognition of the Jewish state.24 After
the war, Richard Crossman got in touch with Ben-Gurion with the aim of restoring good
relations between Labour and Israel. ‘
The PLP also remained overwhelmingly pro-Israel during the crisis. The Labour 
MP Edward Short sponsored a pro-Israel EDM which attracted one hundred and twenty- 
six signatures, eighty-one (see appendix 3.1 and table 3.1) of which were from Labour 
MPs. Labour’s support for the motion was twice as high as the Conservatives’, showing 
that the Conservative government’s policy did not stem from pro-Israeli sentiment. 
Eden accepted the Foreign Office’s pro-Arab orientation, believing that Israel should 
give up some of the territory captured during the 1948 war. Moreover, he had
22 Press R elease issued by Transport House, 15 February 1957.
23 W illiam s, ed„ 1983:553.
24 Foot, 1973:540.
25 Howard, 1990:203.
Table 3.1 Pro-Israel Early-Day Motion, 1956
Date of First Tabling Number and Title Party Support Main Sponsor Total Number of 
Names Appended
Number of Labour 
Names Appended (and 
percentage of total 
names)
11.2.57 42. Withdrawal of 
Israeli Forces
Labour
Conservative
Liberal
Edward Short 
(Labour)
126 81 (64)
in
vO
previously refrained from criticising Egypt for refusing to allow Israeli shipping through
the Canal. Nor did the party have a pro-Jewish reputation at the time, even containing
people like the MP Thomas Moore who sympathised with the British Union of Fascists
in the 1930s.26 The Conservatives’ unwillingness to sign the motion also reflected the
partisan nature of the debates over Suez, drawing attention to the shift away from
consensus politics. <u> wtll opposiW, fWPsuKcc; Ukeltj EDMs
Wfre c -^FVaI oV p«Ucy.
For Jewish MPs, the dilemmas of the war were particularly acute.27 With the
Jewish community predominantly behind Israeli policy,28 Jewish MPs were under
pressure to dissent from Labour’s anti-war policy. Barnett Janner, who was President of
the Board of Deputies of British Jews (BOD) and the Zionist Federation, came under
communi+y
particular pressure, with the Jewishjchallenging his position on the BOD.29 Even the 
French General Zionist Party condemned Janner for having voted with Labour against 
the intervention, stating that Janner’s conduct was ’incompatible with the moral 
obligations of a Zionist’ and disqualified him from ’holding any responsible position in 
the Jewish national movement’.30 Nevertheless, Janner, along with the other sixteen 
Jewish Labour MPs,31 voted with Labour in the voting divisions. He only refused to 
conform to party policy on the vote which took place immediately after the UN’s 
condemnation of Israel and just before the Anglo-French attack because such a vote 
criticised Israel alone. Justifying his stand, Janner distinguished between the Israeli 
action and the British action, saying that Labour opposed the latter and not the former.32
For left-wing Jewish Labour MPs, the difficulties in reconciling their opposition to 
the war with their pro-Israel sympathies were sharper because their involvement in anti­
26 Epstein, 1964:175-177.
27 Ibid: 174.
28 Alderman, 1983:131.
29 This account draws heavily on Epstein, 1964:189-195 and Alderman, 1983:131-132.
30 Jew ish C hron icle , 7 D ecem ber 1956:1.
31 These were: Austen Albu, Frank Allaun, Maurice Edelman, G eorge Jeger, Harold Lever, L eslie  
Lever, Marcus Lipton, Ian Mikardo, Maurice Orbach, Emanuel Shinw ell, Julius Silverman, Sydney  
Silverman, G eorge Strauss, Barnet Stross, M oss Turner-Samuels and David W eitzman (Epstein, 
1964:185).
32 Epstein, 1964:195. The other Jewish M Ps who abstained from this vote were Austin A lbu, L eslie  
Lever, M oss Turner-Samuels and David W eitzman (Alderman, 1983:199 26n) Shinw ell and Harold 
Lever.
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colonialist politics put pressure on them to adopt a pro-Nasser position. Ian Mikardo, 
Maurice Orbach, Sydney Silverman and Bamett Stross all condemned the government's 
reaction to Nasser's nationalisation of the Canal.33 However, these MPs’ stand was far 
from anti-Israel. Like Janner, they distinguished Israel's role from Britain’s and 
France’s. Mikardo denied the suggestion that Israel benefited from the Anglo-French 
intervention, claiming that a demilitarisation of the Sinai Peninsula would have been 
more helpful.34 Moreover, he claimed that Israel's objectives were 'limited' and were a 
legitimate response to Egypt's sponsorship of the fedayeen (saboteurs) and the blockade 
on Israeli shipping.35 Most of the Jewish Labour MPs responded to criticism by saying 
that they represented their constituents and not the Jewish community and Mikardo 
defended his obedience to the party whip in this way.36
There were two exceptions to this pattern. Emanuel Shinwell, who had never 
forgiven Gaitskell for replacing him as Minister of Fuel and Power in 1947,37 publicly 
criticised Labour’s policy. Shinwell was not actively involved in Zionist or Jewish
' i  o
organisations, having a background in trade unionism and socialism,' and as a socialist 
he rejected zionist philosophy. Nevertheless, he had a strong emotional commitment to 
the Jewish state, rooted in his view of it as a refuge for the Jews and as an experiment in 
socialism.39 Although he mainly voted with the party in the divisions, he deliberately 
abstained from the vote condemning Israeli policy. Shinwell publicly accused the 
government for having previously failed to counter Arab aggression against Israel and 
suggested that the UN’s delay in taking speedy action explained Israel’s military 
response. He strongly criticised those who portrayed Israel's action as a violation of 
international law, including people in his own party 40 Harold Lever, who represented 
the Jewish constituency Manchester Cheetham, also deliberately abstained from the vote
33 Jew ish  C hronicle, 17 August 1956:8.
34 Epstein, 1964:191.
35 Tribune, 2 N ovem ber 1956:2.
36 A lderm an, 1983:132; 199 27n.
37 M organ, 1992:222.
38 Epstein, 1964:188-190; Alderman, 1983:131-132.
39 Parliamentary Debates, C om m ons, V o l.570, 1956-57, C ols.608-609.
40 Epstein, 1964:188-190; Alderman, 1983:131-132.
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which implicitly criticised Israeli action.41 Lever objected to the idea that Israel was the 
aggressor and supported Britain’s alignment with the state and the government’s veto of 
the UN Security Council’s condemnation of the Israeli action. Although he did not 
back the British attack on Egypt, he suggested that it showed that the government 
recognised Israeli interests 42
The balance in favour of Israel also remained in the party’s policy-making sections 
(see tables 3.2 and 3.3). The NEC and the International sub-committee contained 
Jewish MPs like Ian Mikardo and Sydney Silverman and people like Gaitskell, Anthony 
Greenwood, Crossman, Bevan and Alice Bacon, all of whom supported the formation of 
Israel for historical reasons. Although Barbara Castle sympathised with Nasser, she 
was not anti-Israel. Edith Summerskill was the only strongly pro-Arab member of the 
NEC and International sub-committee and her views brought her into conflict with other 
NEC members.43
Nor were there any signs of a grass-roots retreat from Labour’s pro-Israel 
consensus. Speeches at the party’s conference stressed the view that Israel wanted peace 
and that the west should arm the Jewish state in order to reduce its sense of insecurity 44 
At the TUC conference, speakers claimed that peace in the Middle East depended on 
the Arab states recognising the Jewish state 45 Labour Women also remained loyal to 
Israel. Like the rest of the party, this section exonerated Israel for its role in the crisis, 
criticising the government's Middle East policy on the grounds that it threatened the 
existence of Israel.46 At its conference in February 1957, Mary Mikardo, from Poale 
Zion, moved a resolution condemning Egypt for its anti-Israel policies and called for UN 
guarantees of Israel's borders and shipping. The conference carried the resolution and 
Morgan Phillips, the general secretary, sanctioned it.47
41 Alderman, 1983:132.
42 Epstein, 1964:190; see also Alderman, 1983:199 26n.
43 Gaitskell in W illiam s, ed., 1983:569.
44LPACR, 1956:70-75.
45 TUC Report, 1956:436-440.
46NCLW , 1956:44.
47NCLW , 1957:42-43.
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Table 3.2 NEC Members, 1956
Pro-Zionist/Israel Pro-Arab/Palestinian
Alice Bacon Barbara Castle
Aneurin Bevan
R.H.S. Crossman
T.E.N. Driberg (Vice-Chair)
Hugh Gaitskell
E.G. Gooch
A.W.J. Greenwood
M. Herbison (Chair)
Ian Mikardo 
S. Silverman 
H. W ilson
Edith Summerskill
Table 3.3 International Sub-Committee Members, 1956
Pro-Zionist/Israel Pro-Arab/Palestinian
Hugh Gaitskell Barbara Castle
E.G. Gooch  
A. Greenwood 
R.G. Gunter 
M. Herbison  
Sam Watson (Chair)
Edith Summerskill
So, Labour’s anti-war campaign did not undermine the party’s basic pro-Israel 
orientation. Indeed, the party rallied to support the Jewish state, reconciling its anti-war 
stance with its support for Israel by distinguishing sharply between Israeli actions and 
British and French actions. This suggests that although the party’s policy was badly 
received by the Jewish community, the relations between Jews and Labour were not 
irreparably damaged as implied by Alderman’s claim.48 In the following section I shall 
consider the way the war affected the party’s attitudes towards Arab nationalism.
48 See Alderman, 1983:133.
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3.2 Attitudes Towards Arab Nationalism
Although Labour opposed the war against Egypt, the crisis did not dramatically 
challenge its traditional hostility towards Arab nationalism. If anything, the hostilities 
showed just how deeply rooted anti-Arab feeling was, paralleling Conservative attitudes. 
This similarity between Labour and the Conservatives was most evident at the start of 
the crisis when only Gaitskell’s emphasis on Israeli interests distinguished his position 
from the Conservatives’.49 The Labour leader saw the Egyptian president as a dictator 
with expansionist aims and opposed the nationalisation of the Canal, calling for 
American-backed sanctions against Egypt.50 Dalton went even further, welcoming 
Israel's defeat of Egypt and claiming that 'the myth of Egypt as a military power and a 
leader of the Arab world is smashed for ever. All this is wonderful'.51 In a 
parliamentary debate, Dalton asked whether Ministers had ever thought that Nasser 
should have been left to the Israelis, since they ‘were doing a very good job'.52 Herbert 
Morrison and other right-wingers such as Reggie Paget, Frank Tomney and Jack 
Jones,53 favoured military action against Egypt.54 Some TUC members also advocated 
outright condemnation of the nationalisation and objected to the idea that force could 
only be used after referral to the UN. However, the mainstream view prevailed in the 
end,55 reflecting Gaitskell’s influence in the TUC leadership.56
Throughout the crisis, the leadership was at pains to show that its position did not 
imply support for Nasser. Gaitskell was contemptuous of people who sympathised with
49 K yle, 1991:164-165.
50 Epstein, 1964:66.
51 Quoted in Pimlott, 1986:687.
52 Parliamentary Debates, Commons, V oi.561, 1956-57, Col. 1294.
^  R eggie Paget represented Northampton from 1945 to 1974. Frank Tom ney was the M P for North  
Hammersmith from 1950 to 1979 and Jack Jones was a junior M inister between 1947 and 1950 and M P  
for Bolton from 1945 to 1950 and for Rotherham from 1950 to 1962 (W illiam s, ed., 1983:349 17n; 366  
4n; 569  21 n).
54 Gaitskell in W illiam s, ed., 1983:569.
55 The Tim es, 1 September 1956:6.
56 See Foote, 1985:230.
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the Egyptian president, including John Hynd,57 William Warbey, Tony Benn and Edith 
Summerskill, challenging what he saw as their automatic defence of any eastern country 
and their failure to recognise that Nasser was a dictator. He believed that SummerskiH's 
views stemmed from her being 'a woman whose political views are almost entirely 
dependent on personal contacts'.58 Gaitskell publicly denied that Labour was taking a 
'pro-Nasser' line.59 The MP Patrick Gordon Walker,60 advised the annual conference 
not to become 'pro-Nasser' because it was anti-govemment, distinguishing popular 
nationalism from the Egyptian leader’s nationalism:
'We must come to terms with the genuine nationalism of 
the Middle East and cut the ground from beneath Nasser's 
feet by saying openly that we recognise the right of the 
Arab states to nationalise the oil wells and installations'.61
The TUC leadership made a similar distinction. At its conference, C.J. Geddes, head of 
the international committee, said:
'We must not let our legitimate criticism of the 
Government's handling of this situation be interpreted as 
praise for Colonel Nasser...Nasser is a military dictator 
and this movement has no love...for military dictators'. “
Even Bevan described Nasser as a 'thug' who needed to be 'taught a lesson'.63 At 
the ‘Law Not War’ rally at Trafalgar Square, he stressed that although he thought that 
Eden was wrong, he did not think that Nasser was right64 While opposed to the war, 
Bevan maintained that even the existence of western imperialist interests in the Canal 
did not justify Nasser’s 'extreme nationalism', contending that:
57 Former M inister and Labour M P for Sheffield A ttercliffe, 1944 to 1970.
58 Gaitskell in W illiam s, ed., 1983:567-569.
59 Jewish C hronicle, 9 N ovem ber 1956:8.
60 Labour MP for Sm ethwick.
61 The Times, 2 October 1956:11.
62 TUC Report, 1956:434.
w See Mikardo, 1988:158.
64 Foot, 1973:526.
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'it is no answer to say that the Suez Canal was an 
imperialist project from the beginning and that it has been 
exploited ever since. That does not establish Egypt's right 
to exploit the Canal in her own interests'.65
Arab nationalism never had the same emotional appeal as Israeli nationalism for 
Bevan.66 His perception of the Middle East drew heavily on traditional stereotypes of 
Arabs:
'the collective psychology of the Moslem states is
definitely repulsive to me. It is so morbid and wildly
irrational that I am conscious of an abiding sense of 
unease when I am in one of them'.67
Bevan’s attitude impressed Gaitskell 68 Prior to Suez, he and the leader had been rivals.
Gaitskell saw Bevan as excessively volatile, even comparing him with Hitler on one 
occasion.69 As Chancellor, Gaitskell provi<M lit ocrafia* ^  Bevan’s resignation from 
government over NHS charges. In opposition, the two disagreed over German
rearmament and Bevan resigned from the shadow Cabinet. However, the Suez war
united the former opponents and they co-operated over the anti-war campaign. Gaitskell 
later rewarded Bevan by making him shadow Foreign Secretary.70
Bevan’s position reflected his ambivalent attitude towards international affairs, 
putting him at odds with the rest of the left. Mikardo thought that his anti-Nasser 
statements had 'blunted' his attack on Eden.71 The press commented on the emerging 
division between 'Bevan and the Bevanites'.72 One of Tribune's readers remarked that 
'as a disciple of Mr. Bevan, it was most disappointing to see "Our Nye" climbing on to
65 Tribune, 10 August 1956:12.
66 Foot, 1973:517.
67 Quoted in Foot, 1973:547.
68 See K yle, 1991:190.
69 M organ, 1992:225.
70 Pelling, 1991:107-118.
71 Mikardo, 1988:157.
72 The T im es, 10 A ugust 1956:2.
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the Eden-Gaitskell bandwagon of hate against Nasser and Egypt'.73 This development 
was highly portentous, presaging Bevan's growing alienation from the left-wing. His 
new closeness with the right led to bitter differences with the rest of the Bevanite left, 
including people like Crossman, Castle and Foot. This became especially evident 
during the 1957 annual conference when Bevan urged Britain to hold on to its nuclear 
weapons, overturning his previous commitment to unilateralism.74
Labour’s anti-Arab current was also evident in its treatment of the Palestinian 
crisis. By 1956 there were about one hundred thousand refugees living in Jordan, 
Lebanon, Syria and the Gaza Strip. Despite UNRWA’s (the UN Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees) efforts to provide the refugees with homes, medical and 
educational services and the Palestinians’ success in finding employment in countries 
like Lebanon, many of the refugees lived in very sub-standard conditions.75 However, 
the party showed little sympathy for their situation. The leadership marginalised people 
who drew attention to their position. Before the war, Anthony Greenwood reprimanded 
Summerskill for suggesting that some of the refugees should return to Israel, claiming 
that her proposal gave the false impression that Labour held Israel responsible for the 
resettling of the refugees.76 Whenever the issue came up during the war, leading party 
members portrayed it as a problem for Egypt and the Arab countries to resolve. Dalton 
argued that the refugees should be resettled in (unspecified) 'Arab lands' and that Israel 
had no responsibility for them:
'There is no room for them [the Palestinian refugees] in 
Israel, that is clear. Their place has been taken by other 
refugees, by Jewish refugees from Arab lands and we 
cannot keep turning people round and round'.77
Even left-wingers portrayed the Palestinian incursions into Israel as instances of 
'mindless terrorism'. As part of a series of visits to the Middle East in the early 1950s,
73 Quoted in K yle, 1991:190.
74 See M organ, 1992:216-217.
75 Rodinson, 1970:52.
76 Poale Zion Press R elease, 7 October 1955.
77 Parliamentary Debates, Com m ons, V ol.561 , 1956-57, Col. 1299.
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Crossman inspected the refugee camps.78 Before the 1956 hostilities, Crossman and 
Maurice Orbach acted as 'mediators' between Egypt and Israel when America and 
Britain sponsored the peace plan Project Alpha. This plan proposed that Israel would 
take back about seventy-five thousand refugees and compensate the rest in return for a 
guarantee of Israel's borders and an end to the Arab blockade on Israeli shipping.79 
However, the experience did not make Crossman sensitive to the Palestinians’ situation. 
After the war, he spoke of the impunity under which the 'Fedayeen gangs' entered Israel 
and said that he would not blame the Israelis if they tried to 'drive the Egyptians out and 
clean up the Fedayeen'.80 Ian Mikardo described the Palestinian fedayeen as 'murder- 
trained infiltrators',81 indicating a failure to acknowledge the fact that many of the 
refugees who crossed Israel’s borders were not sponsored by Arab states but merely 
trying to return home.82
Labour’s anti-war campaign did not therefore hinge on pro-Nasser sympathies and 
the hostilities did not produce a groundswell of support for Arab nationalism, especially 
on the part of the leadership, but also in the PLP, the NEC and the trade unions. In the 
next section, I shall consider why the crisis did not significantly affect Labour attitudes.
3.3 Explaining Labour’s Policy
One of the reasons why the war did not dramatically affect Labour’s outlook was 
because anti-imperialist politics played no part at all in Gaitskell’s campaign against the 
war. On the contrary, as a member of the revisionist right, the Labour leader 
disapproved of the idea of socialist foreign policy, favouring pragmatism over what he 
saw as left-wing 'utopianism'.83 Ever since the Korean war, Gaitskell had been strongly 
pro-American and anti-communist.84 It was the leader’s view that Britain’s policy
78 M organ, ed., 1981:195.
79 Shamir in L ouis and O wen, eds., 1989:77; Oren, 1990:358.
80 Parliamentary Debates, C om m ons, V ol.566, 1956-57, C o ls .1418-1419.
81 Tribune , 2 N ovem ber 1956:12.
82 See Rodinson, 1970:68.
82 Haseler, 1969:112-113.
84 Morgan, 1992:224.
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undermined the Anglo-American alliance which principally lay behind his protest 
against government policy.85 Under the Eisenhower government, America’s desire to 
improve its position in the region led it to shift from a pro-Israel to a pro-Arab policy.86 
The leadership’s respect for the UN also determined its anti-war stance. Gaitskell 
constantly stressed 'the wrongfulness of acting outside the United Nations and...in 
defiance of the United Nations',87 protesting against the government’s failure to comply 
with Britain’s pro-UN policy.88 Before the hostilities, Labour claimed that Britain 
should use the UN Security Council to help it resolve its problems with Egypt, saying 
that Britain should not contemplate using force without the UN’s approval. Gaitskell 
argued that military intervention disregarded the UN’s Charter. Labour’s deputy leader, 
James Griffiths, centred on this theme in his motion of censure.89
Internal party pressure also persuaded Gaitskell to adopt an anti-war position, with 
people like Denis Healey and Douglas Jay on the right and Barbara Castle on the left, 
being particularly influential.90 Healey was more ‘pacifist’ and ‘neutralist’ than 
Gaitskell had anticipated,91 stemming partly from his vehement distaste for the Soviet 
Union’s invasion of Hungary.92 Gaitskell himself admitted that Healey had critically 
influenced his decision to oppose government policy.93 A ginger group called the Suez 
Emergency Committee, operating from the Movement for Colonial Freedom’s (MCF) 
offices, organised over two hundred and forty protest meetings across the country. 
Constituency party activists also protested against the intervention.94 The Labour left 
attacked Gaitskell for 'outdoing the Tories' in his response to the Canal’s nationalisation 
and his comparison of Nasser with Hitler, suggesting that the leader’s proposal that 
Egyptian funds in Britain be blocked was 'indefensible in law or morality'.95 Gaitskell's
85 Foot, 1973:518.
86 Ovendale, 1992:157-158.
87 Epstein, 1964:80; See also Morgan, 1992:228..
88 Epstein, 1964:75.
89 Ibid:80 62n.
90 Morgan, 1992:228.
91 Gaitskell in W illiam s, ed., 1983:566.
92 Reed and W illiam s, 1971:112.
93 Ibid: 112.
94 H ow e, 1993:270-272.
95 TribuneA 3 A ugust 1956:1
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characterisation of Nasser as Hitler also went down badly, with Tony Benn feeling so 
embarrassed that he 'wanted to shout "Shame". As a member of the back-bench foreign 
affairs group, Benn, along with his colleagues, tried to persuade the leader to take a 
more oppositional line towards government policy.96
Labour’s stance also reflected the shift away from consensus politics, especially 
over colonial policy. Under the impact of the Labour left’s rise and this faction’s 
pressure on the party to adopt a more confrontational approach to foreign policy, in the 
mid-1950s the two major parties began to polarise over colonial issues and 
decolonisation, with Labour adopting a more moralistic opposition to colonialism now 
that it was in opposition. The previous agreement between the two major parties over 
the inevitability of decolonisation gave way to Labour strongly opposing the 
Conservative government’s use of force, especially in British Guyana and the Suez crisis
Q7almost led to a ‘total break-down in communication’ between the two parties.
Although the anti-war campaign satisfied a variety of elements in the party,
Q8including pacifists, anti-colonialists and UN supporters, this unity obscured some 
fundamental differences between the factions. It was not pro-American feeling which 
led left-wingers like Bevan and Crossman to oppose the war. Bevan was deeply 
suspicious of American motives in the Middle East.99 Critical of American and Soviet 
policy, he wanted the two powers to disengage from the region. In the postwar period, 
Gaitskell went on to support the Eisenhower Doctrine whereas Bevan went on to oppose 
it as much as he had objected to the Anglo-French intervention.100 Crossman believed 
that America's policy of appeasement to the Arab states had previously shaped British 
policy, contending that the consequence of America's patronage of the Middle East was 
'the job of bribing the Arabs on our side by sacrificing the essential rights of the Jews'.101
Labour’s reluctance to acknowledge Nasser’s nationalist movement also stemmed 
from the nature of the Egyptian regime. The leadership, in particular, was unwilling to
96 Adams, 1992:117.
97 Kavanagh and Morris, 1989:97-99.
98 Epstein, 1964:78-79.
" F o o t , 1973:517.
100 Ibid:536;539
101 Parliamentary Debates, C om m ons, V ol.566 , 1956-57, Col. 1420.
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embrace a movement which was not social democratic. Nasser’s desire to increase 
Egypt’s independence and to modernise the economy by adopting a neutralist position 
had a progressive element. The Suez campaign turned him into something of a hero 
within Arab nationalism, scuppering Britain and France’s intention to weaken the
I
Egyptian leader. However, in terms of internal policies, Nasser’s promise of 
progress and democratic control of the economy turned out to be superficial. Through a 
system of state control over the economy, landowners, officers and bureaucrats 
continued to have a monopoly over power and the Egyptian people suffered 
considerably as a result of Egypt’s foreign policies.103 Moreover, although Nasser 
opened up the political system with elections to the Legislative Assembly and by giving 
the left greater freedom of expression, the military remained overwhelmingly 
powerful.104
Labour's neglect of the Palestinian refugee question reflected the Palestinians’ 
dependence on Nasser. In the 1950s, the Palestinian cause was intimately bound up 
with Egypt and Palestinian activists were 'drawn into the orbit of Nasserism'.105 
Although Nasser's policy towards the refugees was ambivalent and instrumental, 
Palestinians living in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon saw the Egyptian leader as their natural 
ally against Israel. While Palestinians in Egypt and the Gaza Strip were more sceptical 
about the president, Egypt sponsored some (although not all) of the raids into Israel. 
However, there is a sense in which the Suez crisis helped to stimulate Palestinian 
nationalist consciousness, precipitating the formation of Fatah, which later became the 
dominant faction of the PLO.106 This development would later prove critical to 
Labour’s subsequent shift towards a pro-Palestinian stance.
The party’s hostility towards Nasserism also reflected its ambivalence towards 
anti-imperialist movements. Gaitskell, Dalton and Morrison all valued a pragmatic 
approach to international affairs. The Labour leadership’s aims were not dissimilar from
Rodinson, 1970:77.
103 H alliday, 1979:21.
104 Rodinson, 1970:81.
105 Ajami, 1992:xv.
106 Khalidi in Louis and Owen, eds., 1989:387.
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the Conservative government’s in so far as they prioritised the protection of British 
interests. The difference between the two turned on the means by which these interests 
could best be protected rather than the aims, with Labour believing that force was not 
the way.107 Carlton has suggested that this sentiment stirred the leadership’s protests
I AO
over Suez and represented a form of ‘inverted jingoism’. Gaitskell initially opposed 
Nasser because he felt that the Canal’s nationalisation threatened British interests in the 
region and he did not believe that these should be sacrificed in favour of anti-imperialist 
nationalisms.109 The Labour leader felt that stability in the Middle East was vital to 
Britain's oil interests.110 A number of backbenchers objected to intervention against 
Egypt because they believed that it would 'inflame the Arab nations against us and have 
the gravest repercussions in Asia and Africa'.111 John Strachey,112 a member of the 
revisionist right, argued that:
'We are supposed...to be safeguarding our oil supplies, 
but where will our oil supplies be if we are at war with 
every Muslim state between the Persian Gulf and the 
Atlantic?'.113
Even Bevan argued that the Suez Canal was critical to Europe’s supply of oil, giving 
Egypt the potential to put ‘a stranglehold on the economic life of Europe’.114
Nor was it politically advantageous for Labour to identify too closely with Arab 
nationalism. In an attempt to portray the opposition as unpatriotic, Conservatives 
derided Labour for being 'Nasser's party' or 'Nasser's little lackey', playing on its 
reputation for failing to protect national interests.115 By opposing the war and 
simultaneously objecting to Nasser, Labour could avoid being explicitly jingoistic while
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continuing to allay public fears by appealing to popular hostility towards Arabs. While 
the general public was split along party lines over Suez, some leading party members 
were worried that support for Egypt would alienate working class voters. Bevan, for 
example, thought that middle class ideas overly-influenced Labour's approach to foreign 
affairs.116 The Arab states’ role in the Second World War had created some wariness 
within the British public.117 Before the 1956 hostilities, opinion polls suggested that 
there was widespread opposition to the hostilities. However, once the conflict started, 
the public showed a lot more sympathy for the government and ‘rallied to support’ 
Britain’s position.118
Labour’s continuing sympathy for Israel reflected a number of ideological and non- 
ideological factors too. First, whereas it opposed Nasser for being anti-social 
democratic, it supported the Jewish state for its commitment to social democratic 
principles. Defending the Jewish state, Dalton appealed to its democratic nature and 
said that:
‘I am not a Jew. But I am a very warm admirer of the 
achievements of the State of Israel. In this, I am in the 
mainstream of thought and sympathy of the British 
Labour Party, which has always been very friendly to the 
State of Israel’.119
Greenwood stated that Israel was the only country in the Middle East ‘which [thought] 
and [felt] and [had] the same standards as ourselves’.120 These ideas were pervasive in 
the party. The Labour left believed that Israel’s socialist experiment would raise the 
Arabs’ standard of living and teach them progressive practices.121 This sense of 
common politics led Labour to ignore developments in Israel such as the rise of hard­
liners like Ben-Gurion over moderates like Sharett. As Israel’s Prime Minister between
116 Ibid: 147-148.
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1953 and 1955, Sharett negotiated with Egyptian officers and his diplomatic approach to 
the conflict impressed Nasser.122 Ben-Gurion initiated a campaign against Sharett’s 
moderation, forcing his resignation in 1955 so that he could become leader again. It was 
Ben-Gurion’s tough approach to foreign policy which provided the backdrop to the 1956 
conflict.123
Whereas Labour had no political links with Arab nationalism, it had strong ones 
with the Israeli government and Labour Party. Gaitskell’s visit to the Jewish state in 
1953 had already sharpened his pro-Israeli leanings.124 Dalton was also influenced by 
his links with the Israelis, having met Sharett, his former student at the LSE, and other 
members of the Knesset during one of his visits to the Jewish state. After one visit, he
I ?  Sclaimed that Israel was a country based on the principle of social equality. Bevan was 
on very close terms with Yigal Allon, the Labour Minister.126 Moreover, the Israeli 
labour movement was well-represented at the Socialist International, providing an arena 
for contacts between the two parties.127 Furthermore, there were significant relations 
between the British trade union movement and the Israeli trade union movement, in the 
form of reciprocal visits.128 Finally, there were linkages between Labour Women and 
the Israeli Labour movement through the International Women's School.129
These ties enabled the Israeli Labour Party, Mapai, to lobby the British party over
Suez. During the crisis, Mapai was worried about Labour’s policy. Golda Meir
recalled that some Israeli socialists felt that Labour had ‘swallowed Nasser’s line 
110whole’. ' Israeli politicians tried to rectify this situation, with Mapai, for example, 
contacting the party about the number of fedayeen attacks against Israel.131 Moreover, 
talks with the Israeli Ambassador in Britain influenced Gaitskell’s view that Nasser had
122 Rodinson, 1970:69.
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expansionist ambitions and that his rise would harm Israel in the long term.132 More 
locally, Poale Zion put forward Israel’s case during the debates over the crisis, arguing 
that the Jewish state put into practice the British labour movement’s ideals by trying to 
build socialism, condemning the Conservative government for refusing to supply Israel 
with arms and allowing Nasser to prevent Israeli shipping from using the Canal.133 
Poale Zion tried to re-build relations between Labour and the Jewish community, taking 
part in the creation of Labour Friends of Israel (LFI) in 1957.134 As a non-affiliated 
organisation, LFI aimed to lobby opinion on behalf of Israel. Formed at a public rally at 
Labour’s annual conference, Herbert Morrison was among a number who addressed the 
rally and Anthony Greenwood was its first chair.135
Historical considerations also played a part in the maintenance of Labour’s pro- 
Israel sympathies. Leading Labour figures supported Israel because memories of 
Germany’s wartime atrocities were still fresh in their minds. Gaitskell saw the state as
I 7Athe progressive homeland of an oppressed people, ' and both he and Bevan were 
emotionally attached to the country.137 Gaitskell’s commitment stemmed from his 
experiences in 1930s Vienna where he met Jews brought up in the Central European 
tradition of Marxism,138 and the collapse of social democracy in Austria led him to 
become a strong supporter of anti-fascist causes.139 The ‘spirit of the resistance’ which 
was so strong in France,140 was not lost on this generation of Labour politicians whose 
experience of the war converted them to the Zionist cause. They believed that the 
Jewish people’s survival depended on Israel’s existence and that Egypt threatened this. 
In fact, recent contributions to the crisis show that Nasser was not a great threat to Israel 
at the time and that he wanted to avoid conflict with Israel up to 1955 and for a while 
opposed Palestinian raids into the country.141 Nevertheless, emotional commitment to
132 See W illiam s, e<±, 1983:559-560.
I33LPACR, 1956:72-73.
134 Alderman, 1983:133-134.
135 LFI leaflet, ‘30 Years o f LFI (1957-1987).
136 W illiam s, 1979:393.
137 Foot, 1973:517.
138 See W illiam s, 1979:53-63.
139 Morgan, 1992:222.
140 See Louis and Owen, eds., 1989:4.
141 Khalidi in Louis and Owen, eds., 1989:390.
8 1
the Jewish state remained an important determinant of pro-Israel feeling. Labour 
continued to regard Israel as a refuge for the Jews from persecution and Shinwell spoke 
for many when he said that:
'When, as a result of Hitler's dastardly acts, millions of 
people were destroyed in gas chambers, what could one 
expect? There must be a haven, a refuge for persecuted 
people, the victims of the pogroms and the rest, and there 
was the state of Israel'.142
There were also compelling political reasons for maintaining a pro-Israel position, 
rooted in the continuing link between Jews and social democracy. By 1956, there were 
still significant ties between Labour and the Jews, with the party containing seventeen 
Jewish Labour MPs. Moreover, there was a notable connection between these and the 
party’s left-wing. Six of the MPs were among the fifty-seven who joined Bevan in 
voting against defence policy in 1952. Ian Mikardo and Sydney Silverman were 
prominent left-wingers. Mikardo had close ties with the affiliated organisation, Poale 
Zion and Silverman had connections with various Zionist organisations.143 In the same 
way as the Conservatives exploited the party’s (largely ungrounded) 'pro-Nasser' stand, 
they also made much of Labour's apparent 'betrayal' of its friendship with Israel. In one 
Commons’ debate, a Conservative MP, Charles Waterhouse, and an enthusiastic 
supporter of force against Egypt, said that:
'it is a very cruel thing that the Israelis, in this hour of 
their tribulation, in this hour when every hand is turned 
against them, should find that many of the voices to 
which they have been used to listen have been silent'.144
Gaitskell himself represented a constituency, Leeds South, which contained a significant 
Jewish community. He was married to a Jewish women and his father-in-law was an
142 Parliamentary D ebates, C om m ons, V ol.570 , 1956-57, C ol.609.
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active Zionist.145 Such was the strain between Gaitskell's opposition to the war and his 
sympathies with Israel that he felt compelled to make clear that he had not given up on 
Israel. During his anti-government attack Gaitskell telephoned a close Jewish friend in 
Leeds to reassure her that he was not 'turning against' Israel.146 This concern was not 
groundless. Maurice Orbach’s case illustrated the costs of too close an identification 
with the Arabs’ case. Unlike the other left-wing Jewish MPs, Orbach clearly 
sympathised with Nasser, having previously mediated between Egypt and Israel over the 
Palestinian refugee question.147 At a public meeting, he defended Nasser, eliciting a 
good deal of anger from the Jewish community.148 Orbach represented Willesden East, 
a marginal constituency which contained a good number of Jews who were in a position 
to affect election results.149 Local Conservatives exploited the MP’s difficulties up to 
the 1959 general election and he lost the seat by over two thousand votes.150
The 1956 war did very little to change Labour’s fundamental loyalties in the 
Israel/Arab conflict. Ideological and non-ideological factors combined to produce this 
situation. Committed to social democracy, Labour looked more favourably on Israeli 
nationalism because the Jewish state was a liberal democracy led by a sister party. In 
contrast, although Nasserism appealed to progressive values, it was not a social 
democratic movement and had no political ties with Labour. Moreover, Israeli 
nationalism, because of the history of Nazism, had more of a moral and emotional 
appeal to the party than Arab nationalism. Even so, instrumental factors also played a 
part. Despite Labour’s commitment to anti-imperialism, it was ambivalent towards anti­
imperialist movements, sharing with the Conservatives a commitment to the 
preservation of British interests. Furthermore, its pro-Israeli stance stemmed also from a 
rational calculation of the political costs associated with a pro-Arab policy and the 
benefits arising from a pro-Israeli one. However, there was some evidence of changing 
dynamics and I shall consider these in the next section.
145 Epstein, 1964:194.
146 W illiam s, ed„ 1983:243-244.
147 See Shamir in Louis and O wen, eds., 1989:77.
148 Jew ish C hronicle, 17 A ugust 1956:8; Jewish C hronicle, 31 A ugust 1956:14.
149 Epstein, 1964:185.
150 Alderman, 1983:133. Orbach returned to parliament in 1964 as M P for Stockport South.
83
3.4 Towards Dissent
Despite the overwhelming tendency to continue to support Israel and to be sceptical of 
Arab nationalism, the 1956 conflict did produce a slight shift from the prevailing Labour 
views. People like William Warbey, Edith Summerskill and Tony Benn challenged the 
leadership’s hostility towards Nasser. Benn claimed that 'no country has committed so 
many crimes against Egypt as this country has'.151 After a meeting of the executive of 
Bristol South East CLP in August, he issued a statement which said that:
'the real issue is very simple. Egypt is a poor country 
which since 1882 has been fully or partly occupied by 
British troops. Now free, she is anxious to raise her 
living standards. Without the Aswan Dam she cannot 
succeed...she deserves the support of the British 
people'.152
Edith Summerskill knew Nasser personally. After the war, she visited Egypt and 
returned saying that the Anglo-French attack caused many more casualties than 
acknowledged.153 Barbara Castle and Fenner Brockway led a march of five hundred 
people to protest against the government.154 People linked with the Tribune newspaper 
described the Anglo-French intervention as a 'Crime Against the World', suggesting that 
Britain and France had, in defiance of the United Nations, engaged in an 'evil, 
imperialist struggle against the Arab peoples'.155
The rise of the MCF partly accounted for this development. Formed in 1954, it 
was not linked specifically to one party, however, Labour tended to dominate it.156 The 
organisation aimed to support national liberation movements and decolonisation. It 
attracted people from the party’s left-wing, including Michael Foot, Barbara Castle,
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pacifists like Frank Allaun, and Tony Benn, who was its treasurer. William Warbey was 
also closely involved in the organisation, having chaired its London Area Council. 
There was a particularly strong link between ILP members like Fenner Brockway and 
the MCF. The body’s links with Labour also operated through affiliated constituency 
parties, local and national trade unions. It was the MCF which originally planned the 
anti-war demonstration in Trafalgar Square, allowing Labour to take it over after the 
latter showed some interest.157
Unlike the leadership, these elements did oppose the war on anti-colonialist 
grounds. Warbey was highly critical of Labour’s foreign policy and although he was 
not a fellow-traveller, he had some sympathy for communist principles. Brockway was 
a committed anti-colonialist for humanitarian reasons. He believed in the absolute right 
to national self-determination on moral grounds and wanted Labour to strengthen its 
anti-colonialism and to support independence for all the colonies. The Labour left 
identified with the third force principle, opposing the cold war division between 
America and the Soviet Union.158 It argued that freeing the Middle East from cold war 
ambitions would provide stability in the region and that this depended upon recognition 
of Arab nationalism.159 Barbara Castle advocated a new approach to the Middle East 
'based on the political co-operation of all the great powers, including Russia, in an effort 
to solve the problems of the area'. She claimed that military pacts should be replaced 
with economic aid through UN agencies and suggested that Nasser's position was a 
weaker nation’s response to 'imperialist polices'.160 Left-wing opponents of the war 
were very critical of America’s decision to withdraw aid for Egypt’s Aswan Dam 
project.
Developments in the Middle East also contributed to this shift. In the late 1950s, 
Arab nationalism began to make appeals to socialism and these forms of nationalism 
went on to dominate in Egypt, Syria, Algeria and Iraq in the early 1960s.161 The rise of
157 This account derives from H ow e, 1993:231-249;265;272 note 14.
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Nasser was particularly important. Whatever his shortcomings in terms of domestic 
policy, he was a charismatic leader who won the loyalty of Arab people but also 
appealed to western politicians. Nasser attended the Bandung conference in 1955. The 
conference’s pro-Arab views impressed him and he began to believe that African and 
Asian states needed to distinguish themselves from the superpowers in order to achieve 
independence and argued that they should act as a third force in international politics. 
Nasser created the idea of positive neutrality, which suggested that states like Egypt 
could build up independence if they avoided alignment with the great powers in the cold 
war. 162 The Bandung conference as a whole identified with third force ideas.163 Since 
Labour’s anti-colonialists shared these politics, they began to sympathise with 
Nasserism. This faction’s concern with anti-colonialist goals allowed it to turn a blind 
eye to some of the more unsavoury aspects of Egypt’s internal regime.
At this stage, sympathy for Nasser did not entail criticism of Israeli policy. People 
like Warbey and Brockway had been strongly pro-zionist in the 1940s. Warbey joined 
Silverman, Mikardo and Maurice Orbach in their condemnation of Bevin’s Palestine 
policy.164 Nor was Barbara Castle anti-Israel. She believed that to ignore Arab 
nationalism and to adopt anti-Nasser policies would exacerbate the Arab/Israeli conflict 
and threaten Israel’s existence.165 Reflecting on the crisis, Castle remarked on the 
difficulties of the Arab/Israeli dispute:
‘Though I was no Zionist, I always had an instinctive 
alignment with Israel. I was haunted by the horrors of the 
holocaust and could identify with the Jews’ hunger for 
status and security. At the same time, I had sympathy 
with the Palestinians who had been turned off their land 
and out of their homes so that the new state could be 
formed. It was one of those problems which, like 
Northern Ireland, seemed almost insoluble.’166
162 D essouki in Louis and Owen, eds., 1989:33-36.
163 H ow e, 1993:302.
164 Ibid: 151.
165 T ribune , 21 Septem ber 1956:5.
166 Castle, 1993:242.
86
Only one left-winger, Michael Foot, was openly critical of Israel’s policies. He believed 
that the west’s cold war policies, such as the Baghdad Pact, isolated Israel. However, he 
did not think that this was enough completely to let Israel off the hook.167 Foot 
suggested that although Israel had been subjected to severe provocation, the Jewish 
state’s actions were 'morally wrong and highly dangerous'.168 He has claimed that his 
position stemmed from disillusionment with internal Israeli politics, in particular, the 
marginalisation of moderates like Sharett in favour of activists like Ben-Gurion.169
These developments later provided the basis of a slight change in Labour's analysis 
of the Israel/Arab conflict. Arab socialist groups tried to exploit the anti-imperialist 
tendency in the party which had come to the fore in Suez. At the end of 1957 members 
of an Arab Students Union approached Tony Benn and proposed the establishment of 
permanent links with the Labour Party which could be used as the basis of contacts 
between Labour and Ba'ath Socialists in the Middle East. Although Benn was worried 
about the Ba'ath Socialists refusal to meet the Israelis, he concluded that such contacts 
were the only way to progress.170 John Clarke, the Administrative Officer of the 
International Department, welcomed this development.171 Moreover, after the war the 
NEC asked the International sub-committee to provide a restatement of Labour's Middle 
East policy. The subsequent document proposed that Labour 'seek out and assist 
socialist elements among the Arabs'.172
A Middle East working party aiming to reconsider Arab nationalism and the 
Israel/Arab conflict was set up in 1959. Sympathisers with Israel, including the chair, 
Ian Mikardo, and Crossman, Philip Noel Baker and Kenneth Younger, were members, 
so the working party was unlikely radically to change party policy. Nevertheless, it gave 
Arab nationalism serious consideration for the first time.173 In August 1959 the 
Secretary of the International Department, David Ennals, went on a fact-finding visit to
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Israel, Syria, Lebanon and Cyprus. Crucially, he paid an informal visit to the Ba'ath 
Socialist Party conference in Beirut.174 One of Ennals's aims was to 'make contact with 
socialist groups and to see the Palestine refugee problem at first hand'.175 During his 
stay, he met a number of people involved in the Ba'ath Socialist Party, including Dr. 
Jamal Shaer, a member of its organising committee. In Lebanon he stayed with Nassim 
Majdalany, a parliamentary representative of the Popular Socialist Party led by Kamal 
Jumblat.176
This experience was of formative importance in Ennals's approach to the 
Arab/Israeli conflict. It produced the first indication of a movement away from 
Labour's pro-Israel consensus. In an unpublished report on the Palestinians, Ennals 
wrote that:
'While they [the Palestinian refugees] have eked out their 
existence on the UNRWA rations, maybe supplemented 
by casual labour, they have seen thousands of Jewish 
immigrants from Europe, North Africa and elsewhere 
pour into Israel. They are aware that at the same time as 
Arabs are refused permission to return, the Jewish 
Agency is negotiating for new immigrants'.177
However, Ennals's views remained those of a minority until well after the 1956 war.
3.5 Conclusion
Although the 1956 war provided a significant test of Labour’s pro-Israeli policy, the vast 
majority of the party remained committed to the Jewish state, refusing to see the Israeli 
government as blameworthy as the British and French ones for its intervention against 
Egypt. Leading the anti-war campaign, Gaitskell went to great lengths to distinguish 
Labour’s opposition to the war from support for Arab nationalism. Labour’s
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exonerative attitude towards Israel stemmed from its strong relationship with the Israeli 
Labour leadership and lack of equivalent ties with Arab nationalism together with an 
awareness of the potentially damaging political effect of adopting an anti-Israel policy 
given the relationship between Jews and the party. Moreover, memories of the Second 
World War generated an emotional loyalty to the Jewish state, leading party members to 
rationalise Israeli policy in terms of the country’s survival. Nevertheless, the war did 
generate a ripple of dissent from Labour’s prevailing hostility towards Arab nationalism 
and sympathy for Jewish nationalism. Although few members of the Labour left 
actually challenged Israeli policy, a significant number began to question the 
leadership’s anti-Arab attitudes. The conflict succeeded in putting pressure on the party 
to take Arab nationalism seriously and set off a series of contacts between members of 
Labour’s internal bodies and Arab nationalist groups. In the next chapter, I shall look at 
how Labour responded to a further challenge to its pro-Israeli tradition.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE 1967 WAR: TOWARDS A BREAK-DOWN IN LABOUR’S CONSENSUS
OF SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL
The 1967 war provided the second major test of Labour’s pro-Israel consensus. The 
Jewish state’s definitive victory within six days and its subsequent occupation of the 
West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights, directly challenged the left’s conception of 
the country as an underdog.1 Moreover, invoking a division between the west and the 
Soviet Union, with western countries almost exclusively backing Israel and non­
capitalist countries supporting the Arab states,2 aspects of the conflict appealed to 
Labour’s anti-imperialist politics. Coming from the Bevanite left and committed to 
continuing the postwar process of decolonisation,3 the Labour Prime Minister, Harold 
Wilson, was apparently dedicated to the pursuit of socialist policies abroad.4 With 
this background, Wilson, his government and the party, had to decide between Israeli 
nationalism and anti-imperialist Arab nationalism. Alderman has suggested that 1967 
was a turning-point in Labour’s relations with the Jewish state and that the 
government transgressed the party’s pro-Israel tradition.5 This chapter explores the 
way Labour dealt with the challenges posed by the hostilities. In section one, I show 
how the war created a wave of solidarity with Israel. In the second section, I look at 
the reasons for the party’s overwhelming support for the Jewish state and in section 
three, I consider dissent from the traditional pro-Israel consensus.
4 .1 Solidarity with Israel
Despite the government’s claims to neutrality,6 and Wilson’s contention that Britain 
would not take sides in the conflict,7 leading members of the Cabinet showed
1 K ingsley Martin, ‘Dual Sym pathies on the L eft’, Jew ish  C hronicle , 20  October 1967.
2 Halliday in D avis et al., eds., 1975:161-162.
3 H ow e, 1993:306-308.
4 Morgan, 1987:250.
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6 Brand, 1974:367.
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considerable solidarity with the Jewish state. Wilson strongly condemned Nasser’s 
blockade and spoke of forcing Egypt’s president to open the Straits of Tiran to Israeli 
shipping.8 Referring to Egypt’s part, he said that there was no ‘doubt...that the UAR 
military posture, with its loud orchestrated propaganda support, looked to the Israelis 
like a formidable threat of imminent invasion’.9 The Prime Minister wanted to 
persuade America to break the blockade of Israeli shipping and ‘passionately 
advocated intervention to aid Israel’. Herbert Bowden, the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Affairs, and Ray Gunter, the Minister of Labour, wanted Britain to 
take unilateral action to help Israel. Other key members of the government rallied 
around the Jewish state during the war. Roy Jenkins, the Home Secretary, also backed 
the use of force to help the country. John Silkin, the Chief Whip, apparently became a 
‘fanatical pro-Israeli’, despite his anti-zionist and non-religious Jewish background. It 
was the view that an Anglo-American intervention would look like an attempt to ‘re­
assert western domination in the Middle East’, alienating the Afro-Asian block in the 
UN, that persuaded the leadership to adopt a more cautious approach. 10
It is true that in the parliamentary debates, the Foreign Secretary, George Brown, 
frequently claimed that there was an Arab case as well as an Israeli case.11 When 
Israel continued to occupy the territories captured during the war, he told the UN 
General Assembly that the country should not seek territorial expansion or take 
unilateral action over the status of Jerusalem.12 However, he pursued a pro-Israel line 
behind-the-scenes by adopting a ‘hawkish’ attitude towards the blockade; instructing 
the British delegation at the UN to help America to frustrate the Soviet attack on Israel 
in the General Assembly and by trying to persuade King Hussein of Jordan to seek a 
settlement with Israel.13 Brown also proposed that political assurances should 
accompany Israel’s withdrawal from the territories.14 Wilson later recalled that
8 Eban, 1972:210.
9 W ilson, 1971:395-396.
10 Crossman, 1976:356-358.
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although Brown had never been as pro-Israel as the rest of the leadership, during the 
war he ‘never wavered...to make his weight felt against Arab aggression’.15
It was not just the right that held these views. Richard Crossman, the Leader of 
the Commons, regarded Nasser’s ‘peremptory’ demands as one of the main causes of 
Although he did not favour actively helping Israel, he was clearly torn,
‘For once part of me is on the side of military action but 
another instinct says we shouldn’t take part. We should 
stand aside and let the Americans take the rap, to which 
my reason replies that if we stand aside the Americans 
will let the Israelis down, in which case the Israelis will 
be forced to fight a war on their own and be dubbed an 
aggressor by the U.N. We would have another Suez on 
our hands with a Labour Government this time 
colluding with the aggressor’.17
Crossman’s views surprised his colleagues who thought that he would have adopted a 
more explicitly pro-Israel position and the press even described him as an appeaser. 
Finding this particularly upsetting, he immediately ‘put the record straight’ with the 
Israeli Ambassador.18 When the UN began to debate Israel’s withdrawal from the 
territories, he argued that it was ‘intolerable’ to expect the country to return to its 
previous frontiers.19 Crossman said that Israel’s achievement confirmed the wisdom 
of having ‘left the Israelis alone...to let them have their one chance’."
The PLP also rallied behind the Jewish state. During the war, Labour MPs 
sponsored three pro-Israel EDMs. The most popular motion attracted one hundred 
and sixty-six signatures, one hundred and five of which were from Labour members 
(see Table 4.1 and appendix 4.1). This motion asserted ‘the right of Israel, by her own 
force of arms, to meet an avowed threat to her existence’.21 Although there were three 
Labour-sponsored pro-Arab EDMs, these attracted little support; the most popular had
15 W ilson, 1981:332.
16 Crossman, 1976:355.
17 Ibid:356.
18 Ibid:358;365; See also W ilson, 1981:332.
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the war.16
writing:
only nineteen Labour names (see Table 4.2). Moreover, out of just over three hundred 
Labour MPs, two hundred were registered and paying members of LFI.22
Support for Israel clearly transcended party factions. Although one might have 
expected some left-wing dissent, there was none in the parliamentary party. Eric 
Heffer, MP for Liverpool Walton, for example, was one of Israel’s most outspoken 
supporters. In the Commons, Heffer opposed the UN General Assembly’s resolution 
calling for the state to revoke its law on Jerusalem’s status. He described reports of 
Israel’s intention to incorporate the Gaza Strip as false on the grounds that, first, the 
country wanted to preserve its Jewish character and second, the territories would be an 
economic burden.23 Shortly after the war Heffer was one of seven Labour MPs to fly 
to Israel in order to assess the political situation and the refugee problem at LFI’s 
invitation.24 On his return, he wrote that ‘the Israelis not only want peace with the 
Arabs, but equally they want justice for the Arabs’. On the refugees, he claimed that 
he was convinced that ‘it has not been the declared policy of the Israeli Government to 
force the refugees to leave’.25 Later, Heffer was one of a number of Labour MPs who 
argued that Israel should not return to its pre-June borders and that the Golan Heights 
‘should never go back to having gun emplacements shooting at Israel’.26
For Jewish Labour MPs, the dilemmas of the 1967 conflict were not as acute as 
those of the 1956 war because the party’s leadership was not asking them to oppose a 
war in which Israel was involved. Nevertheless, they were under pressure to express 
outright support for the Jewish state. At the time, there were thirty-eight Jewish 
members of the PLP.27 Some of these had particularly strong links with Zionist 
organisations. Barnett Janner, for example, chaired the Anglo-Israel Parliamentary 
Group and he was president of the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and the 
European Council of World Confederation of General Zionists and a member of the 
World Zionists General Council (Actions Committee).28 In parliament, Janner 
consistently spoke on behalf of Israel, maintaining that the country wanted peace
22 Jew ish Chronicle, 1 July 1967:7.
23 Parliamentary D ebates, C om m ons, V ol. 749, 1966-67, C ols.2059-2060 .
24 The Times, 28 June 1967:6.
25 The Times, 29 July 1967:11.
26 Jew ish Chronicle, 13 October 1967:26.
27 See Alderman, 1983:174-175.
28 The Jew ish Year B ook, 1967:257-258.
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Table 4.1 Pro-tsrael Early-Day Motions, 1967
Date of first tabling Number and title Party support Main sponsor Total number of 
names appended
Number of labour 
names appended (and 
percentage of total 
names)
8.6.67 568. The Middle East Labour, Conservative David Weitzman 166 105 (63)
and Liberal (Labour)
8.6.67 570. Defence of peace Labour Arthur Lewis 1 1 (100)
and Israel (Labour)
27.7.67 630. Middle East Labour William Molloy 11 11 (100)
peace (Labour)
Table 4.2 Pro-Arab Early-Day Motions, 1967
Date of first tabling Number and title Party support Main sponsor Total number of 
names appended
Number of Labour 
names appended (and 
percentage of total 
names)
14.6.67 573. Plight of Arabs 
in Sinai Desert
Labour Jack Ashley (Labour) 19 19(100)
13.7.67 606. Ending Israel’s 
occupation of 
Jerusalem
Labour Margaret McKay 
(Labour)
18 18(100)
No fixed date 78. Her Majesty’s 
Governments’ policy 
towards Arab/Israel 
dispute
Labour Margaret McKay 
(Labour)
1 1 (100)
whereas the Arab states wanted war, supporting Israel’s measures in Jerusalem and 
objecting to the presence of a UN peace-keeping force inside Israel’s frontiers.29 
David Weitzman, the MP for Stoke Newington and Hackney North, made similar 
claims.30 Other Jewish MPs, such as Ian Mikardo, Leo Abse and John Mendelson, 
actively campaigned in favour of Israel by organising ‘solidarity with Israel’ 
meetings.31
The extra-parliamentary party also remained largely pro-Israel. The NEC and 
the Overseas Department contained many more pro-Israel members than pro-Arab 
ones (see tables 4.3 and 4.4). There were few indications of a shift in these sections’ 
attitudes. The Overseas Sub-Committee did show some sign of a more neutral 
position with one document suggesting that peace depended on compromise between 
Israel and the Arab states. The document said that Israel should not hold on to the 
occupied territories and that the Arab states should guarantee Israel’s shipping rights; 
that Israel should take back the refugees created by the war and that both Israel and the 
Arab states should work together in finding a solution to the problem of the other 
refugees; that economic links should be encouraged between Israel and the Arab states 
and finally, that the international community should work towards keeping the level of 
arms in the Middle East down.32 However, these views were not incorporated into 
official policy. In the postwar period, the NEC adopted the UN Security Council 
Resolution 24233 as central to its policy, but added a clause that stressed Israel’s 
‘absolute right to exist’. The Jewish press welcomed the NEC’s position as 
confirmation of Labour’s continuing support for Israel.34
29 Parliamentary Debates, C om m ons, V ol.749 , 1966-67, C ols.2044-2051 .
30 Parliamentary Debates, C om m ons, V ol.749 , 1966-67, C ols.2084-2090 .
31 Jew ish  C hronicle, 9 June 1967:5.
32 ‘The M iddle East War - the Afterm ath’, Labour Party Overseas Sub-C om m ittee, 1967.
33 For the full text o f the resolution, see D jonovich, ed., 1989:8.
34 Jew ish C hronicle, 2 October 1970:40.
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Table 4.3 NEC Members, 1967
Pro-Zionist/Israel_______________________Pro-Arab/Palestinian
A. Bacon F. Allaun
E.M. Braddock T. Benn
J. Callaghan B. Castle
T. Driberg 
A. Greenwood 
J. Lee (Chair)
J. Lestor 
I. Mikardo 
H. Wilson
Nor did the hostilities result in a break-down in the constituency section’s 
support for Israel. Five constituency parties’ resolutions held a position broadly in 
line with the government’s.35 Although there was a groundswell of grass-roots’ 
opposition to the government’s other foreign policies, such as Vietnam, Rhodesia and 
South Africa, there was none on the Middle East generally or the Israel/Arab conflict 
specifically.36 This situation continued well after the war. While Labour activists 
were generally hostile to the government’s foreign policy in the late 1960s, they did 
not attack Wilson’s attitude towards the Middle East,37 with the annual conference 
unanimously accepting the leadership’s policy.38 Moreover, Labour members of the 
GLC showed solidarity with Israel, supporting a policy of sending advisers on 
rebuilding East Jerusalem to Israel and backing Soviet Jewry’s emigration rights.39
Throughout the conflict the TUC remained pro-Israel too. The unions’ 
leadership strongly supported the Jewish state’s aims, calling for the Arab countries to 
recognise Israel and for direct negotiations between the two sides.40 Labour Women 
also continued in the party’s tradition. At the first of its conference held after the war,
35 ‘R esolutions from CLPs and Trade U nion s’, Overseas Department, O V /1966-67:61.
36 See R esolutions, 1967:58-61.
37 R esolutions, 1968:50-53.
38LPACR, 1970:200-205:327.
39 Alderman, 1989:116.
40 TUC Report, 1967:489-492; Jew ish C hronicle , 8 Septem ber 1967:1.
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this section expressed its ‘full solidarity with the people of Israel who are defending 
their existence and their liberty against aggression’. Although Doris Young, from the 
National Labour Women’s Advisory Committee, raised the matter of the Palestinian 
refugees, she supported the resolution and the conference carried it.41 Later, she and 
another member of the committee attended an International Council of Social 
Democratic Women seminar in Israel. After meeting with representatives from the 
Histadrut, the Israeli Labour Party, and the Israeli women’s movement, these women 
reported sympathetically on Israel’s situation in the Middle East, calling for the 
establishment of the ‘closest possible links’ between the British and Israeli labour 
movements to help counter the threat to the Jewish state 42
Table 4.4 Overseas Department Members, 1967
Pro-Zionist/Israel Pro-Arab/Palestinian
J. Callaghan B. Castle
T. Driberg
A. Greenwood
M. Herbison
J. Lee
G. Morgan
H. Wilson
Despite Labour’s ostensible commitment to anti-imperialist politics, it continued 
to have little sympathy for Arab nationalism. Western colonial history in the Middle 
East gave rise to anti-Arab stereotyping, including the characterisation of Arabs as 
aggressive, backward and feudalistic. Moreover, it involved the denial of Palestinian 
identity and portrayals of Palestine as an empty land that needed to be transformed.43 
Rodinson has suggested that western indifference to the Palestinian people stemmed 
from the notion of European supremacy 44 By the late 1960s, important sections of 
the labour movement continued to operate within this tradition. Wilson believed that 
responsibility for the war lay squarely with ‘Arab aggression’ and Nasser’s ‘great
41 NCLW , 1968:40.
42 N A D A V /80/7/70; O V /1969-70/78
43 See Said, 1980:8-9.
44 Ibid:82. o \ 'E u ^o^ a  Op l*\<JV£V<y
Y 6Cf fS*x't* vcWs .
fanfare of aggressive speeches’.45 The trade union leadership also spoke of ‘Arab 
backwardness’ and ‘fascism’. At the TUC conference, Frank Cousins, the TGWU 
leader, referred to the Arab states’ ‘feudalism’. In the debate on the Middle East, Fred 
Hayday, Chair of the International Committee, said that ‘the Arab countries’ war aims 
[were] clear, simple and specific - that is, to drive the Israelis out of Israel and to 
extinguish them as a people...’. Another trade unionist spoke of the Arab states’ 
‘Fascist’ and ‘Nazi’ ideas,46 and these themes were common in the labour 
movement.47
The 1967 conflict also drew attention to the Palestinian question. The PLO was 
formed in 1964 with the aim of uniting expatriate Palestinians. It had a government in 
exile in Gaza and an army consisting of refugees and Nasser was one of its main 
sponsors.48 Having abandoned pan-Arabism in the aftermath of the war in the belief 
that the Arab states were powerless in the face of Israel, Palestinian nationalism 
focused on the figure of Yasser Arafat and called for independent national rights for 
the Palestinians.49 However, key members of the government paid very little attention 
to the refugee question. Although Brown’s speech at the UN called for a solution to 
the refugee crisis, it did not identify Israel as responsible.50 In their postwar 
reflections on the conflict, neither Wilson nor Crossman mentioned the Palestinians at 
all.51 Many party members continued to argue that the Arab states should take 
responsibility for resettling the refugees.52 Moreover, although Labour’s rank and file 
took up other aspects of Third World politics, such as the anti-Vietnam war campaign 
and anti-apartheid, it did not adopt the Palestinian cause. The party as a whole 
showed little sympathy for this movement, condemning the rise of Palestinian 
terrorism and the activities of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
at the 1970 annual conference.53
45 W ilson, 1971:395-396.
46 TUC Report, 1967:489-491.
47 See, ‘Labour Looks at Israel’, LFI, 1971.
48 O vendale, 1984:170-171.
49 Ajami, 1983:123.
50 The Times, 22 June 1967:4.
51 See W ilson, 1971; Crossman, 1976.
52 See, for exam ple, Parliamentary Debates, C om m ons, vo l.749 , co ls .2046-2047;2059;2089-2090;
53 LPACR, 1970:327.
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There is little evidence then that the war significantly altered Labour’s traditional 
sympathies. Indeed, the conflict led most of the party, from the leadership to the 
constituency parties, to rally behind the Jewish state and to condemn the Arab 
countries for aggression. The fact that Israel had a decisive victory and went on to 
maintain military control over the territories and to annex East Jerusalem, was of little 
consequence to the party’s policy. In the next section I shall consider the reasons for 
this.
4.2 Explaining Labour’s Policy
One of the reasons why Labour continued to support Israel during the hostilities was 
essentially ideological, that is, based on a sense of shared political purpose with the 
Jewish state. Heffer, for example, defended Israel’s continued occupation of the 
territories on the grounds that Israel was ‘the only genuine democratic and socialist 
oriented state in the Middle East’.54 The MP Raymond Fletcher said:
‘I support the socialist dockers of Haifa, the socialist 
builders of Beersheba, the socialist farmers on the 
shores of Galilee, the socialist mayor of Nazareth, who 
has given his Arab people better houses and better 
conditions than they would get in Jordan.’55
The political identity between Labour and the Israeli Labour Party led to considerable 
networking, enabling Labour to hear the Israeli case. Wilson, for example, was on 
very close terms with people like Golda Meir,56 Abba Eban and Yigal Allon, 
describing Allon as his ‘closest friend among the Israelis’.57 During the war, Wilson 
entertained the Israeli Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol, at Chequers and Downing 
Street.58 Crossman was close to Labour politicians in Israel and people linked with 
Israel in Britain, such as Marcus Sieff and the Israeli Ambassador, Aharon Remez.
54 See ‘Labour L ooks A t Israel’, LFI, 1971:31.
55 ‘Labour Looks At Israel’, LFI, 1971:30.
56 See Alderman, 1983:160.
57 W ilson, 1981:380.
58 Eban, 1972:192.
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Sieff was vice president of the Joint Palestine Appeal and Crossman kept in touch 
with both people throughout the conflict.59 George Brown publicly announced that 
his concern for Israel’s safety arose out of his being married to a Jewish woman.60 
Furthermore, a number of Cabinet Ministers, including Crossman, Greenwood, 
Bowden, Edward Short, Tony Benn, Patrick Gordon Walker, Arthur Bottomley, 
George Thompson (Minister of State for Foreign Affairs) and Jennie Lee, were 
members of LFI.61
Similar links existed between the TUC and the Israeli labour movement. 
Throughout the 1960s, the TUC leadership and representatives of powerful unions 
such as the TGWU went on a number of mutual exchange visits with the Histadrut 
executive. From the early 1960s the TUC had given the Histadrut financial assistance 
for its Afro-Asian Institute in Tel Aviv. The institute provided scholarships for 
students from countries like Nigeria, (then) southern Rhodesia, Ghana, Grenada, 
Uganda and Zambia for training in trade unionism.62 Left-wing Israeli critics of 
Israel’s role in Africa and Asia have suggested that the Institute was a primary means 
by which the Jewish state tried to ‘build economic and political ties with non-Arab 
Afro-Asian states and to strengthen pro-Israeli influence there’.63 Given the unions’ 
block vote at the annual conference, these links had significant policy consequences. 
Other sections of the Israeli labour movement had links with the British movement. 
For example, Pioneer Women of Great Britain was an affiliate of Mapai operating in 
the UK. Mary Mikardo was a member of this organisation and it sent representatives 
to the Labour Women’s conference.64
Labour’s solidarity with Israel also arose out of a continuing emotional 
commitment, leading it to exonerate the country for policies that it would normally 
have criticised. For instance, the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza involved the 
disenfranchisement of the Palestinian population in these areas, contravening the 
state’s liberal democratic principles. However, Labour chose to gloss over this
59 See Crossm an, 1976:364-365.
60 L itvinoff, 1969:3.
61 Jew ish  C hron icle , 7 July 1967:7.
62 TUC  Report 1964:477; TUC Report 1965:251; TUC  Report 1966:264;TU C  Report 1967:266.
63 H anegbi e ta l .,  1971:12-13.
m N C L W , 1968.
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development. For people who had been around during the Second World War, the 
sight of Arab armies converging on Israel’s borders struck a deep emotional chord. 
Not enough time had passed for war-time memories not to be salient. Referring to 
public sympathy for Israel, Wilson said that it was ‘understandable after two thousand 
years of history and the sufferings of the Jewish people, including the massacres of the 
last war’.65 Defending Israel’s postwar policies, Crossman claimed that the country 
had ‘raised the status of the Jew and banished his sense of insecurity which provided 
for centuries the basis of antisemitism’.66
These ideological and historical factors gave Israel an advantage over the Arab 
nationalist leadership. Arab nationalism was not based on social democratic 
principles. In the period after the Second World War, Nasserism was the dominant 
anti-imperialist movement in the Arab world, opposing western control over Egypt’s 
economy and apparently empowering the masses through state control of the 
economy. However, its socialist rhetoric oWur-ccUhe fact that Nasser did not allow 
mass political organisation.67 Furthermore, there were no Arab members of the 
Socialist international at the time, with which the party could identify. Although the 
Palestinian cause had begun to organise itself, it was still subordinated to pan- 
Arabism, being physically dependent on the Arab states’ sponsorship. The PLO’s 
lack of independence meant that the Palestinians had yet to touch western opinion. 
Just before the war, people living in western Europe were almost completely unaware 
of the Palestinian refugee crisis, despite the fact that there were already over a million 
refugees.68
However, external political considerations also played an important part in 
shaping the government’s policy. In office, Labour was constrained by the need to 
protect British interests. Despite the left’s expectations, Wilson’s approach to 
international affairs departed little from the conservative tradition.69 The anti­
colonialist left’s hopes for the government had been premature, evidenced especially
65 W ilson , 1971:403.
66 Jew ish  C hronicle, 10 N ovem ber, 1967:19.
67 Halliday, 1979:21-24.
68 O vendale, 1984:172-175.
69 W rigley in C oopey et. al. eds., 1993:123-125.
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by Wilson’s attitude towards Rhodesia and Vietnam.70 The government’s 
commitment to Atlanticism was an important dynamic behind its support for Israel. 
Wilson enthusiastically supported a strong alliance with America in opposition to the 
Soviet Union. His tacit support for American involvement in Vietnam was the most 
controversial expression of this tendency.71 Wilson’s belief that Britain should form a 
special relationship with America shaped his general attitude to foreign affairs.72 
Indeed, all the key players at the time - Wilson, Brown and Healey - accepted the need 
for Britain to ally itself with America in opposition to the Soviet Union. Brown 
subordinated his pro-Arab inclination to his fear of the Soviet Union. Being a tough- 
minded pragmatist, Healey, the Defence Secretary, prioritised the alliance with the US 
and he was keen to maintain British presence in areas such as south-east Asia and the 
Persian Gulf and even supported the supply of arms to South Africa.73
Under Wilson between 1964 and 1970 the Labour government preserved aspects 
of the postwar consensus in foreign policy, including the nuclear deterrent and pro- 
Americanism, despite Wilson’s short-lived spell of unilateralism. At the end of his 
second term, he even approved the updating of the Polaris system.74 This continuity 
between Labour and the Conservative tradition expressed itself in the government’s 
attitude towards the Middle East. There was considerable agreement between Labour 
and the Conservatives over the 1967 war. The leader of the opposition, Edward 
Heath, welcomed Wilson’s approach,75 and in none of the four Commons debates was 
there a division or a motion of censure,76 contrasting sharply with the Suez crisis.
In 1967 the west’s identification with Israel and the Soviet Union’s support for 
the Arabs was most pronounced.77 Israel’s alliance with America had been sharpened 
in the years preceding the 1967 war. The USA provided the Jewish state with 
ideological, economic and military support.78 In the previous wars, America was 
more ambivalent, supporting the formation of the state in 1948, but opposing its role
70 H ow e, 1991:308.
71 Pelling, 1991:148.
72 Foot, 1968:207-213.
73 Morgan, 1992:317-320.
74 Kavanagh and Morris, 1989:102-103.
75 W ilson, 1981:336-344.
76 Jew ish Chronicle, 7 July 1967:7.
77 Halliday in D avis, M ack and Y uval-D avis, eds., 1975:161-162.
78 C hom sky, 1986:1-27.
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in the 1956 war in the belief that Israel was not in sufficient danger to warrant US 
support. However, in 1967, it saw the Jewish state as an ally in its attempts to counter 
revolutionary movements.79 Leading Israeli Labour politicians, like Shimon Peres, 
made it clear to key party members that Israel’s ambition was to integrate into the 
industrially advanced west. Israel’s pro-western orientation made it an obvious ally 
for a Labour government which wanted to strengthen its relationship with America.
Internal political considerations were also important. In 1967, Labour lost 
control of the GLC and its inner London districts which the party had controlled from 
the 1930s.81 The Conservatives took the lead in the opinion polls, largely because of 
the government’s unpopular economic policies. Wilson, and the Chancellor, James 
Callaghan, presided over a government whose determination to ward off devaluation 
led to a series of economic measures, including a wages and price freeze, which were
O'} 0-1
badly received. During the war, public opinion was predominantly pro-Israel. ' 
Two Gallup polls showed that one fifth of the British public wanted Britain actively to 
help Israel, compared with 1 per cent who wanted Britain to fight on the Arabs’ side.84 
A poll conducted by the Opinion Research Centre for the Sunday Times showed that 
whereas 56 per cent of the people questioned supported Israel, only 2 per cent of those 
polled supported the Arab states.85 Popular support for Israel was also expressed in 
the high level of participation in ’solidarity with Israel’ rallies, with around ten 
thousand people attending a pro-Israel demonstration on 5 June. Wilson and people 
like Crossman were acutely aware of the weight of public opinion in favour of 
Israel,87 and this was likely to have played a part in their thinking.
In this context, too, the leadership took notice of Jewish opinion. Jewish 
members of the party were quick to condemn any public signs of a moderate approach
79 Halliday in D avis et al. eds., 1975:161-162.
80 See Benn, 1987:489.
81 Pelling, 1991:140.
82 Ibid: 140-141.
82 O vendale, 1984:174-175.
84 Jew ish Chronicle, 9 June 1967:26.
85 Jew ish  Chronicle, 14 July 1967:16.
86 The Times, 6 June 1967:1.
87 See W ilson, 1971:403 and Crossman, 1976:370.
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to the Arabs, with Poale Zion warning of alienating Jewish opinion.88 The Jewish 
community and a number of Jewish Labour MPs characterised the government’s 
ostensible non-alignment as a betrayal of the party’s pro-Israel tradition, portraying 
the policy as one of non-intervention in favour of the Arabs. The Jewish press 
maintained that ‘the Foreign Office, from Bevin to Brown, has based its policy on its 
so-called Arab friends’.89 The Labour MP, Emmanuel Shinwell, forcefully attacked 
the leadership for failing to take positive action in favour of Israel.90 Paul Rose, 
David Weitzman, Sydney Silverman and Barnett Janner all reacted sharply to Brown’s 
pro-Arab tone at the UN.91 Poale Zion’s General Secretary, Sidney Goldberg, told the 
party that the organisation was dismayed at Brown’s UN speech, saying that 
‘appeasement’ would be counterproductive for Britain’s relations with Israel and the 
Arab states.92 The organisation sent a delegation to the Prime Minister complaining 
about the UN speech and seeking confirmation of Labour’s commitment to Israel. 
Concerned about these developments, Wilson instructed Gerald Kaufman, then the 
Parliamentary Press Liaison Officer, to clarify the government’s position, which was 
that it did not advocate an Israeli withdrawal in the absence of guarantees for its 
recognition.93
The PLP chose to support Israel for much the same reasons as the government, 
namely, a strong ideological and emotional attachment to the country. However, its 
failure to challenge the leadership’s position reflected also its conservative and pro­
leadership tendency in the 1960s. The parliamentary left had begun to grow, partly as 
a result of new recruits after the 1964 and 1966 elections,94 and partly as a result of 
the establishment of the Tribune Group in 1966.95 However, it was not a strong 
oppositional force at this stage, lacking a well-defined programme and constrained by 
its ties with Wilson.96 During the first years of Wilson’s government, much of the left
88 Correspondence from Sidney Goldberg to Gwyn Morgan, Overseas Department; see also Jew ish  
C hronicle, 14 July 1967:7.
89 Jew ish C hronicle, 9 June 1967:6.
90 The Times, 8 June 1967:7.
91 Jew ish C hronicle, 21 July 1967:17; Jew ish  C hronicle, 3 N ovem ber 1967:18.
92 Telegram  , 22 June 1967.
93 Jew ish  C hronicle, 4  August 1967:1.
94 Berrington in Kavanagh, ed., 1982:81.
95 See Seyd, 1987:77.
96 Seyd, 1987:16.
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supported the new leader and the PLP was very loyal to him.97 A similar situation 
existed in the NEC. Its left-wing members included people like Mikardo, Greenwood 
and Jennie Lee, all of whom belonged to the generation who welcomed the 
establishment of the Jewish state in the 1940s, for humanitarian reasons. However, 
grass-roots’ sympathy for Israel was paradoxical because America’s support for Israel 
was related to its attempt to gain political, economic and military control over other 
parts of the Third World.98 Given the activists’ hostility towards American foreign 
policy and Wilson’s pro-American orientation, one might have expected a different 
outcome. The fact that there was not testifies to the idiosyncratic nature of Israel’s 
appeal and the continuing Jewish presence in left-wing politics at the time, with 
prominent Jewish members of the left, such as Ian Mikardo and Frank Allaun, 
reinforcing the idea of a link between Jews and socialist politics.
Claims that the 1967 war ended Labour’s traditional sympathy for Israel99 
therefore fail to capture the extent of pro-Israeli feeling within the party during the 
war. A number of factors, including international allies and national opinion, 
determined Wilson’s foreign policy generally,100 and these, together with a strong 
ideological and emotional commitment to the state played a part in Labour’s views. 
Yet despite the weight of opinion in favour of Israel, there were signs of the start of a 
break-down in the pro-Israel consensus.
4.3 Dissent from the Pro-Israel Consensus
Only a small minority dissented from the party’s conventional position. However, 
whereas in 1956 only a few individuals challenged the pro-Israel consensus, in 1967 
the dissenters were more organised, more vocal and more systematic. The war 
marked the start of a trend which intensified throughout the 1970s and reached a peak 
in the 1980s. Labour has always contained a pro-Arab minority following in Bevin’s 
tradition. George Brown, for example, had pro-Arab sympathies, although he forsook1
97 See Foot, 1968:301-309.
98 Deutscher, 1967:31.
99 See Alderm an, 1983:160.
100 W rigley in C oopey et al., eds., 1993:125.
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these for what he perceived as higher objectives during the war. Douglas Jay, 
President of the Board of Trade, one of the party’s revisionists, also sympathised with 
the Arabs.101 From the PLP, Christopher Mayhew was the most notable advocate of 
the Arab cause; Crossman described him as a ‘fanatical pro-Arab’.102 Others included 
Margaret McKay, Andrew Faulds and David Watkins.103
Whereas Cabinet Ministers were constrained by their offices and had to 
moderate their positions, the backbenchers were freer to voice their opinions. In the 
period immediately after the war, they attacked Israel for occupying the captured 
territories and for annexing East Jerusalem. Margaret McKay sponsored an EDM 
which called for an end to Israel’s occupation of Jerusalem. The motion also urged 
the country to implement the UN General Assembly’s resolution, which had declared 
the annexation of East Jerusalem invalid, and to observe the UN Charter which stated 
that war should not lead to territorial expansion.104 The EDM attracted eighteen 
Labour signatures, including those of Mayhew, Watkins and Faulds and Will 
Griffiths from the left (see appendix 4.2). In a Commons debate on the Middle East, 
Mayhew accused Israel of the ‘arbitrary annexation’ of Jerusalem.105
They also challenged the party’s view of Arabs, objecting to the idea that Arab 
aggression caused the war, with Mayhew saying that:
‘We should stop labelling the Arabs the aggressors...It is 
not true that either the Arabs or the Jews are the 
aggressors in this quarrel. It depends where in time one 
takes one’s stand. If one takes one’s stand on 5th June, 
the Israelis were the aggressors; but if one takes one’s 
stand a fortnight earlier, at Aqaba, then the Egyptians 
were the aggressors’.106
In a private meeting of Labour’s foreign affairs group, Mayhew denied that Nasser 
was a racist, saying that when the Egyptian president spoke of the liberation of
101 Jew ish C hron icle , 7 July 1967:7.
102 Crossman, 1976:370.
103 M Ps for W oolw ich  East, Clapham, Sm ethwick and Duham C onsett respectively.
104 N otices o f M otions, 7 July 1967-27 October 1967:12811.
105 Parliamentary Debates, C om m ons, V ol.749, 1966-67, C ol.2047.
106 Parliamentary Debates, C om m ons, V ol.749, 1966-67, C ols. 2098-2099 .
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Palestine he did not mean to annihilate the Jews.107 He also appeared on a Panorama 
programme, expressing sympathy for Nasser.108 Moreover, the right-wing pro- 
Arabists drew attention to the Palestinian refugee crisis, comparing the Palestinians’ 
situation with Jewish historical experience. Mayhew maintained that while the 
establishment of Israel had seemed to the Jews ‘a miraculous homecoming after two 
thousand years of dispersion’, for the Palestinians, it had meant ‘dispersion from the 
land of their fathers and their holy places, eviction from land which they...had 
occupied for longer than the Jews’.109
Some of these MPs took part in the formation of the Council for the Promotion 
of Arab-British Understanding (CAABU). CAABU was formed in 1967, apparently 
in response to the revelation that 98 per cent of the British public had no knowledge of 
the Arab world.110 It aimed to strengthen economic, political and cultural links with 
Arab countries. Although CAABU was not exclusively a Labour organisation, it 
lobbied on behalf of the Arab cause within the party. In 1967 it held a meeting at the 
party’s conference, with the MP Bob Edwards presiding and Mayhew speaking.111 
Mayhew also played a central part in the formation of the Labour Middle East Council 
(LMEC) in 1969 and Faulds and Watkins later became deeply involved with the 
Council. LMEC’s goal was to persuade the Labour Party to take up the Arab cause. It 
published pamphlets and organised meetings at the annual conference in order to put 
forward the Arab case. LMEC members sought the same affiliated status as Poale 
Zion, although without success, with the NEC consistently rejecting the organisation’s 
requests for affiliation.112
The 1967 conflict also precipitated left-wing dissent from the party’s traditional 
stance. Barbara Castle, the Minister of Transport, opposed the leadership’s original 
reaction to rally around Israel with America. Castle viewed Wilson’s plan to ‘stand by 
the US’ and ‘enforce the right of innocent passage through the G u lf as ‘no better than 
1956’.113 In the PLP, the left-wingers Will Griffiths and Stanley Orme, MPs for
107 The Tim es, 7 June 1967:5.
108 Crossman, 1976:364.
109 Parliamentary Debates, C om m ons, V ol. 749, 1966-67, C ols.2096-2097.
110 C A A B U  leaflet.
111 Jew ish  Chronicle, 13 October 1967:26.
112 M inutes o f  the m eeting o f  the Organisation Committee: Org/9 10 July 1972;NEC 26  July 1972.
113 Castle, 1984: 258.
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Manchester Exchange and Salford West respectively, adopted a pro-Arab stance. 
Crossman contemptuously described them as ‘left-wing Nasserites just back from 
Egypt’.114 In the Commons, Griffiths forcefully argued for a re-evaluation of Arab 
nationalism, contending that it represented an understandable response to western 
interference in the Middle East, especially after the Suez W ar.115 Griffiths was one of 
three Labour MPs who moved a critical amendment to the pro-Israel EDM put down 
on 8 June, calling for the right of Egypt, Jordan and Syria to ‘live without breach of 
their territorial integrity’ in accordance with the UN Charter.116
Outside parliament, the Tribune left began to question the party’s conventional 
approach to the conflict. Previously one of Israel’s the most enthusiastic supporters, it 
now condemned the country’s decision to remain in the territories captured during the 
war and to annex East Jerusalem on the grounds that these policies breached 
international law.117 The shift in this strand’s position was sharply illustrated in the 
editorial’s contention that:
‘sentimental Israelis are wont to excuse this 
[annexation] on the grounds that Jerusalem means so 
much to the Jews. It means a lot to the Moslems too,
I 1 8but no-one is being sentimental about them’.
The Tribune left now explicitly challenged customary conceptions of the Arabs as 
feudalistic, backward and reactionary, arguing that Nasser’s Egypt represented a 
source of ‘stability and moderation’ in the region and denouncing ‘hysterical 
comparisons with Hitlerism’.119 It also took up the Palestinian cause and claimed that 
peace between Israel and the Arab states depended upon Israel accepting its 
obligations towards ‘the hundreds of thousands of Arab refugees who lost their homes 
when Israel was created’. Tribune carried a cartoon by Abu which depicted Moshe
1 70Dayan sending Palestinian refugees back to where they ‘didn't come from’.
114 Crossman, 1976:361.
115 Parliamentary D ebates, C om m ons, V ol. 747, 1966-67, C ols. 142-153.
116 N otices o f  M otions, 5 June 1967-6 July 1967:12122.
117 Tribune , 16 June 1967:1; Tribune, 30  June 1967:2.
118 Tribune, 7 July 1967:3.
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Furthermore, a leading member of this group, Michael Foot, was one of LMEC’s 
sponsors.
Although the party’s right and left-wing dissenters united in their challenge to 
the pro-Israel tradition, their reasons for doing so were not the same. The right’s 
dissent was not motivated by a socialist-inspired anti-imperialist ideology. This 
faction’s support for the Arabs lay more with a desire to protect British interests in the 
Middle East than an idealistic concern for Arab nationalist aspirations. Although 
CAABU aimed to be independent of party politics, conservatives and business 
sponsorships originally dominated the organisation.121 Following in Bevin’s
I 9 9footsteps, " the Labour right was highly pragmatic and objected to the notion of 
socialist foreign policy as unrealistic.
Brown subordinated his pro-Arabism to the demands of office, but he did 
sympathise with Arab aims. Reflecting on his position, he claimed that it arose out of 
his ‘oddly inherited Irish background, which made [him] an anti-imperialist and gave 
[him] sympathy for people who were trying to throw off the yoke of imperialism’.123 
This interpretation was rather romantic, contradicting the Foreign Secretary’s 
reputation for being strongly pro-American and hostile to the Soviet Union. 
Moreover, Brown’s own links with the Middle East originated in commercial 
contacts.124 During the 1950s, Brown had got to know a number of Arab leaders, 
including a member of the Lebanese Parliament, Emile Bustani, who wanted to put 
the Arab case to western politicians. Through Bustani, Brown made contact with 
King Hussein of Jordan and, most importantly, with President Nasser, whom he 
admired greatly.125 In the past, Douglas Jay was associated with Socialist 
Commentary, a journal which advocated maintaining British influence in the colonies 
and promoted a paternalistic type of imperialism.126 Mayhew was Bevin’s 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary during the 1945 to 1951 Labour governments and had 
backed the government’s Palestine policy in the 1940s. Some suggested that McKay’s
121 Interview with John G ee, Information Officer, C A A B U , 27 June 1991.
122 See Haseler, 1969:112-137.
123 Brown, 1971:227.
124 Ib id:227-228.
125 See Brown, 1971:229-231.
126 Foote, 1986:203-204.
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support for the Arabs derived from her dedication to the monarchies in Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia.127 McKay retired in Abu Dhabi in the Union of Arab Emirates.128
In contrast, the left’s views sprang from a different set of factors. This faction’s 
previous sympathy for Israel arose from its identification with moderate members of 
Mapai, such as Sharett.129 However, developments within Israeli politics undermined 
this identity. Although the Israeli Labour Alignment, formerly Mapai, was still in 
power, it had moved rightwards in relation to external affairs and the Palestinians. 
The Israeli government’s postwar policies reflected the subordination of the moderate 
strand of Zionism, represented by Sharett, to the activist strand of Zionism, represented 
by people like Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir. The entry of former military people into 
politics was partly responsible for this development.130 People known as hard-liners 
on external policy, such as Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres, entered politics from the 
military under Ben-Gurion’s patronage.131 Peres was Deputy Minister of Defence 
between 1959 and 1965 and Dayan was Minister of Agriculture from 1959 to 1966 
and appointed Minister of Defence in June 1967.132 The Labour left in Britain did not 
identify with the new, activist type of politician in Israel, seeing Dayan’s rise in 
politics as an obstacle to peaceful settlement in the Middle East. ' *
Moreover, by the time of the war this element had become more sensitive to 
anti-colonialist politics. America’s involvement in Vietnam generated a wave of 
protests. The 1967 hostilities took place, crucially, in the midst of these 
developments. Left-wing activists began to make connections between Israel’s role in 
the Middle East and America’s involvement in Vietnam and to see Israel as a major 
inhibitor of Arab nationalism.134 Griffiths argued that ‘it [was] the conviction of Arab 
nationalists everywhere that Israel was created as an instrument of imperialism and 
not a refuge for persecuted Jews’ and that the current crisis was a direct result of the 
west’s use of Israel to defend its interests in 1956.135 Left-wing dissenters from
127 Jew ish C hronicle, 7 July 1967:7.
128 W ho’s W ho, 1993.
129 Interview with M ichael Foot, 1 N ovem ber 1990.
130 Shanin in Halliday and A lavi, eds., 1988:244.
131 Peri, 1983:71-73; M edding, 1972:252-253.
132 Ovendale, 1992:156; 180-181.
133 Tribune, 30  June 1967:2.
134 See N ew  Left R eview , N o. 44, 1967:30-45.
135 Parliamentary Debates, C om m ons, V ol. 747, 1966-67, C ols. 143-144.
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Labour’s pro-Israel tradition tended to be involved in the anti-colonialist and anti­
racist movements. Castle, was a long-time member of the anti-colonialist left and 
between 1960 and 1964 she was president of the Anti-Apartheid Movement.136 David 
Ennals chaired the Anti-Apartheid Movement between 1960 and 1964.137 As a 
backbencher, Ennals was one of a few MPs to oppose the government’s attitude 
towards Vietnam.138 Tribune was a forum for protesting against America’s war 
against Vietnam too. It was no accident that the paper chose to serialise the 
reflections of the radical American journalist, I.F. Stone, on the Israel/Arab war.139 
Stone was a sharp critic of American foreign policy.
The rise of Nasser as a figurehead against western neo-colonialism appealed to 
these new sentiments. Despite Arab nationalism’s ambivalent relationship to 
socialism, it began to exploit socialist language.140 Arab, especially Palestinian, 
politics started to converge with other major issues and people like Frantz Fanon, Mao 
and Guevara entered the Arab ‘political idiom’.141 Arab nationalism’s appeal to 
socialist principles led this faction to ignore the unsavoury aspects of movements like 
Nasserism and Ba’athism, including the repression of communist elements. Some of 
those who sympathised with the Arabs were aware of these movements’ short­
comings but willing to tolerate them. For example Ennals believed that Labour 
should form good relations with Ba’athist socialists despite the fact that they were not 
democratic socialists.142 These developments provided fertile ground for the creation 
of contacts between Arab groups and the party, serving to counter the ties between 
Jewish groups and Labour. Links between Labour and the PLO were also established.
Tribune had made contact with Palestinian refugees and the PLO before the 1967 
war,143 and the PLO’s decision to forge a separate identity in the postwar period 
further generated support for Palestinian nationalism in this faction.144
136 See H ow e, 1993:250.
137 W h o’s W ho, 1992.
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However, the introduction of pro-Arab views into the party provoked a furore. 
In a Commons debate, Janner attacked McKay, asking her to read ‘the scurrilous, 
venomous-Hitlerian’ literature of the Arabs.145 Pro-Israel activists, such as Paul Rose, 
Edward Rowlands and David Weitzman, moved critical amendments to the pro-Arab 
EDMs. Mayhew’s appearance on Panorama got an angry response, with a number of 
Labour MPs writing to the Chief Whip complaining that the M P’s presence on the 
programme gave the impression that his views represented the Labour Party’s.146 
Thirty-five Labour backbenchers signed the letter, including Ted Rowlands, Edwin 
Brooks, John Dunwoody, Myer Galpern, Arnold Shaw, Daniel Jones, Lena Jeger, 
Raymond Fletcher and Paul Rose.147 The political costs of appearing to sympathise 
too closely with the Arabs were most clear in the case of McKay. McKay entered into 
a debate with her constituency party over her pro-Arab activities and the NEC 
authorised a reselection meeting to solve the difficulties. However, she withdrew 
from the contest before the meeting was held.148
In the party’s left, a rift developed between previously close colleagues. Ian 
Mikardo was deeply distressed by Tribune's line on the conflict. In his article, ‘Who 
let Nasser off the leash?’,149 he deviated from the newspaper’s editorial position. 
Mikardo resigned from Tribune shortly after this episode and it is possible that the 
newspaper’s movement towards a more critical position on Israel contributed to his 
resignation. Tribune's position on the war also led to a debate with the Israeli party, 
Mapam, which was to the left of Mapai, centering on the paper’s refusal to accept that 
Nasser was intent on territorial expansion.150 Moreover, Abu’s cartoon led to 
accusations of anti-semitism, but Michael Foot and others on the newspaper’s board 
denied these accusations and defended the cartoon’s publication.151
Did these developments result in Labour anti-semitism? In the first place, very 
few Labour members adopted an anti-zionist stance, defined in terms of opposition to 
the existence of a Jewish state. Even the strongest pro-Arabists in the party, Mayhew
145 Parliamentary Debates, C om m ons, V ol.749 , 1966-67, C ols.2049-2050.
146 Jew ish  C hronicle, 16 June 1967:23 and Crossman, 1976:364.
147 The Times, 13 June 1967:4.
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and Mckay, defended Israel’s right to exist;152 although, in a private meeting of the 
party’s foreign affairs group Mayhew advocated the reconstruction of Israel as a ‘non- 
zionist, multi-racialist state’.153 At this stage too, the Labour left explicitly did not 
adopt an anti-zionist stand-point and consistently defended Israel’s right to exist. For 
example, Tribune's pointed critique of Israel’s policies also stated that ‘the Arabs 
have got to accept the existence of Israel. They must recognise as every sane person 
does, that Israel...has the “right to live’” .154 In 1967 this faction was wholly free from 
anti-Jewish stereotypes.
However, some individual members of the pro-Arab strand did use anti-Jewish 
ideas. Although anti-zionism and anti-semitism are analytically distinct, they can 
overlap in practice.155 The theme of Jewish ‘dual loyalty’ and a conspiracy theory of 
Zionism have been central to traditional anti-semitism and there is clear evidence of 
these themes appearing in the views of prominent pro-Arab members of the party. 
Mayhew, for example, consistently exaggerated Zionist power, holding that the 
‘zionist lobby’ was responsible for Labour’s policy.156 Mayhew later defected to the 
Liberal Party. In the early 1970s, Young Liberals like Peter Hain, now a Labour MP, 
were at the forefront of the anti-apartheid and anti-zionist campaign inside the Liberal 
Party, leading to Lord Beloff’s resignation.157 Andrew Faulds and David Watkins also 
used anti-Jewish themes. For example, in a Commons debate on the Middle East, 
Faulds made a very explicit appeal to the idea of Jewish dual loyalty when he said 
that:
‘It is time some of our colleagues on both sides of the 
House forgot their dual loyalty and another Parliament.
They are representatives here and not in the Knesset...it 
is undeniable that many MPs have what I can only term 
a dual loyalty, which is to another nation and another 
nation’s interests’.158
132 See Parliamentary Debates, Com m ons, V ol. 747, 1966-67, Col. 170 and M ayhew  in Twentieth  
Century’, V ol. 1066, 1971:4.
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Wilson later removed Faulds from the front-bench for ‘uncomradely behaviour’ in 
‘impugning the patriotism’ of Jewish M Ps.159 In his reflections on ‘Labour and 
Palestine’, Watkins argued that Zionism was a nationalistic philosophy which opposed 
the basic principles of democratic socialism. In his account of the relationship 
between Zionism and the labour movement, he drew heavily on a conspiracy theory of 
Zionism, maintaining that ‘the infiltration of the Labour Party has always been the 
policy of British agencies of the world-wide Zionist movement’; he said that this 
infiltration began in 1906 and that it was ‘under Zionist influence [that] Labour 
adopted double standards towards the Middle East in the year of the Balfour 
Declaration’. Explaining the pro-zionist tradition of the party, Watkins argued that 
‘during the 1930s and ‘40s, the Zionists consolidated their grip on the Labour Party 
and came completely to control its policy towards the Middle East’.160 This crude 
conspiracy theory of Zionism runs through Watkins’s pamphlet, completely ignoring 
the fact that Labour frequently exploited Zionism for its own purposes and abandoned 
it when it wanted to, as in the postwar government.
Despite these signs of dissent, Labour criticism of Israel and sympathy for the 
Arabs remained marginal. At the 1970 conference, the NEC’s statement on the 
Middle East condemned the activities of the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine. It claimed that the UN Resolution 242 provided the best basis of peace in 
the region but added a series of clauses which prioritised Israel’s right to exist as a 
sovereign state. David Ennals asked conference to refer back the statement on the 
grounds that the NEC had added the party’s ‘own gloss’ to the UN resolution. 
Ennals’s request was overwhelmingly defeated.161 The conference also refused to 
observe a minute’s silence in memory of President Nasser, who died that year.162 In 
the period after the war, the NEC consistently rejected LMEC’s requests to affiliate.
159 Ziegler, 1993:389.
160 W atkins, 1975:3-14.
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4.4 Conclusion
Labour mainly responded to the war by maintaining its pro-Israeli stance. Indeed, the 
hostilities succeeded in uniting the leadership, most of the PLP, the NEC, the trade 
unions and the constituency parties behind the Jewish state, cutting across party 
factions. This virtual consensus existed because the Israeli Labour Alignment shared 
significant ideological and political links with Labour, and the Israeli right-wing had 
yet to dent the left’s hegemony. It also existed because the Palestinian nationalist 
movement had only just emerged as an independent force and had not managed to 
influence international opinion. Partly because of this, it was more politically 
advantageous for Labour to adopt a pro-Israeli rather than a pro-Arab position. The 
weight of sympathy for Israel in the party made it impossible, for the small minority of 
dissenters from the pro-Israel consensus to affect any policy change. All the more so 
since those who challenged the leadership’s stance were either marginal mavericks, 
like Christopher Mayhew, or elements from the Labour left which was relatively 
powerless at this stage. Nevertheless, the 1967 conflict represented a turning-point in 
so far as the seeds for change were sown and a further crisis in the Middle East where 
Israeli policies appeared to depart even more from socialist principles, would almost 
certainly generate a greater level of dissent. In the following chapter, I shall look at 
Labour’s reaction to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982.
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CHAPTER FIVE
ISRAEL IN LEBANON: A NEW LABOUR CONSENSUS?
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Israel made a series of incursions into Lebanon. 
The 1982 invasion was the most controversial, unleashing an unprecedented level of 
international condemnation. Although the attempted assassination of Shlomo Argov, 
the Israeli Ambassador in London, was the pretext for the strike, Israel aimed first, to 
undermine the PLO’s military and political base in the country; second, to forge links 
with its Lebanese allies and third, to improve its border security.1 The government 
believed that a heavy military blow to the PLO would render it incapable of carrying 
out terrorist activities and erode its support among moderate Palestinians.2 In 
September the Lebanese Christian militia massacred Palestinians in the Sabra and 
Chatila refugee camps in Beirut. The massacre took place within sight of the Israeli 
army,3 creating the view that Israel’s decision to send the militia into the camps 
rendered it responsible for the subsequent events. The invasion and the massacre 
dramatically undermined the Jewish state’s international standing. The resulting 
furore drew attention to a new form of left-wing anti-zionism, found mainly in new 
and far left groups and the women’s movement.4 How did the social democratic left 
react? In this chapter, I look at the way the British Labour Party responded to Israel’s 
policy towards Lebanon. In section one I illustrate the shift in the party’s attitudes. In 
section two I consider the reasons for this shift. In the third section I explore the 
emergence of anti-zionism and in the fourth section, I investigate the intra-party 
conflict resulting from the policy change and the leadership’s subsequent efforts to 
moderate the party's position as part of the 1987 policy review process.
5.1 The Collapse of the Pro-Israel Consensus
The 1982 war precipitated a wave of Labour grass-roots condemnation of Israeli 
policy and revealed how far the party's activists had moved in the direction of the
1 Lesch and Tessler, 1989:63.
2 Ibid:36-37.
3 Ibid:63.
4 See chapter one.
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Palestinian national cause. Local parties in London and Scotland spearheaded the 
campaign against Israel and in favour of the Palestinians. In London, Hackney North 
and Stoke Newington, Brent South, Paddington and St. Pancras North actively 
championed the Palestinian cause.5 Later on, the Chipping Barnet CLP endorsed a 
pro-PLO motion.6 In Scotland, Aberdeen South, Dundee East, Dundee West and 
West Renfrewshire were the main pro-Palestinian parties. The Dundee Labour Party 
was especially active. It forged links with Palestinian activists from Dundee 
University such as Yousef Allen, who later became the British representative of the 
Palestinian Trade Union Federation.7 The party also organised meetings open to the 
general public and addressed by PLO representatives.8
Although particular parties in London and Scotland dominated the pro-Palestinian 
campaign, a more general shift took place too. At the annual party conference held 
immediately after the Sabra and Chatila massacres, forty-six emergency resolutions 
were sent to Labour's headquarters and all of them condemned Israel.9 Grass roots’ 
sympathy for the Palestinians escalated during the 1980s and reached a peak in the 
late 1980s. By this time, nearly all the constituency parties in the Greater London 
region and the south consistently turned down LFI’s offers of speakers for their 
meetings.10 Conference decisions reflected the trend. At the 1988 conference, the 
pro-Palestinian motions won the two-thirds majority needed to become policy (see 
table 5.1).
A similar development occurred in some Labour councils. Both the GLC and 
Brent began actively to promote Palestinian national rights. In the May 1982 borough 
elections, the Jewish Labour candidate for Cricklewood (Brent), Alf Filer, declared 
that Israel should become a secular state." In the 1980s, the GLC embarked on a 
number of measures to promote the Palestinian cause. County Hall became the base 
for the Labour Committee on Palestine (LCP). In 1984 the Council launched an 
anti-racist year and the Ethnic Minorities Unit (EMU) provided funding to the
 --------------------------------------  m z
' Sources for this information include the LPACA, 1982; the LPACR, 1982; the Jew ish  C hronicle^and 
an interview with Ernie Ross, M P, 16 April 1991. The list o f  pro-Palestinian parties is not exhaustive.
6 Alderman, 1989:136.
7 Interview with Y ousef A llen, 5 June 1991.
8 Interview with Ernie Ross, 16 April 1991.
9 Jew ish C hronicle , 17 Septem ber 1982:6.
10 Interview with Peter Grunberger, Director o f  LFI, 8 July 1991.
11 Alderman, 1989:126.
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Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC) for a conference on racism against Arabs.12 
Dundee District Council played an important part in campaigning for the Palestinian 
nationalist cause. The council was twinned with the West Bank town of Nablus and 
the PLO flag flew over Dundee City Chambers. After the invasion of Lebanon, the 
council unanimously adopted a resolution that condemned Israel for its actions in 
Lebanon, for its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and which spoke of the 
'genocide' of the Palestinian people.13
Table 5.1 Pro-Palestinian Resolutions, Labour Party Annual Conference
Year V otes For V otes A gainst
1982 3 ,538 ,000+ 3 ,2 63 ,000
3 ,318 ,000++ 3 ,308 ,000
1988 4 ,1 6 3 ,0 0 0 1,943,000
1989 4 ,6 4 5 ,0 0 0 1,394,000
+ C om posite motion.
** Em ergency resolution.
The trade unions also began to challenge the pro-Israel consensus after the 
invasions. At the TUC conference in 1982 the General Council and Tom Jackson 
(chair of the International Committee) opposed a pro-Palestinian motion on the 
grounds that condemnation of Israel would hinder the prospects of peace. However, 
the conference overwhelmingly backed an FBU-sponsored resolution, condemning the 
'death and destruction' caused by Israel's invasion and saying that only recognition of 
the national rights of the Palestinian people would provide security for all the states in 
the Middle East, including Israel.14 The TGWU also put its weight behind the 
Palestinians, asking the TUC in 1982 to organise an air
and sea boycott of Israel until the country’s troops left Lebanon.15
12 Ibid: 130-134. It should be noted that Jewish groups also benefited from EM U funding, such as the 
ultra-orthodox Agudas Israel.
13 Jew ish C hronicle, 16 July 1982:6.
14 The T im es , 10 Septem ber 1982:4; TUC  Report 1982:615.
15 The Times, 25 Septem ber 1982:6.
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During the 1980s, a number of unions sent delegations to the occupied territories 
as a result of Trade Union Friends of Palestine (TUFP) co-ordination. These 
included: the FBU, GMB, MSF, NGA, NUPE, SOGAT 82, TGWU and UCATT and 
non-affiliated unions such as the AUT, NALGO, and the NUT. At the same time, 
branch level unions increasingly participated in TUFP activities.16 NALGO, NUPE, 
NUCPS, ACCT, COHSE, GMB, FBU, NUM and SOGAT affiliated to TUFP. 
Although the TGWU was not affiliated, it had good relations with the organisation 
and both sent and received delegations to and from the West Bank.17 Having the 
support of unions like the NUM, the TGWU and NUPE was vital since these unions 
controlled a large proportion of the conference vote.18 As the 1980s proceeded, the 
unions continued in this trend. SOGAT '82 played a specially active part in the late 
eighties, sponsoring the resolutions at the party conferences in 1988 and 1989 that, in 
the context of the intifada, attracted overwhelming support.19
The new generation of Labour Women also challenged the party’s pro-Israel
tradition. Clare Short played a high-profile role in the campaign for recognition of
Palestinian national rights and became an active member of LMEC. Harriet Harman,
Maria Fyfe, Kate Hoey and Marjorie Mowlam also sympathised with Palestinian
nationalism and joined LMEC. Dawn Primarolo, Alice Mahon and Anne Clwyd did
w +H  20
not join LMEC but sympathised ^ aims. The agendas for the National Conference 
of Labour Women (NCLW) in 1984 and 1986 indicate a shift in favour of Palestinian 
national rights and a more critical attitude towards Israel.21 These developments 
represented a significant policy change. In the early 1980s, the NEC for the first time 
adopted a resolution that called for the establishment of a Palestinian state, with the 
PLO involved in negotiations. Benn described the decision as a ‘major development 
in Labour policy'.22
Israel's involvement in Lebanon set off an unprecedented critical reaction in the 
PLP. An analysis of EDMs put down on the Palestinian/Israeli conflict in 1948, 1956,
16 S ee 'A Cry For Justice: Trade unions and life in the occupied territories o f  Palestine', N U C PS, 
1990:25-26.
17 Interview with Y ou sef A llen, 5 June 1991.
18 S ee K oelble, 1987:260-261.
19LPACR 1988 :134;LPACR 1989:156.
20 LMEC mem bership list, 1991.
21 N CLW A, 1984:55 ;NCLW A, 1986:110.
22 Benn, 1992:240.
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1967 and 1982 indicates a sharp decline in pro-Israel feeling in 1982 and a 
corresponding increase in support for Palestinian nationalism. However, sympathy for 
the Palestinians did not reach the level of pro-Israel feeling in the preceding years 
(see graph 5.1 and appendix 5.1). There were no Labour-sponsored pro-Israel EDMs 
between April and June 1982, but there were three Labour-sponsored pro-Palestinian 
ones (see table 5.2). Pro-Israel activists contented themselves with moving critical 
amendments to EDMs which criticised Israel.
The party's leadership played a part in this shift. In June 1982 Michael Foot 
sponsored an EDM that condemned Israel's invasion of Lebanon; endorsed the United 
Nations Security Council’s call for an immediate cease-fire and demanded the 
withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanon. Although, it should be noted that the 
motion also included a condemnation of the attempted assassination of Israel's 
Ambassador to Great Britain, Shlomo Argov.23 Foot's stand was consistent with his 
earlier departure from the party’s tradition. However, even prominent right-wing 
members of the leadership began to criticise Israeli poiicy and support Palestinian 
national aims. In June, Denis Healey, then the shadow Foreign Secretary, warned 
Israel that humiliation of the Arabs in Lebanon would have repercussions throughout 
the Arab world and play into the hands of 'Arab fundamentalism'.24 Elsewhere, 
Healey sympathised with the idea of Palestinian statehood.25 In the 1980s then, most 
of the party’s sections began to challenge Labour’s traditional loyalty to Israel and to 
advocate a policy in favour of Palestinian national rights. In the following section I 
shall consider the reasons for this development.
5.2 Explaining Labour’s Policy
In the past, a good deal of Labour's sympathy for Israel depended on an identification 
between Zionism, socialism and progress and the idea that Israel was the only 
progressive and democratic regime in the Middle East. From the state’s inception, the 
Israeli Labour Party was politically dominant, reinforcing these conceptions. Israel’s 
shift to the right challenged these views. In 1977, the right-wing Likud Party won
23 N otices o f  M otions, V ol.V III, 1981-1982:7214.
24 Jew ish C hronicle, 11 June 1982:44.
25LPACR 1982:136-137.
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Table 5.2 Early-Day Motions, 1982
Date of first tabling Number and title Party support Main sponsor Total number of 
names appended
Number of Labour 
names appended (and 
percentage of total 
names)
29.3.82 372. Israeli action Labour, Conservative David Watkins 30 18(60)
against Palestinians and SDP (Labour)
22.4.82 422. Israeli attacks on Conservative and Tony Marlow 44 22(50)
Lebanon Labour (Conservative)
26.4.82 426. Congratulations Labour and David Watkins 13 8(62)
to the Institute of Conservative (Labour)
Contemporary Art*
9.6.82 510. Israeli invasions Conservative and Dennis Walters 60 25 (42)
of Lebanon Labour (Conservative)
9.6.82 512. The conflict in Liberal and Labour David Alton (Liberal) 14 6(43)
the Lebanon
10.6.82 519. The Middle East Labour Michael Foot 64 62 (97)
(Labour)
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power. Made up of a number of independent factions including Herut, which was 
headed by Menachem Begin,26 Likud was ideologically committed to a ‘Greater 
Israel’ and embarked on a series of uncompromising policies towards the Palestinians 
and the Arab countries, including intensive settlement of the occupied territories and 
the annexation of the Golan Heights.
These political changes led a number of Labour people to feel that Israel’s 
policies betrayed the country’s original values. From the left, Eric Heffer’s support 
for Israel had been based on the idea that Israel was a progressive and democratic 
state. Israel’s involvement in Lebanon forced Heffer to question his own convictions. 
At the LFI’s annual dinner in November 1981, he responded to Shimon Peres's 
criticism of the European conception of Palestinian self-determination by dropping his 
prepared speech in favour of a proposal for Palestinian national self-determination and 
negotiations with the PLO. In protest against Israel's position on the question of 
Palestinian statehood and its involvement in Lebanon, Eric Heffer and Tony Benn 
resigned from LFI in 1982.
Prominent right-wingers responded similarly. Although Healey was never as 
emotionally committed to Israel as Heffer (his pragmatism led him to support Bevin in 
the 1940s), in the 1980s he argued that Begin’s and Sharon’s policies were a threat to 
peace in the region and to Israel's existence.28 Gerald Kaufman’s personal account of 
Israeli politics in the 1980s argued that the country was in political and moral 
decline.29 Leo Abse, the MP for Pontypool, summed up the general feeling when he 
said that Begin’s policies represented a ‘vulgar nationalism quite contrary to the 
founding principles of the Israeli state’.30
The developments in Israel dovetailed with political changes in the Jewish 
communities outside Israel. In a number of western countries Jews began to drop 
socialism in favour of conservative politics, largely as a consequence of changes in 
their socio-economic status, but also because of their disillusion with left-wing anti- 
zionism.31 Commenting on American Jewish attitudes, Healey claimed that Jewish
26 Lesch and T essler, 1989:143-144.
21 Jewish C hronicle, 4 D ecem ber 1981:21.
28 N ew Socialist, Septem ber/October 1982:40-41.
29 Kaufman, 1986.
30 The Times, 9 A ugust 1982:1.
31 Rubinstein, 1982:118.
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intellectuals had evolved from anti-communist marxists to 'hard-line Zionists of the 
radical right' and that this had detrimentally affected American policy in the Middle 
East.32 In Britain, a.s a result of increasing prosperity and disproportionate 
membership of the upper and middle classes, the Jewish community started to adopt 
conservative politics and the Jewish electorate moved to the right.33 Although Jewish 
Labour MPs continued to outnumber conservative ones, the gap between the two 
narrowed.34 Jews started to perceive the Conservative Party as the best representative 
of their social and economic position, eroding the ‘traditional affinity’ between 
Labour and the Jews.35
As Israeli and Jewish politics moved rightwards, Palestinian politics moved 
towards a more accommodating position. From the early 1980s the PLO began to 
move from a maximalist position, calling for Israel’s destruction, to one that accepted 
the Jewish state’s existence. The PLO began to accept a two-state solution to the 
conflict and by 1986 it offered to acknowledge UN Resolution 242 in return for Israeli 
recognition of Palestinian national rights.36 The organisation’s shift towards a more 
moderate policy legitimised Palestinian aims. At the same time, the PLO’s 
organisation in western countries helped it to win international recognition. In 
Britain, Palestinian activists carried out solidarity work aimed at influencing party 
policies. They worked with the party’s activists and members of the PLP.37 PLO 
representatives in London, such as Said Hammani and Nabil Ramlawi, forged links 
with MPs such as Ernie Ross in order to influence opinion.38 London representatives 
of the PLO were also in touch with members of Labour’s front-bench, notably, 
Gerald Kaufman. In 1988 Kaufman shared a platform with Edward Said and Faisal 
Lweida, a London-based PLO representative, at a meeting organised by LMEC.
Other developments affected the party’s perceptions of Israel. During the 1980s, 
organisations like UNESCO, the Socialist International and the EEC began to take up 
the Palestinian nationalist cause.40 In June 1980 the EEC statedthat the Palestinian
32 Healey, 1989:200-201.
33 See Alderman, 1983:135-138; 154-160.
34 Ibid: 174-175.
See Rubinstein, 1982:156.
36 Lesch and Tessler, 1989:282.
37 Interview with Y ou sef A llen, 5 June 1991.
38 Interview with Ernie Ross, M P, 16 April 1991.
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people had a right to self-determination and that the PLO should be involved in peace 
negotiations. More generally, by 1989, ninety-six states had given Palestinian 
representatives diplomatic recognition.41 As early as the 1970s, the Socialist 
International had started to establish links between European socialists and Arab 
socialist groups, causing some debate in Labour’s internal policy-making bodies.42 
Nevertheless, these developments clearly affected Labour policy. Healey, for 
example, referred to them in his justification for supporting Palestinian self- 
determination.43
In the latter part of the 1980s, the intifada stimulated widespread sympathy for the 
Palestinians. Starting in December 1987, it involved a series of riots and protests that 
began spontaneously and were subsequently directed by local committees. The 
uprising was a grass-roots movement, spearheaded by young people living in the 
occupied territories rather than political leaders or academics. It galvanised Israeli 
Arabs into asserting their Palestinian identity and it represented the Palestinians’ 
attempt to act independently of the Arab countries.4" The intifada had major 
implications for international politics. It affected the policies of the PLO as well as 
other important actors in the Middle East conflict, including America.45 This 
movement provided a significant backdrop to Labour’s overwhelming support for 
Palestinian nationalism at the 1987 and 1988 annual conferences.
Nevertheless, these developments would have been less effective without the rise 
of the Labour left, which made the party particularly receptive to the Palestinian 
cause. In the seventies and 1980s, the party began to attract people from middle class 
professions, including teachers, lecturers and social workers, displacing traditional 
working class activists. Ethnic minorities and women’s groups also began to enter the 
party, introducing distinctive ‘voices of protest’.46 The new activists tended to be 
young and influenced by movements such as anti-apartheid, CND and the women's 
movement.47 The left began to organise itself into groups such as the Campaign for
41 O vendale, 1992:202;294.
42 Int/9 12 N ovem ber 1974; NEC 26 N ovem ber 1974. A s chair o f  the international com m ittee, Ian 
Mikardo had opposed the S i’s decision to make these links.
43 N ew  Socia lis t, Septem ber/October 1982:40.
44 Lesch and Tessler, 1989:272-273.
45 Hunter 1991:4.
46 Morgan, 1992:8.
47 Seyd, 1987:40-50.
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Labour Party Democracy (CLPD) and the Labour Co-ordinating Committee (LCC). 
The former was established in 1974 and fought mainly for constitutional changes, 
whereas the latter was formed in 1978 and focused mainly on political ideas and 
policies.48 Labour councils, especially in London, became the site of considerable 
left-wing activism. In London, the GLC was the most notable case. After the May 
1981 elections to the council, the new Labour majority introduced a more radical 
outlook.49 Under the leadership of Ken Livingstone,50 the GLC introduced a new left 
agenda, incorporating a multiplicity of causes such as feminist and anti-racist politics. 
This development influenced other London councils, such as Brent borough council 
and Labour councils in Scotland also became more radical in the 1980s.51
Although the unions were not politically unified, having both a right and left 
wing,52 they too moved to the left in the 1980s. The unions' dissatisfaction with the 
party’s leadership and the new left activists' strategy to mobilise union support for 
their aims accounted for this shift.53 The formation of Trade Union Friends of 
Palestine (TUFP) was part of this process. Established in 1980, its sponsors included 
Bill Speirs, Assistant Secretary of the STUC; Ernie Ross, Labour MP for Dundee 
West; Brian Price, President of AEUW, TASS; Jim McCafferty, member of the 
Scottish executive of the NUM; William McKelvey, MP for Kilmarnock; George 
Galloway, Vice Chair of the Labour Party in Scotland and Councillors Colin Rennie 
and Tom McDonald from Dundee District Council.54 TUFP aimed explicitly to 
mobilise support for the Palestinians within the trade union movement. Prior to the 
recent introduction of One Member One Vote (OMOV), Labour’s industrial wing had 
a disproportionate influence at the annual party conference because of the block 
vote.55 The party’s structure in the 1980s meant that these campaigners had no chance 
of affecting a policy change without the trade unions’ support. The TUFP’s tactics 
were partly responsible for the high levels of conference support for pro-Palestinian 
resolutions in the 1980s.
48 See Seyd, 1987:83-94.
49 Alderman, 1989:127.
50 1981-1986.
51 W ainwright, 1987:94-105.
52 See D unleavy in Dunleavy et al. eds., 1993:139.
53 K oelble, 1987:255-258.
54 TUFP information sheet, 1980.
55 K oelble, 1987:255.
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Labour Women’s support for the Palestinians also resulted from these internal 
changes. In the 1970s and 1980s, a new generation of women who had been involved 
in the feminist movement entered the party.56 These feminists radicalised the 
women's organisations, politicising institutions such as the NCLW.57 The women's 
movement outside the party had already taken up the Palestinian cause under the 
impact of Third World feminism, developments in the UN and trends within 
socialism, such as those towards anti-racism and anti-imperialism.58 The new 
generation of women brought these ideas into the party.
Similar developments occurred in Labour’s internal organisations. External 
advisers began to play a part in formulating policy. People like Fred Halliday and 
Christopher Hitchens joined Labour’s Middle East sub-committee (MESC). Both 
were from the left of the political spectrum. Halliday was a regular contributor to the 
New Left Review and Hitchens was a radical journalist and author. Although Halliday 
was not prominent in the campaign for Palestinian national rights, he had some 
sympathy for the cause. From 1967, the NLR pursued a consistently pro-Palestinian 
line. Halliday himself contributed to a volume on ‘Israel and the Palestinians’ where 
he argued that the Arab states could force America to pressurise Israel into conceding 
Palestinian statehood.59 Hitchens’s pro-Palestinian views were expressed in a book 
jointly authored with Edward Said entitled Blaming the Victims.60 Although MESC 
had previously been highly divided over Palestinian nationalism, it played a part in 
getting the party to call for PLO participation in peace negotiations in the early 
1980s.61
The PLP’s position also stemmed from a shift to the left. As a result of the 1964, 
1966 and 1974 elections, the parliamentary left had grown. Incoming MPs were 
disproportionately left-wing and the constituency parties selected more left-leaning 
candidates. “ These developments contributed to Michael Foot’s election as leader in 
1980.63 In 1982, twenty-three Labour MPs formed the left-wing Campaign Group.64
56 Seyd, 1987:49.
57 Lovenduski and Randall, 1993:142.
58 See Pope, 1986:13-25.cq
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As the 1980s progressed, the PLP’s left-wards trend intensified as a result of the entry 
into parliament of the 'new urban left1. This new element introduced a soft left agenda 
which included a sensitivity to issues such as gender and minority rights65, 
predisposing them to Palestinian nationalism. Members of LFI’s parliamentary group 
noted that new MPs were reluctant to join the organisation.66
A striking number of left-wingers were actively involved in the campaign for 
recognition of Palestinian national rights. Although David Watkins and Andrew 
Faulds were not left-wing, a number of the other pro-Palestinian activists were (see 
appendix 5.2). Martin Flannery, Joan Maynard, William McKelvey, Robert 
McTaggart, Robert Parry, Reg Race, Allan Roberts and Ernie Ross were all members 
of the Campaign Group. Albert Booth, Dale Campbell-Savours, Stanley Newens and 
Martin O'Neill were members of the Tribune Group. Many TUFP sponsors were from 
the Labour left, such as Dennis Canavan, who was a member of the Campaign 
Group67 and George Galloway, who was involved in the formation of the Labour 
Co-ordinating Committee (LCC) in Scotland.68 Moreover, the 
pro-Israel/pro-Palestinian division mapped on to the right/left divide in the unions. 
While a good number of unions had begun to take on the Palestinian cause, the 
right-wing EETPU remained pro-Israel. At the 1983 conference the EETPU moved a 
resolution which gave priority to recognition of Israel's borders. The motion was 
defeated.69
Generational changes also played a critical part in the party’s adoption of the 
Palestinian cause. Whereas the sight of Jewish refugees had touched Labour’s older 
generation and created a groundswell of sympathy for Zionist aims, the Palestinian 
refugee crisis was more salient for the 1980s’ generation. The Palestinian cause 
attracted a greater proportion of the younger generation of Labour MPs than the Israeli 
cause. An analysis of the activists70 in the PLP for the respective causes shows that 9 
per cent of pro-Israel activists were born in or after 1935 compared with 32 per cent
65 Dunleavy in D unleavy et al., eds., 1993:140-141.
66 M inutes o f  the Parliamentary Group, LFI, 1 July 1980.
67 Seyd, 1987:222 note 18.
68 Heffernan and M arqusee, 1992:172.
69TUC Report 1983:555-558.
70 I have included as pro-Palestinian activists Labour M Ps w ho signed tw o or more E D M s in 1982 
which were critical o f  Israel and supportive o f Palestinian national rights. I have included as pro-Israel 
activists Labour M Ps who signed critical amendments to the pro-Palestinian MPs. I have discounted  
members w ho signed both pro-Palestinian motions and critical amendments.
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of pro-Palestinian activists. After taking into account other sources of data which give 
a broader picture, around 6 per cent of Labour MPs who sympathised with Israel were 
born in or after 1935 compared with around 29 per cent of Labour MPs who 
identified with the Palestinian cause. Furthermore, whereas 32 per cent of pro-Israel 
Labour MPs entered parliament after 1970, around 62 per cent of pro-Palestinian MPs 
did.
The left’s rise led the party to adopt a broad approach to foreign policy which was 
particularly amenable to Palestinian demands. Labour contained a strong undercurrent 
of anti-American feeling, being particularly critical of America’s involvement in the 
Third World. At the same time, the party adopted anti-racist politics, protesting 
against South African apartheid, and it took up the campaign for nuclear disarmament. 
These developments coincided with Israel’s increasing identification with American 
foreign policy. America provided Israel with a high level of financial and political 
support and the Likud government helped America implement its foreign policy 
agenda in the Third World. It sold arms to countries like Somoza’s Nicaragua and 
Guatemala. It also had links with South Africa.71 Furthermore, Israel had begun to 
develop a nuclear capacity. The Vanunu affair in 1986 drew attention to this 
development, sparking off a series of protests. In an interview with the Sunday 
Times, Mordechai Vanunu claimed that Israel had developed and stockpiled nuclear
72weapons. Mossad captured Vanunu in Rome and he was imprisoned for treason.
Healey has commented that the American authorities’ knowledge of Israel’s nuclear
weapons programme provided a further example of commitment to the
hwirfccv
Jewish state leading ^to controvert its broader aims.73
The significant localisation of pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel activism in London 
and Scotland deserves special consideration. The case of London was particularly 
interesting because the pro-Palestinian movement occurred in traditionally Jewish 
areas, such as Brent. However, demographic trends created black and Asian 
communities in boroughs such as this and relations between these minorities and the 
Jewish community were tense, with some Asians and Afro-Caribbeans adopting anti- 
zionist politics.74 This coincided with Labour’s efforts to appeal to black and Asian
71 See Said, 1988:24;33.
72 Ovendale, 1992:303-304.
73 Healey, 1989:315.
74 Alderman, 1989:118-125.
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voters.75 During the 1982 local elections in particular, Labour candidates, amongst 
others, made a concerted effort to attract these minorities’ votes.76 Consequently, the 
new, anti-racist left’s links with black and Asian communities replaced the traditional 
alliance between Labour and the Jews.
These factors did not account for the high level of pro-Palestinian activism in the 
Scottish labour movement. The Scottish left’s support for the Palestinians reflected 
the radical and independent tradition in the country’s labour movement. The Scottish 
Labour Party and the Scottish TUC (STUC) had never felt compelled to stand by the 
national party’s policy positions.77 The Scottish labour movement’s independent 
spirit enabled it to identify with movements for self-determination such as the 
Palestinian one. Moreover, its identification with other left-wing causes, such as the 
anti-apartheid campaign, was important. Although not on the far left, the Dundee 
Labour Party had long been committed to causes such as the anti-apartheid movement 
and various anti-imperialist movements.78 Political activists such as Abe Sirton, who 
had spent his life campaigning on behalf of oppressed groups, played a part in getting 
the Scottish Party to take up the Palestinian cause by helping to establish the Scottish 
Friends of Palestine (SFP).79
Like other left-wing movements then, in the 1980s the Labour Party broke away 
from its pro-Israel tradition and moved towards support for Palestinian national rights. 
External factors, including developments in Israel, the British Jews’ shift to the right, 
and the rise of the PLO and the intifada, all contributed to this shift. However, the rise 
of the Labour left was the most important factor. In the following section I shall 
discuss the question of anti-zionism in the party and whether the party succumbed to 
anti-Jewish themes.
5.3 Anti-zionism
It would be misleading to suggest that the Labour Party has never contained 
anti-zionist elements. The traditional pro-Arabists, Mayhew and Watkins, were anti-
Peele in D unleavy et al. eds., 1990:81.
76 Chariot in Ranney, ed., 1985:139-154.
77 W ainwright, 1987:144-149.
78 Interview with Ernie R oss, 16 April 1991.
79 The G uardian, G2T:18.
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80ziomst. However, their views were very marginal before the 1980s. In this decade, 
new elements began to elaborate anti-zionist themes. For example, at the 1982 annual 
conference, Ted Knight (a Workers’ Revolutionary Party [WRP] plant) moved an 
emergency motion which called for the replacement of Israel with a democratic 
secular state of Palestine.81 In his supporting speech, Knight compared Zionism with 
anti-semitism and Nazism, claiming that it was the 'zionists who...feed antisemitism 
by working hand-in-glove with the Nazi Falangists in Lebanon'.82 At the party 
conference in 1986, Jeremy Corbyn chaired a meeting of the Labour Campaign for 
Palestine (LCP). Tony Greenstein was one of the speakers at the meeting.83 
Greenstein espoused an especially extreme form of anti-zionism, claiming zionism 
justified the National Front’s views and even questioning the extent of the Nazi 
genocide of the Jews.84 Ken Livingstone allegedly referred to Israel as a country 
based on 'racism and the murder of Arabs'.85 At a rally held in Trafalgar Square in 
August 1982, he compared the Israeli Cabinet with the Galtieri regime in Argentina.
The far left Labour press also provided a platform for anti-zionist views. In June 
1982 the Labour Herald carried a cartoon which showed Begin, dressed in a Gestapo 
uniform, standing over the bodies of Palestinians. The cartoon was entitled 'The Final 
Solution'. The newspaper also described Israel as a 'state entirely built on the blood of
on
Europe's Jews, whom the zionists deserted in their hour of greatest need'. The ILP 
newspaper, the Labour Leader, used similar images. In September 1982, it published 
a photograph of Jews in a Nazi concentration camp next to a picture of Begin 
described as the 'former leader of a terrorist gang'.88 By the mid-1980s, far left ideas 
had evidently affected Labour Women. NCLW resolutions began to use characteristic 
anti-zionist themes. In 1984, Bootle Women's Section put down a resolution which 
stated that the Palestinian/Israeli conflict was the result of the 'intervention of
on
imperialism'. Two years later Leicester South Women's Section called on the NEC
80 See chapter four.
81 LPACR, 1982:148.
82LPACR, 1982:133
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to demand Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories and stated that it was 
'opposed to the Zionist state as racist, exclusivist and a direct agency of imperialism'.90 
International developments underpinned this trend, including: the 1976 UN security 
council passed a resolution which condemned Zionism as a form of racism; the shift to 
the right in Israel and the rise of Palestinian nationalism.91
However, Trotskyist entryism was also responsible for introducing anti-zionism 
into the party. Trotskyism has a strong anti-zionist tradition. Contemporary groups 
continued in this tradition, but also added a new theme, replacing the idea that 
zionism split the working class with the view that Zionism was a form of racism or 
even fascism.92 In the 1970s various far left groups entered the party. The Militant 
Group, which was strong in Merseyside and to a lesser extent London, was the most 
significant of these,93 with its membership tripling between 1976 and 1982.94 Other 
Trotskyist groups included the Socialist Organiser Alliance (SOA) and the Chartist 
Group, which seceded from the SOA in 1980 and published London Labour Briefing. 
The latter was active primarily around the GLC and Labour borough councils in 
London.95 Ted Knight, the controversial leader of Lambeth council, was a member of 
the WRP.96 Knight had links with people like Ken Livingstone and Jeremy Corbyn. 
All of these people were involved in the Labour Herald, which was published by 
Gerry Healy's WRP printing presses.97 The London Labour Briefing was also anti- 
zionist. A committee of WRP members ran this newspaper and Livingstone, 
representing the Labour Party, was a committee member.
Did this wave of anti-zionism incorporate anti-semitic themes? Billig argues that 
anti-zionism is anti-Jewish when it singles out Jewish nationalism for special 
criticism. Hence, it is not anti-Jewish to oppose Jewish nationalism on the grounds 
that nationalism generally contradicts socialist principles.98 The question of whether 
opposition to Israel is anti-Jewish can only be settled at the empirical level. At this 
level, it cannot be denied that some party members’ anti-zionism had an obsessive
90 A genda for the N C LW  1986:110.
91 See chapter one.
92 See B illig , 1984b:28-34.
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quality and included typical anti-Jewish themes. The Labour Leader, for example, 
conceptualised Jews as a race, claiming that Israel had given 'exclusive civil and 
political power to the race which had habitually been denied such power'.99 The 
portrayal of Begin as a blood sucker and the claim that Israel was based on the ‘blood 
of Jews’, resonated with the anti-semitic theory of 'blood libel'.
Some members of the far left and pro-Palestinian strand also upheld a conspiracy 
theory of Zionism. Knight spoke of 'zionist forces' and claimed that 'zionist 
organisations, particularly in this country and throughout the world, have attempted to 
silence the critics of what has gone on in the Lebanon'.100 Some members of LMEC 
referred to the 'conspiracy of silence' over Labour’s policy on Israel.101 The 
conspiracy theory of Zionism exaggerates the power of zionist organisations in the 
same way as anti-semites have traditionally exaggerated Jewish power. More 
sensitive members of the campaign for recognition of Palestinian national rights 
noticed the tendency towards conspiracy theory. After attending a Poale Zion fringe 
meeting on 'Racism, Antisemitism and the Socialist Agenda', Clare Short said that 
supporters of the Palestinian cause were in danger of 'slipping into the language of 
conspiracy'.102
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude, as Alderman does, that the 
anti-zionist element of the party had taken control of the NEC by the early 1980s.103 
Although in 1982 the NEC endorsed the principle of Palestinian self-determination 
and statehood, it was not anti-zionist. Indeed, the NEC explicitly opposed hard-line 
opposition to Zionism or Israel. Speaking as its representative at the 1982 annual 
conference, Healey opposed two resolutions on the grounds that they failed to include 
clauses which conceded Israel's right to exist.104 Moreover, it is important to 
distinguish between the views of the far and the soft left. Whereas the former saw 
class conflict as fundamental, the latter was interested in divisions other than class 
ones.105 Consequently, the far left refused to recognise Israel and proposed the 
establishment of a democratic, secular state, whereas the soft left tended only to
99 Labour L eader, Septem ber 1982:6-7.
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criticise Israeli policy, which is not necessarily anti-zionist. Michael Foot, for 
example, did not question Israel’s right to exist. Nor did he depict Israel as a racist or 
fascist state. The same was true of the younger generation of soft left activists. Clare 
Short, for example, advocated a two-state solution to the conflict and explicitly 
opposed Trotskyist demands.106 Even Palestinian activists believed that the far left’s 
call to abolish Israel was impractical and damaged their cause.107 So, although the 
anti-zionist elements did seek to influence policy, their views were in the minority. In 
the following section, I shall consider the intra-party conflict which followed Labour’s 
movement away from a pro-Israeli perspective and its implications for policy.
5.4 Conflict and Retreat
However widespread the shift towards recognition of Palestinian national rights, it 
produced a serious rift within Labour’s ranks. Jewish members of the party played an 
active part in seeking to stem the tide of the new current, including prominent 
backbenchers like Ian Mikardo. Although Mikardo accepted the principle of 
Palestinian self-determination,108 he strongly opposed the movement in the party 
towards recognition of the PLO. In the past,109 he objected to internal party criticism 
of Israel and the Socialist International's decision to establish links between European 
socialists and Arab socialist groups.110 Following a fact-finding trip to Lebanon after 
the 1982 invasion, the MP told a meeting of LFI’s parliamentary branch that there had 
been a 'gross exaggeration' of the number of casualties and people made homeless and 
that the Lebanese people were grateful to Israel for freeing them from PLO control.111 
At the party conference, he opposed the pro-Palestinian resolutions on the grounds 
that they sought the 'extinction' of Israel.112 In response to the cluster of 
pro-Palestinian resolutions submitted to the conference in 1982, Greville Janner, MP 
for Leicester West and president of the BOD, complained that he and the Jewish
106 The principle o f  a two-state solution was advocated by Short at a talk given at the LSE on the G ulf 
War on 25 February 1991. B efore talking about the conflict, Short criticised the Trotskyist elem ent in 
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community could not understand how a democratic body such as Labour could have 
relations with the PLO. He added that Jewish delegates at the conference would do 
their best to overturn the resolution.113 Kaufman’s contacts with the PLO alienated 
certain sections of the Jewish community and press. Some Jews felt that his links 
with the PLO invalidated his claim to be a zionist.114 In their efforts to counter the 
pro-Palestinian movement, Jewish Labour organisations began to operate in areas 
which were at the forefront of the campaigns. In particular, Poale Zion and LFI 
organised in the Scottish labour movement. In the summer of 1982, LFI arranged a 
demonstration against a Scottish TUC meeting in Perth. A leader of the Dundee 
Jewish community, Albert Jacobs, supported LFI’s director, Valerie Cocks.115 In June 
1982 Poale Zion formed a Scottish branch with the MP for East Kilbride, Maurice 
Miller, becoming its chair.116
4/i vd
Some Jewish Labour members and groups^to influence political opinion by 
appealing to the Jewish vote. In the Brent borough elections in May 1982, John Lebor 
advised electors not to vote Labour on the grounds that around one fifth of all Labour 
candidates in the borough supported the PLO. The local Rabbi, Dr Harry Rabinowicz, 
warned congregants not to vote for Alf Filer, the Jewish Labour candidate for 
Cricklewood, because Filer favoured the establishment of a secular state of Israel. 
During the May 1982 elections Labour lost two Cricklewood seats and its share of the 
poll decreased quite considerably compared with 1978. Some attributed Labour’s 
poor results to the rows between the Brent Labour Party and the Jewish community.117 
The BOD also tried to influence the Jewish electorate. In the 1983 election, Dr. Jack 
Gewirtz, its director of defence, expressed concern about 'activities within the Labour 
Party of groups and individuals which work closely with the PLO'. The Board 
identified the Labour candidate for Westminster North, Arthur Latham, as a PLO 
supporter.118 The organisation also made direct appeals to the party leadership. Just 
before the annual conference in 1988, a BOD delegation, headed by its president, Dr.
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Lionel Kopelowitz, met Neil Kinnock to express concern about the anti-Israel motions 
which had been tabled.119
The Labour councils’ shift towards the Palestinian movement revealed sharp 
differences in opinion between the old Labour left and the new Labour left.120 John 
Lebor, former leader of Brent council and a member of LFI’s national executive, 
claimed that 'militant leftists' were responsible for this development.121 The protest 
focused on Ken Livingstone. Some Labour members of the GLC objected to 
Livingstone’s outspoken criticisms of Israel, and especially his claim that Jews on the 
extreme right had taken over the BOD. The GLC chair, Illtyd Harrington suggested 
that Livingstone's remarks had made the GLC seem anti-semitic and damaged 
relations with the entire Jewish community. Gladys Dimson, former chair of the 
GLC’s Housing Committee, threatened to resign unless Livingstone apologised for the 
remark about the BOD. The Labour Group subsequently voted for Livingstone to 
withdraw his claim.122
The policy changes also split Labour Women. The party’s older generation of 
women and the incoming generation disagreed over a range of issues.123 This split 
played itself out on the question of Israel. Prominent women in Labour’s older 
generation, such as Gwyneth Dunwoody and Jo Richardson, remained strong 
supporters of Israel and active members of LFI. In the 1980s Dunwoody and 
Richardson continued to champion Israel and to resist the impetus towards the 
Palestinian cause, especially recognition of the PLO. This conflict also took place in 
Labour councils. In April 1983 women members of Poale Zion were prevented from 
attending an International Women's Day seminar at County Hall. In June 1984 four 
Labour members of the GLC council, including Gladys Dimson, voted with the 
opposition in protest against the GLC's Women's Committee’s alleged anti-zionist
124comments.
The debates drew attention to the potential costs to Labour of too strongly 
identifying with the Palestinian cause. The party's officials and leadership tried to
119 Jew ish C hronicle, 1 October 1988:1.
120 See Alderm an, 1983:114.
121 Alderman, 1989:125-126.
122 Ibid: 134.
123 Seyd, 1987:49; see also W ainwright, 1987:165-171.
124 Alderman, 1989:135.
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diffuse the tension. In response to the NEC's endorsement of a policy document 
drafted by MESC, Joan Lestor, chair of the international committee, suggested that the 
reference to the PLO be omitted.125 At the 1983 conference, the NEC decided to 
withdraw resolutions on the Palestinian/Israeli conflict for the sake of unity and its 
statement on the Middle East did not include a reference to the conflict.126 The new 
leader, Neil Kinnock, adopted a more conciliatory approach towards Jewish opinion 
and tried to re-build bridges with Jewish Labour groups in Britain and in Israel. 
Kinnock always attended the LFI reception held at the party's annual conference. He 
expressed a particular sympathy for Israel and was close to Shimon Peres and other 
leading Israeli politicians.127 In June 1987, Kinnock told the Jewish Chronicle that 
Labour was 'a strong supporter of Israel' and that he had campaigned strongly for 
changes in Soviet policy on the question of Jewish emigration.128
Labour’s attempts at reconciliation with the Jewish community had direct 
implications for candidates’ policies in the 1987 general election in Jewish areas. The 
candidate for Hendon South, Louise Christian told the Jewish Chronicle that she 'fully 
supported Israel's right to exist as a separate state'. She also said that although the 
PLO should be included in peace talks, she opposed the view that zionism was a form 
of racism, clearly seeking to distance herself from the anti-zionist left. Poale Zion 
backed her. In Finchley, John Davies, leader of the Labour group on Barnet Council, 
campaigned primarily on issues irrelevant to Jewish voters. However, his agent, Mick 
O'Connor, said that the party was going to draw attention to Thatcher's refusal to 
pursue Nazi war criminals.129 Thatcher had long been personally committed to Israel, 
being one of the first members of the Conservative Friends of Israel.130 However, she 
was vulnerable to Labour’s exploitation of her government’s record, whose Middle 
East policy previously tended to be pro-Arab.131 Even Ken Livingstone, the candidate 
for Brent East, began to moderate his views. Livingstone replaced the Jewish Labour 
MP Reg Freeson, who had been particularly upset by the developments in London.132
125 Jew ish C hronicle, 4 June 1982:6.
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In an interview with the Jewish Chronicle, Livingstone said that if anyone thought he 
was anti-semitic, they should not vote for him, but 'it would be difficult for anyone to 
explain how [he could] support every single minority except the Jewish minority'. He 
added that he had always defended the rights of Jews to live in Israel. He dismissed 
the charge that he had described the BOD as fascist and added that he did not think 
zionism was a form of racism,133 signalling a definite shift in his position. 
Livingstone’s new moderation on this issue reflected his increasing alienation from far
i r  H4left groups. *
In the late 1980s the tide began to turn on the question of Labour's policy towards 
Israel and the Palestinians. The leadership sought to replace the earlier radicalism 
with a more moderate position. The NEC opposed the resolutions at the 1988 and 
1989 conferences,135 despite the fact that they included references to Israel’s right to 
exist. Whereas in 1982 the NEC's policy statement had included an explicit reference 
to Palestinian statehood, its policy statement in 1988 referred to the Palestinians' right 
to self-determination and a 'homeland'. The pro-Palestinian activists were not happy 
with this shift.136 Kaufman’s and Tony Clarke’s policy review on 'Britain and the 
World', included a diluted form of previous policy commitments to the Palestinian 
cause. The statement recognised that the Palestinians had been prevented from having 
their own chosen form of government; called for the government of Israel to enter into 
dialogue with the PLO and supported a UN sponsored International Conference to 
negotiate a settlement to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict.137 At a meeting in May 1989 
the NEC discussed the review document. During the discussion of the Middle East, 
Tony Benn moved a motion in favour of acceptance of a Palestinian state. He was 
defeated by eighteen votes to five. Ken Livingstone moved a motion which called for 
Palestinian refugees to be allowed to return to Israel. The motion was defeated by 
twenty votes to three.138 These votes showed very clearly the change that had taken 
place since the early 1980s.
133 Jew ish C hronicle, 12 June 1987, London Extra:4.
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The battle over the party’s policy towards Israel and the Palestinians was part of 
a wider battle. The Labour right began a counter-attack on the left and the left started 
to fragment and divide.139 As the 1980s proceeded, the left’s dominance declined. 
With the election of the new leadership in 1983, the balance of power between the 
factions shifted. The Kinnock/Hattersley partnership tried to restore a more 
centralised style of leadership, characteristic of the Wilson era.140 Kinnock was from 
the party’s left. Nevertheless, under his leadership the left divided over a series of 
issues, in particular, the miners’ strike.141 After Labour's electoral defeat in 1987, the 
leadership’s desire to reconstitute the party intensified. The 1987 policy review 
process aimed to transform the party by dropping apparently unpopular policies.142 
By the late 1980s, the left’s retreat was evident in Labour's decision to drop its 
commitment to unilateralism and withdrawal from the EC.143
Nevertheless, a new (if imperfect) Labour consensus emerged, based a 
compromise between the two sides. The policy included three main principles: first, 
recognition of Israel; second, support for a UN-sponsored peace conference and third, 
support for Palestinian self-determination. With respect to the first principle, the pro- 
Palestinian activists conceded the leadership’s demand for a policy which included an 
explicit recognition of Israel’s right to exist within secure borders.144 The activists’ 
concession reflected developments in the PLO. Under Yasser Arafat’s leadership, the 
PLO had moved towards co-existence with Israel as well as Palestinian statehood.145 
The two sides also agreed over the idea of a UN peace conference. At the party 
conference in 1990, Kaufman said that there had to be an international conference 
which would provide 'justice and self-determination' for the Palestinian people.146 
Later, the NEC overwhelmingly backed this policy. Ernie Ross’s support for the 
NEC’s decision indicated agreement between the activists and the leadership.147 The 
two sides also agreed over the principle of Palestinian self-determination. Although 
the leadership’s statements tended to use the ambiguous concept of ‘homeland’ rather
139 See Seyd, 1987:159-171.
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141 Seyd, 1987:166-167.
149
P eele in D unleavy et al. eds., 1990:79-80.
143 M organ, 1992:339.
144 LPACR, 1988:180; LPACR, 1989:156.
145 Said, 1992:xiii. See also, Lesch and Tessler, 1989:282.
146 Jew ish  C hronicle, 12 October 1990:6.
147 The G uardian , 31 January 1991:4.
140
than statehood, irritating some of the pro-Palestinian campaigners,148 Kaufman 
claimed that a peace conference should aim to achieve self-determination for the 
Palestinians.149 Moreover, LMEC members felt that the party could not go back on its 
commitment to this principle.150 In any case, Labour’s sanctioning of this policy was 
not politically risky. By this stage, there was a significant current of support for 
Palestinian self-determination, both internationally and nationally. An implicit 
consensus also emerged over recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative 
of the Palestinian people. Although the leadership did not include this principle in 
official policy statements, it gave the principle its unofficial support. Kinnock stated 
that a future Labour government would be willing to meet the PLO if such a meeting 
would assist the peace process.151 Moreover, Kaufman told a meeting of Poale Zion 
and LMEC that the PLO should be included in peace talks. He suggested that the 
Palestinians should be able to choose their representatives in the same way as the Jews 
had been able to choose theirs during the British mandate.152
5.5 Conclusion
In the early 1980s Labour moved decisively towards recognition of Palestinian 
national rights. Previously, dissent from the pro-Israel consensus was confined to a 
small number of pro-Arab MPs, some elements in the Labour left and the constituency 
parties. However, the break-down in support for Israel in the 1980s embraced all 
sections of the party, including the PLP. The rise of the right in Israel, the movement 
of British Jews towards conservatism, and the increased activism of the Palestinian 
nationalist movement in western politics all contributed to this shift. However, the 
key dynamic was the rise of the Labour left. Although identification with Palestinian 
nationalism cut across party factions, the Palestinian cause became closely associated 
with the new kind of left activist. The party's policy in favour of Palestinian statehood 
in the early 1980s was part of a wider process which led to the adoption of 
unilateralism and a policy of withdrawal from the EC.
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This trend towards greater sympathy for Palestinian nationalism did not go 
uncontested. The minority which continued to be ideologically committed to Zionism 
and Israel campaigned against the pro-Palestinian element. Alderman's description of 
the 1980s as a decade marked by a 'descent into war' between the Labour Party and the 
Jews,153 somewhat exaggerates the state of affairs, but the Israeli/Palestinian conflict 
did reveal intra-party divisions. The debates drew attention to the potential costs of a 
party identifying with the Palestinian cause, in terms of intra-party division and in 
electoral terms. The election of a new leadership in 1983, intent on weakening the left 
as part of a drive towards making Labour more electable, had repercussions for the 
policy on the Palestinian/Israel conflict. In the late 1980s, a new division emerged 
when the leadership marginalised some of the pro-Palestinian demands in its attempt 
to re-build the party. This gave way to a new consensus, based on recognition of 
Israel’s right to exist and the Palestinians’ right to self-determination.
Although intra-party developments were behind this shift towards a moderate 
stance, external factors made it easier for pro-Palestinian activists to accept it. In the 
first place, the PLO itself had dropped its wholesale opposition to Israel, advocating a 
two-state solution to the conflict. Second, Israel’s shift to the right, which had so 
alienated traditional Labour supporters of the Jewish state, had sparked off a counter­
reaction and given rise to progressive forces such as the Peace Now movement. Its 
effect had not been to unite Israelis but to polarise them, creating a sharp division 
between right and left with the former rallying behind Begin and the latter strongly 
dissenting from the Israeli government’s policy.154 These developments provided the 
original momentum behind the Israeli Labour Party’s move towards negotiation with 
the Palestinians, propelling leaders like Shimon Peres towards a more accommodating 
attitude, ending with the current peace negotiations. The British Labour Party could 
now safely support a two-state option without alienating the Jewish community.
To what extent did the evolution in Labour’s thinking take place in other left- 
wing groups? Did the processes behind its policy changes operate within the 
communist left and other social democratic parties? The next part of the thesis 
addresses these comparative questions. It looks first at the way the British
153 Alderman, 1989:111.
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Communist Party responded to Israel during the postwar period and then at the French 
left’s attitudes.
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Part Two: The CPGB, the French Left and 
Conclusion
CHAPTER SIX
THE BRITISH COMMUNIST PARTY AND ISRAEL: FROM THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JEWISH STATE TO THE INVASION OF
LEBANON
As a member of the international communist movement, the British Communist 
Party (CP) had a strong internationalist current, holding that international 
socialism prevailed over national culture and that the cause of the international 
working class took priority over nationalism.1 Supporting only those nationalist 
movements considered capable of overthrowing capitalism and imperialism, the 
CP had a long tradition of hostility for Zionism and support for Arab nationalism. 
With respect to the conflicting nationalist claims to Palestine, the party opposed 
the Jews’ claims on the grounds that Zionism divided the working class and only 
paid ‘lip service’ to socialism. Moreover, it believed that the zionist movement 
depended upon an alliance with imperialism, whereas Arab nationalism 
represented a ‘struggle for national independence against imperialism’.2
As the cold war intensified, the CP’s support for anti-imperialist national 
liberation movements sharpened. Perceiving western imperialism as the major 
threat to progress, the party supported national liberation movements irrespective 
of their relationship to communism or socialism so long as they were anti­
imperialist.3 To what extent did communist principles determine the party’s 
policy positions during the various Israel/Arab conflicts? Was the party’s attitude 
unchanging and monolithic or was there dissent? How did the communists’ stand 
compare with Labour’s? In this chapter I shall consider these issues. In the first 
section, I shall describe the way the CP interpreted the Israel/Arab conflict from 
the postwar period to the 1980s. In the second section, I shall explain its various 
policy positions and in the third section, I shall compare the evolution of its 
approach to Israel with Labour’s.
1 Hobsbawm , 1977:5-6.
2 See Rennap, 1943:73-87.
1 How e, 1993:288-293.
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6.1 Changing Attitudes Towards Israel
Given the CP’s traditional hostility towards Zionism, one might have expected it to 
oppose Jewish immigration into Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state. 
However, during the 1940s, the CP abandoned its principles and adopted a number 
of pro-zionist policies, including the formation of a National Jewish Committee 
(NJC) in 1943 and support for Jewish immigration into Palestine and land 
purchases.4 Phil Piratin, MP for Mile End, and Jack Gaster, communist 
representative for Mile End on the LCC,5 made a statement to the Anglo- 
American Committee of Inquiry saying that although Jewish development in 
Palestine had contributed to a large mass of landless Arabs, the existing Jewish 
community had earned the right to ‘develop their new home as free and equal 
citizens of Palestine’.6 In 1948, the CP wholeheartedly supported the 
establishment of Israel, seeing the state’s foundation as ‘a big step toward 
fulfillment of self-determination of the peoples of Palestine’ and ‘a great sign of 
the times’.7 The party’s past support for Arab nationalism gave way to a hostile
O
characterisation of the nationalist movement as reactionary and feudalistic, with it 
suggesting that there should be an ‘ultimatum to the Arab feudal lords, who are 
truly puppets of Anglo-American oil - an ultimatum to lay down their arms’.9
This position brought the communists into conflict with the Labour 
government. The CP condemned Bevin’s Palestine policy, accusing him of 
having committed a ‘shameful betrayal’ of the Jews and claiming that ‘Bevinism 
leads to antisemitism and all that follows’.10 In parliament, William Gallacher, 
MP for West Fife, and Piratin sponsored an EDM that stated that the government 
was responsible for the Arab states’ invasion of Palestine, urging recognition of 
Israel and recommending the immediate withdrawal of military aid to the Arabs. 
The fellow-travellers, Denis Pritt and John Platts-Mills added their signatures.11
4 Kushner, 1990:67-70.
5 Alderman, 1992:317.
6 CPGB, ‘European Jewry and the Palestine Problem ’, 1946:14-15.
I D aily  W orker, 15 M ay 1948:1.
8 See Said, 1978 for an account o f  popular stereotypes o f Arabs.
9 D aily W orker, 18 M ay 1948:1.
10 Kushner, 1990:70-71.
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The party declared that the war in Palestine was ‘British sponsored’ and the direct 
consequence of ‘imperialist policy’:
‘This reactionary war conducted by the chieftains of 
the Arab League under British control is entirely 
against the interests of the Arab masses, who in all 
the countries of the Middle East are striving for 
freedom from imperialist domination’.12
The communists portrayed the Jews’ protest against British policy as an anti- 
imperialist struggle, declaring that ‘the days of imperialism are numbered’.13
However, the party’s ideological opposition to zionism and support for Arab 
nationalism quickly re-emerged. Its initial support for Israel gave way to a strong 
anti-zionist stand during the Slansky trials in Czechoslovakia and the ‘Doctors’ 
Plot’ in Russia,14 with the party asserting that the Slansky trials:
‘revealed the now familiar pattern of American 
espionage and sabotage against the People’s 
Democracies...The fact that eleven of the fourteen 
conspirators were of bourgeois Jewish 
origin...proved beyond doubt the complicity of the 
zionist organisation and Israeli government in the 
plot’.15
Now the CP saw Israel as an imperialist state. Harry Pollitt, the party’s secretary, 
said that the zionist movement had always been a ‘tool of British imperialism’ and 
that it was ‘increasingly shifting its allegiance to the stronger American 
imperialism’. He claimed that Israel had become a ‘pawn of the USA’ and that 
zionism was ‘a ready-made tool and weapon for the American-backed spies, 
traitors and wreckers’.16
The party adopted a pro-Arab position in the 1956 hostilities, seeing Nasser’s
17nationalisation of Suez as ‘Egyptian defiance of western imperialism’, and
12 D aily Worker, 22 M ay 1948:1.
13 D aily  Worker, 22 M ay 1948:1.
14 See chapter one.
15 W orld N ew s and Views, no. 50 , 1953:591.
16 Pelling, 1975:167-168.
17 D aily Worker, 31 July 1956:1.
146
viewing the Anglo-French attack as a manifestation of the west’s aim to 
undermine national liberation movements in the Middle East and North Africa. 
The communists claimed that the British government’s
‘only friends are rabid French imperialists, who, 
having got themselves embroiled in large-scale 
warfare in Algeria, would like their British allies 
and rivals embroiled up to the neck in Egypt...Their 
only semblance of a policy consists in the 
assumption that if Britain and France can overthrow 
Nasser, the Arab world will quieten down...’.18
Citing Lenin’s theory of imperialism, the party argued that the Anglo-French 
invasion happened because ‘while there [was] capitalism in the world, the forces 
of reaction, representing the interests of capitalist monopolies, will persist in 
military gambles and aggression’.19
The CP accused Israel of allying with western imperialism, suggesting that 
Israel’s role in the war served ‘the interests of the foreign colonialists’ and was 
motivated by a desire for ‘territorial expansion’. It claimed that the Ben-Gurion 
government had ‘entered into a dangerous plot, together with the British and 
French imperialists, against neighbouring peoples defending their national 
independence and sovereignty’.20 Bert Ramelson, head of the NJC, said that
i
Israel’s part in the conflict reflected the country’s ‘imperialist alliances’." The 
conflict revived the party’s views on the nature of Zionism and antisemitism. It 
claimed that antisemitism was the ‘weapon of reactionary ruling classes’ which 
‘split the working class’ and reiterated the view that Zionism could not combat 
antisemitism since it was based on the premise that antisemitism was 
‘ineradicable’.
However, the 1956 crisis saw an unprecedented groundswell of internal 
dissent over the party’s position on Israel. Chimen Abramsky and Hyman Levy 
began to challenge communist policy and the view that the USSR was a haven for
18 D aily  W orker, 1 Septem ber 1956:1.
19 L abour M onthly, D ecem ber 1956:560.
20 W orld N ew s, 22 D ecem ber 1956:815-819.
21 Marxism Today, January 1959:24.
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the Jews. In September 1956 the International Department and the NJC held an 
emergency meeting on the question of Soviet antisemitism, revealing a split 
between some Jewish members and the leadership. Members of the NJC stated 
that the Daily Worker had suppressed debate on antisemitism in the USSR and had 
given the impression that the party condoned socialist anti-semitism. The majority 
of the NJC refused to accept Palme Dutt’s defence of the Soviet Union.22 Levy 
and Abramsky in particular challenged the party’s line on Zionism and Israel, 
publishing a short book on ‘Jews and the National Question’ that called for a re- 
evaluation of communism’s attitude towards Jewish nationalism and the party’s 
policy towards Zionism and the Arab/Israel conflict.23
The break-down in the anti-zionist consensus reflected wider developments 
resulting from Khrushchev’s revelations about Stalinist repression. Those who 
dissented over the party’s attitude towards Zionism were also involved in the 
movement for greater internal democracy. Abramsky argued that the party should 
learn from the Khrushchev revelations and that it should re-examine the principle 
of democratic centralism and he objected to the way in which ordinary party 
members played no part in the formulation of party policy and to the tendency for 
‘blind loyalty to Moscow’.24 His and Levy’s eventual departure from the party 
was part of a much wider flight, in which people such as Edward Thompson and 
John Saville took part: Between 1956 and 1959 about ten thousand members 
left.“' The latter took part in the establishment of The Reasoner which also found 
the Soviet Union’s attitudes towards Jewish nationalism disturbing.26
The affair split Jewish communists. Chimen Abramsky later told Zaidman 
that members of his former branch regarded him as an ‘untouchable’.27 Jack 
Woddis, an active member of the MCF, also later broke with the party’s line on 
Jewish nationalism, claiming that the Soviet Union was hostile to Jewish cultural 
expression.28 Ramelson, Zaidman and Solly Kaye chose to remain in the party 
and to conform to its anti-zionist position. Reflecting on the affair, Solly Kaye has
22 Kushner, 1990:71-72.
22 Levy, 1958:12-17.
24 W orld N ew s, 27 October 1956:687.
25 Callaghan, 1990:186-187.
26 Saville, 1976:6.
27 Kushner, 1990:72.
28 M arxism  Today, March 1959:96.
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said that although he could now see that what Levy said was well founded, at the 
time he was impressed by Dutt’s expertise on international affairs.29
The leadership responded by trying to repress the dissent. Palme Dutt 
disowned Levy’s book on the grounds that it contradicted basic marxist tenets, 
saying that Jewish nationalist aspirations could only be realised by ‘methods of 
colonial conquest or imperialism’ and that it provided ‘fodder for antisemitism’.30 
Bert Ramelson, head of the NJC, objected to Levy’s call for a re-evaluation of the 
party’s stand on zionism and described the book as a ‘thinly disguised defence of 
zionism’, attacking Levy for praising the Israeli party Mapam (to the left of 
Mapai) on the grounds that the party shared responsibility for the Israeli 
government’s ‘deeds’.31 Idris Cox recommended a review of the NJC’s 
activities.32 Palme Dutt imposed hand-picked members on the committee on the 
grounds that there was an ‘urgent need for a strong and effective Jewish 
committee’ and claimed that the committee should put forward the communist 
perspective on the Jewish question as ‘part of the general fight against 
imperialism’.33 The new NJC complied with this imperative. In a subsequent 
policy statement it said that zionism falsely claimed that Jewish workers had 
something in common with ‘Jewish supporters of imperialism’; that zionism was a 
reactionary doctrine and had rightly been condemned as such by the international 
socialist movement as early as the first world war. The committee further 
maintained that zionism was integrally linked with imperialism and that:
‘No-one is Socialist - certainly not Marxist - who 
divides workers of a given country, city or locality, 
from each other and finds greater unity between 
capitalists and workers of one religion or race than 
among workers of the same class who may have 
different religions’.34
29 Interview with Solly  Kaye, 3 April 1990.
30 W orld N ew s, 8 March 1958:156.
31 Undated docum ent.
32 M emorandum from Idris Cox to the Political Com m ittee, 7 N ovem ber 1956.
33 M inutes o f  a m eeting o f  ‘Jewish com rades’, 11 Septem ber 1957.
34 Policy statement on the Jewish Question, September 1958.
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With respect to antisemitism in the Soviet Union, the committee contended that 
‘bourgeois Jews’ who ‘could not believe that there [was] a difference between 
hostility to zionism and hostility to Jews’ had made the accusations.35
The CP’s anti-Israel and pro-Arab position remained throughout the 1967 
hostilities. Supporting the Arab countries, John Gollan, the general secretary, 
maintained that the struggle against imperialism demanded support for the Arab 
liberation movement.' The party claimed that the ‘imperialist powers’ had 
‘stirred up conflict between Jews and Arabs to safeguard their own economic and 
strategic interests in the Middle East’.37 It said that the west’s principal aim was 
to overthrow the Syrian and Egyptian governments and to bring these countries 
back into the ‘imperialist orbit’ to secure oil supplies and remove Soviet influence 
from the region.38
As for Israel, the communists said that its role in the war was the result of 
‘imperialist alliances’, with the political committee stating that:
‘Israel can never enjoy security and peace as long as 
it acts as an ally of imperialism, denies the rights of 
Arabs and ranges itself on the side of the forces 
opposing the Arab liberation movement’.39
The 1967 hostilities produced another spate of anti-zionism. Ramelson’s 
pamphlet on the Middle East crisis contended that zionism was a ‘false’ and 
‘reactionary’ doctrine whose sole aim was to ‘weaken the class sense of Jews by 
preaching a non-existent “common national interest’” .40 His exposition of the 
party’s position included a conspiracy theory of zionism. He claimed that Israel’s 
military, financial and strategic force rested on ‘zionist inspired financial, 
economic and “pressure group” support from the widespread Jewish communities, 
conditioned by years of zionist propaganda to believe that they owe allegiance to 
the zionist state of Israel’,41 and that:
35 NJC policy statement, Septem ber 1958.
16 M orning Star, 10 June 1967:2.
37 M orning S ta r , 6 June 1967:1
38 Ram elson, 1967:24.
39 M orning Star, 14 June 1967:2.
40 Ram elson, 1967:7-10.
41 Ram elson, 1967:36-37.
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‘It is...no accident that the “new found” friends of 
the Jews and Israel during 1956 and 1967 are often 
the same ones who supported Munich and the rise of 
Hitler and Mosley, and for exactly the same reasons 
- considerations of imperialist advantage’.42
The party’s policy generated further dissent, with some members challenging 
the idea that Israel was the aggressor and suggesting that the Arab states had 
deliberately whipped up the Palestinian refugee crisis. They also queried the CP’s 
support for Egypt in the light of Nasser’s anti-communist policies. Other party 
members began to question the leadership’s defence of the Soviet bloc against 
accusations of antisemitism. Referring to the Polish Communist Party’s 
repression of Jewish cultural activities, the dissenters accused the British party’s 
leadership of refusing to take seriously the possibility of antisemitism in eastern 
Europe. In particular, they attacked Bert Ramelson and Maurice Lichtig for failing 
to provide information on Poland’s anti-zionist propaganda.43 The leadership 
again tried to repress disquiet over its Arab/Israel position. Idris Cox and the 
International Department decided to re-establish the Middle East sub-committee 
and to merge it with the NJC.44 Cox was responsible for the choice of potential 
members of the new sub-committee and decided that Maurice Lichtig should be 
chair.45 This decision was significant because Lichtig was highly committed to 
the traditional communist view of zionism and the idea that the Soviet Union had 
solved ‘the Jewish problem’.46
So, for most of the postwar period, the CP maintained a pro-Arab and anti- 
Israel stance. However, Israel’s involvement in Lebanon in the 1980s drew 
attention to some significant changes in the party’s outlook. By this time, the 
party had split between the traditionalists and the reformist new times faction. 
The traditionalists centred principally around the Morning Star, and the 
revisionists or the new times faction, centred around Marxism Today. The key
42 Ibid:41.
43 Untitled docum ent signed by A . Lewish and D. Jacobs from the Prestwich branch and D. 
N esbitt and J. Garman from the Crumpsall branch.
44 C orrespondence from Idris C ox to Tom  M cW hinnie, 16 D ecem ber 1968.
45 Correspondence from Idris Cox to M aurice Lichtig, 13 January 1969.
46 See C om m ent, 25 February 1967:117.
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difference between the two factions rested on their analysis of the role of class in 
contemporary society. The former strand believed that communism’s appeal to 
the working class should remain a priority, and although it recognised the 
importance of non-class identities, it maintained that it was wrong to understand 
them separately from class.47 The new times strand included people like Martin 
Jacques and Beatrix Campbell and believed that there was a deep-seated weakness 
in the labour movement, arising primarily out of the decline of the working class. 
This faction challenged what they saw as an indiscriminate tendency to apply class 
analysis to new social divisions.
With respect to the Palestinian cause in the 1980s, the CP as a whole was 
committed to Palestinian nationalist aspirations, having a policy that claimed that 
Britain should ‘recognise the Palestinian people’s right to establish their own 
national state and the PLO as the sole voice of the Palestinians’.48 After the 
invasion, Gerry Pocock, head of the international department, said that the party 
favoured ‘full recognition of the PLO and the right of the Palestinian people to 
establish their own state in the occupied territories’.49 An article in Marxism 
Today suggested that the decline of the communist Rakah party in Israel stemmed 
from its unwillingness to acknowledge the ‘unity of the Palestinian people’.50 The 
CP supported Labour’s shift towards recognition of Palestinian national rights and 
called on the labour movement to follow the pro-PLO resolutions at the annual 
conference and at the TUC conference.51
However, this consensus over Palestinian national rights did not extend to 
views on Israel, with the traditionalists maintaining the party’s previous anti- 
zionist approach and the reformers rejecting it. Pocock argued that the Israeli 
attack was part of a long-term plan to destroy the Palestinian people and to extend 
Israel’s territory. He believed that the UN should impose sanctions against Israel 
to enforce a withdrawal.52 Just before the invasion, the Morning Star condemned 
Lord Carrington, the Foreign Secretary, for refusing to meet PLO representatives
47 Pitcairn, 1985:102-120.
48 36th National Conference o f the CPGB, 1979:7.
49 M orning Star, 8 June 1982:1.
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51 M orning Star, 11 October 1982:3.
52 M orning Star, 8 June 1982:1.
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and claimed that Britain gave Israel ‘tacit support’ for expansionist policies.53 
Moreover, it drew parallels between the invasion and the Nazi holocaust, saying 
that Israel had used ‘Blitzkrieg tactics’ ‘modelled on the military theories of Nazi 
strategists’.54 The party’s traditional strand portrayed Menachem Begin and Ariel 
Sharon as ‘Nazi monsters’, stating that ‘General Sharon seems to have regarded 
this operation as some sort of Israeli version of a “Final Solution” but against the 
Palestinians’.55
Some of the traditionalists’ coverage of Israel was antisemitic, drawing on 
anti-Jewish themes couched in biblical references. In response to the massacre, 
for example, the Morning Star declared that ‘the mark of Cain is clearly on 
Sharon’s forehead’ and:
“‘thy brother’s blood cries out from the ground” 
needs to be inscribed in letters of blood over the 
courtroom in Jerusalem...For these lines from the 
biblical story of Cain and Abel have been in the 
minds and mouths of millions the world over as ever 
more horrific details emerged of the monsters who 
masterminded it’.56
In a pamphlet on Israel and the Palestinians, the party published a cartoon that 
depicted Begin salivating over skulls with his mouth open and revealing the teeth 
of a vampire.57
With a sharp break from party orthodoxy, the reformists adopted a more 
moderate attitude towards Israel and Jewish nationalism, rejecting traditional 
communist rhetoric and confining its criticism to specific Israeli policies such as 
Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza on the grounds that it 
breached human rights and to the rise of the Israeli far right, most notably, the 
Kach Party.58 Whereas in the past, the CP believed that there was no progressive
53 M orning S tar, 3 April 1982:3.
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left-wing in Israel, the reformists sympathised with the Israeli New Outlook, edited 
by Simcha Flapan, which believed that zionism should return to its socialist 
roots,59 and they supported members of the Israeli peace movement, such as Uri 
Avineri.60 In the late 1980s, this, by now dominant, faction’s new approach was 
sealed when it explicitly condemned left-wing anti-zionists like Lenni Brenner for 
being apologists for ‘Marx’s antisemitism’ and rejected communism’s ‘simple 
binary theory’ which posited that Jews were good but Zionists were bad as 
‘sloganism which equates zionism with imperialism or Israel as a tool of the US’. 
It further objected to a fixation on zionist collusion with the Nazis and asked the 
left to take on board ‘the experience of the Jew who has ingested the knowledge of 
the holocaust and now finds it uncomfortable to feel at home anywhere’.61 What 
accounted for the CP’s various positions?
6.2 Explaining the Evolution of the CPGB’s Attitudes
The CP’s early attitude towards Israel and the Israel/Arab conflict stemmed 
principally from its subordination to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU). Although the British party was one of the smallest in western Europe, it 
belonged to the Communist International from 1920 until the International’s end 
in 1943. While it was not formally a member of the Cominform, established in 
1947, it tended to adopt the Cominform line. The formation of the Cominform 
meant that the British party came under greater pressure for conformity by 
Moscow. In relation to colonial and imperial affairs, it accepted the Russian 
leader’s, Andrei Zhdanov’s, view that the world was split into ‘the imperialist and 
anti-democratic camp’ and the ‘anti-imperialist and democratic camp’ whereby the
first camp sought to establish American imperialism across the world and the
62second aimed to undermine imperialism and install democracy. The 
intensification of the cold war led the international communist movement
undemocratic for advocating the expulsion o f  Palestinians from Israel and the occupied territories 
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increasingly to pressurise the party into rejecting any possibility of a third way 
between the USSR and America.63
It was primarily the CP’s relationship to the Soviet party that led it to make 
various pro-zionist gestures in the 1940s. As part of its attempt to mobilise Jewish 
support after Germany’s invasion of Russia, the CPSU set up the Jewish Anti- 
Fascist Committee (JAFC) and declared that the Jews had a ‘right to political 
independence in Palestine’.64 Moreover, Soviet officials made contacts with 
Zionists and supported the Haganah’s illegal efforts to bring Jewish survivors to 
Palestine.65 As part of Russia’s efforts to obtain Jewish support for its fight 
against Germany, the Soviet leadership sent the actor Shloime Mikhoels and the 
poet Itzik Feffer to Britain to advertise the USSR’s pro-Jewish activities. The 
CPSU directed Jewish communists in Britain to raise specific issues in their 
electoral campaigns, such as Mikhoel’s Moscow Yiddish State Theatre, the 
activities of the JAFC and Birobidzhan (an autonomous Jewish region established 
in 1934). Piratin and other candidates dutifully complied with the directive.66 The 
British party’s recognition of Israel directly mirrored Soviet positions. Stalin’s 
immediate postwar policy was pro-Israel, symbolised by Golda M eir’s visit to 
Moscow’s Grand Synagogue soon after the Jewish state’s establishment. At this 
time, the Soviet Union had no allies in the Middle East and the zionist movement 
in Palestine was anti-British. Russia supported Israel because it wanted to weaken 
the western alliance by exploiting Attlee’s and Truman’s disagreement over 
Jewish immigration and to obstruct western control over oil resources.67
The British party’s position in 1956 also arose out of its identification with 
the Soviet Union, which had intensified in the early 1950s. During the Suez crisis, 
Nikita Khrushchev, Russia’s leader between 1953 and 1964, denounced Britain, 
France and Israel for their war against Egypt, saying that Russia would help Egypt 
militarily if the three countries did not withdraw their forces.68 In an effort to 
improve Russia’s position in the Middle East, Khrushchev adopted a pro-Arab
63 H ow e, 1993:160.
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65 Brod in W istrich, ed., 1979:53-55.
66 Srebrnik, 1986:285;295-300.
67 W istrich in W istrich ed., 1979:278-279;281.
68 Cam pbell in Louis and O w en, eds., 1989:246-247.
155
stance, seeing the non-aligned states in the Third World as potential allies and 
portraying Arab nationalists like Nasser as progressive as well as providing Egypt 
with military aid.69 As the Soviet Union’s relations with Egypt improved, its 
relations with Israel deteriorated. Russia’s identification with Third World 
neutralism and Egypt occurred when border clashes between Israel and Egypt had 
exacerbated relations between the two Middle Eastern countries. The Russian 
premier, Bulganin, declared that Israel’s role in the war would alienate the Jewish 
state and even threaten its existence.70 Under Khrushchev, Russia continued to 
repress Jewish nationalist expression and its media consistently linked zionism 
and Judaism with reaction.71
The CP’s position in 1967 again reflected the Soviet Union’s. The Soviet 
Union was neutral about the war at first,72 but soon moved to an anti-Israel stance, 
breaking off diplomatic relations with the Jewish state and other east European 
countries quickly followed suit.73 Russia protested against Israel’s aggression and 
called on the country to give up the occupied territories. The Russian leader, 
Brezhnev, said that ‘the Israeli aggressors [were] behaving like the worst of 
bandits. In their atrocities against the Arab population...they want to copy the 
crimes of the Hitler invaders.’74 This position stemmed from the USSR’s 
continuing pro-Arab strategy aimed at strengthening its position in the Middle 
East by establishing a military presence there.75 In this context, Russia presented 
itself as the Arabs’ natural ally by identifying with Third World liberation 
movements and the Soviet leadership described Nasser as ‘Hero of the Soviet 
Union’, portraying the Egyptian leader’s movement as preparing the way for 
socialism.76
The CP’s anti-zionist campaign in 1967 directly mirrored developments in 
Russia. The new international rivalries between the USSR and America over the 
Middle East expressed themselves in an extreme anti-zionist campaign.77 The
69 W istrich in W istrich, ed., 1979:285-286.
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postwar Soviet press constructed a conspiracy theory of zionism, claiming that
zionism was a ‘ramified system of agencies and political practice of the Jewish big
bourgeoisie closely linked to the monopoly groups in the United States’.78 In the
late 1960s, the Polish Communist Party embarked on a campaign against zionism,
accusing Zionists of being imperialism’s lackeys, warmongers and wanting to
isolate Poland from the Soviet Union; a campaign launched in response to
economic problems and internal unrest, despite the fact that Polish opinion was
sympathetic to Israel.79
The British CP, like the CPSU, opposed Israel because it was a western ally.
Almost from its inception, Israel adopted a pro-western orientation, identifying
with the west over the Korean conflict and seeking to join the western alliance at
the early stages of the cold war.80 In the 1950s, the Israeli government became
increasingly anti-communist. After the Slansky trials, Ben-Gurion began actively
to oppose the Israeli Communist Party. The Histadrut banned communists from
its trade unions, the government stopped the distribution of the communist daily
81newspaper and Ben-Gurion wanted to expel communists from the Knesset. 
Later, Israel moved increasingly towards a pro-American stance, depending upon 
alliances with powerful countries like the America to fulfil its military, economic 
and political needs. This coincided with America’s need to find suitable allies to 
protect its interests in regions like the Middle East. Israel’s original pro-Europe 
orientation gave way to a pro-American alignment and the Jewish state 
simultaneously became more hostile towards the Soviet Union, condemning 
Russia for supporting the Arabs.82 In contrast, Nasser began increasingly to stress 
socialist values,83 and in international affairs, Egypt started increasingly to identify 
with the Soviet Union.84
The party’s loyalty to the Soviet Union at the height of the cold war led it to 
have very little internal democracy. After 1947, the CP initiated procedural 
changes that undermined its earlier openness. In 1945 the executive committee
78 ‘Soviet Opinion in the M iddle East and the Adventures o f  International Z ion ism ’, 1970:48-50.
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was chosen by open ballot, but by 1952 the Political Committee drew up a list 
from which an open ballot was then conducted. In the same year, the leadership 
decided that the rank and file could only discuss party policy and could not 
actively take part in its formulation.85 The Khrushchev revelations did not unduly 
upset the leadership, with Palme Dutt describing them merely as ‘spots on the 
sun’.86 The lack of internal democracy and loyalty to the CPSU accounted for the 
way the party dealt with members who dissented from the anti-zionist line. The 
leadership’s attack on Levy was part of its wider campaign against party 
intellectuals and marked the start of the party’s attempts to establish a division
on
between intellectuals and industrial workers. Although under Gollan between 
1956 and 1975 the CP was supposed to have become more democratic, its 
subordination to Russia remained entrenched.88
The party’s relationship with the CPSU also influenced part of its reaction to 
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in the early 1980s. Although the traditionalists were 
not uncritical of the Soviet Union, having objected to its intervention in 
Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan,89 they continued broadly to follow Moscow 
policy. From the mid-1970s, Russia consistently supported Palestinian 
nationalism, recognising the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians and 
supporting the establishment of a Palestinian mini-state.90 The invasion of 
Lebanon occurred when Russia’s relations with America had deteriorated, partly 
as a result of the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan and the election of 
Reagan as president. Moscow provided the PLO with arms supplies, paralleling 
its previous policies towards Egypt. Russia’s support for the PLO arose from its 
desire to undermine American influence in pro-American Arab countries.91 The 
CP’s traditionalists held America responsible for the events in Lebanon through
07the use of its veto in the UN and its economic and military aid to Israel. “
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However, the British party’s policies did not always flow from Russian 
policy. When its relationship with the CPSU loosened, national factors played a 
part. Between 1943 and 1947, for example, there was a relatively high level of 
intra-party democracy and the party tried to integrate more directly into the British 
democratic system.93 This situation played out in the party’s attitude towards the 
Palestine conflict. While pro-zionist policies mirrored Soviet initiatives, they also 
stemmed from internal factors. For instance, the party had significant political ties 
with the Jews, especially in London’s East End, to the extent that Poale Zion had 
been worried about Jewish support for communism. At the end of the war, the 
zionist movement had only managed to attract about seven per cent of Britain’s 
Jewish population.94 Jews accounted for 10 per cent of the CPGB’s national 
membership,95 and for an even greater proportion of membership of London 
branches, making up at least half of the Stepney party’s membership in 1945.96 
Many of the party’s Jewish members were actively involved in organisations such 
as the Bundist Workers’ Circle Friendly Society (WCFS) and local trade unions.97 
The NJC contained a number of Jewish communists such as Chimen Abramsky, 
Hyam Levy, Mick Mindel, Alec Waterman, Lazar Zaidman and Issie Panner.98
The identification between Jews and the CP was rooted partly in the level of 
pro-Soviet feeling within the Jewish community. Those of East European origin, 
were committed to socialism, having been impressed by post-revolutionary 
Russia’s attempts to deal with the Jewish question, including the establishment of 
Birobidzhan, a Jewish national region, and the Soviet Union’s role in the war.99 It 
also sprang from the party’s history of actively seeking to combat antisemitism 
and fascist groups like British Union of Fascists (BUF), activities that contrasted 
favourably with the Board of Deputies of British Jews’ (BOD) non-confrontational 
approach.100 The Jewish left has traditionally been hostile towards the BOD’s 
passivity.101 Solly Kaye, for example, joined the party because of the communists’
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participation in anti-fascist campaigns.102 The communists believed that the 
Nazis’ anti-Jewish activities justified limited immigration into Palestine.103
This link provided the basis for the party’s attempts to exploit the Jewish 
vote during the 1945 general election campaign. Wanting to pre-empt the zionist 
movement’s influence in the Jewish community,104 communist candidates like 
Phil Piratin and William Rust, the candidate for South Hackney, tried to attract 
Jewish voters in their campaign by moderating the party’s assimilationist 
principles. Piratin stood as a ‘communist and a Jew’ and both candidates called 
for anti-semitism to be outlawed and for measures to satisfy Jewish cultural 
needs.105 Communist candidates did not do well in the general election, winning 
only two parliamentary seats when William Gallacher was re-elected for West Fife 
and Phil Piratin won the Mile End seat, taking it from the Labour incumbent.106 
Nevertheless, their limited success was largely due to Jewish electoral support,
107with about half of Piratin’s vote probably coming from Jews.
In the 1980s, when the party’s reformists began to dominate, the CP’s more 
moderate attitude towards zionism and Israel reflected its distancing from the 
Soviet Union. From the late 1970s, the British party came under the influence of 
Eurocommunism, a term that refers principally to the French, Italian and Spanish 
parties’ attempts to create a more distinctive national identity by distancing 
themselves from the Soviet Union and emphasising integration into their own 
democratic systems. Eurocommunist strategies reflected the national parties’
efforts to enhance their domestic image and increase their electoral strength after
108years of being marginalised because of their identification with Moscow.
The British reformists’ attitude sprang from their movement away from 
Soviet politics. Although they were not strongly anti-communist,109 they refused 
blindly to follow the Soviet Union’s line. This meant that they refrained from 
judging nationalist movements only in terms of their contribution to Soviet
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interests and started to support them for intrinsic reasons. The new times 
manifesto called for a greater sensitivity to ethnic and national identities for their 
own sake. Their sympathy for both Palestinian and Jewish nationalism came from 
a new emphasis on national identities:
‘The character of the working class is 
changing...other sources of collective identity 
among women, black people, and other social 
groups will be central to progressive politics.
Progressive politics has to realign itself to changes 
in its potential constituencies of support’.110
The revisionists’ position stemmed from an attempt to create a new alliance 
with Labour. In their efforts to rejuvenate socialist politics, the new times people 
began to forge links with Labour’s soft left, in particular with members of the 
Labour Co-ordinating Committee (LCC).111 This Labour faction, like the 
revisionists, began to stress the importance of identities like gender and ethnicity 
as well as class. Although in the 1980s, hard left Labour activists like Ted Knight 
tried to get Labour to adopt an anti-zionist agenda, they failed when the Kinnock 
leadership embarked on a process of making the party more electable. After the 
divisions of the early 1980s, Labour eventually adopted the soft left’s support for a 
two-state solution to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict as policy.112 The CP’s move 
towards a more moderate attitude towards Jewish nationalism represented an 
attempt to appeal once more to left-wing Jews. In the late 1980s, Jewish groups 
like the Jewish Socialists’ Group (JSG) continued to draw on the Jewish 
communist tradition, being attracted to Bundist ideology and celebrating the 
Bund’s 90th anniversary in 1989.113
So, although communist principles played a significant part in shaping the 
CP’s policy positions on Israel, by the late 1980s other factors, including intra­
party changes and political expediency, directed the party away from orthodox
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communist policy. In the following section I shall consider the way the CP’s 
attitudes towards Israel and the Arab/Israel conflict compared with Labour’s.
6.3 Conclusion:Comparing the CPGB and Labour
There were significant differences between the Communist Party’s and Labour’s 
approach to Israel in the postwar period. Immediately after the war, the Labour 
leadership jettisoned the party’s electoral commitment to the establishment of a 
Jewish state in favour of an anti-zionist policy. In contrast, the CP abandoned its 
traditional hostility towards zionism and support for Arab nationalism in favour of 
a pro-zionist policy, supporting the creation of Israel and opposing the 
government’s approach to Palestine. During the Suez war, although both parties 
campaigned against the tripartite attack on Egypt, they differed considerably in 
their attitudes towards Israel and Nasser. Labour explicitly tried to separate its 
anti-war stance from an anti-Israel one and made clear tnat its opposition to the 
war did not entail support for Nasser’s nationalist aims.114 The CP, on the other 
hand, strongly identified with Arab nationalism and reverted to its previous anti- 
zionist ideology, condemning Israel for being an imperialist state.
The CP and Labour diverged even more sharply over the 1967 war. The 
majority of the Labour Party, including the leadership, the PLP and most of the 
extra-parliamentary party, rallied behind Israel, claiming that Arab aggression 
caused the war. The CP adopted a completely different policy, showing solidarity 
with the Arab states and arguing that Israeli aggression caused the war. It accused 
the Labour government of colluding with America and Israel in the war against the 
Arab countries, saying that Wilson and President Johnson favoured Israeli 
aggression. Ramelson wrote that both leaders had threatened Egypt with force; 
that they failed to act to help stop the aggression and that they prevented a cease­
fire decision at the UN.115 Moreover, the 1967 conflict led the CP to reassert its 
anti-zionist views, whereas anti-zionism barely existed in the Labour Party at this
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time, being confined to a tiny minority of people including Christopher 
Mayhew.116
The two parties also differed in the direction in which their respective 
dissenters from their traditional attitudes towards Israel tried to push them. In 
1956, Labour’s dissenters, including people like Michael Foot and David Ennals, 
began to move towards a more sympathetic approach to Arab nationalist claims. 
The CP’s dissenters, including people like Levy and Abramsky, went the other 
way, urging the leadership to refrain from unquestioningly adopting a pro-Arab 
stance and to re-evaluate its attitude towards Jewish nationalism. In 1967, 
Labour’s dissenters comprised a small group of right-wingers, most notably 
Christopher Mayhew, and some left-wingers like Michael Foot, who began to 
criticise Israel’s postwar policy and tried to get the party to recognise Arab 
grievances. The former saw the conflict as a chance to air previously held views 
in the tradition of Bevin whereas left-wing critics began to support the Arabs as a 
result of their involvement in anti-colonialist politics.1'7 The CP’s dissenters 
again challenged the idea that the Arabs were victims of Israeli aggression and 
accused the leadership of pandering to anti-semitism in its anti-zionism.
What lay behind these differences? In the first place, the CP never 
constituted a serious rival to Labour, stemming partly from the nature of the 
political system.118 At its high-point in the 1945 it only won two parliamentary 
seats. Thereafter, the party suffered a drop in its membership,119 and both local 
and national decline. During the 1950 election, the CP put up a hundred 
candidates, with only three managing to keep their deposits.120 Piratin and 
Gallacher both lost their parliamentary seats in 1950, with Piratin attracting the 
lowest number of votes in his constituency. Moreover, communist representation 
on the LCC collapsed.121 By the 1980s, the party had irretrievably lost its 
industrial base, rendering it unable to influence the trade union movement, and
I 00was completely unable to attract the younger generation into its ranks. "
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Furthermore, the relationship between Jews and communism broke down in 
the aftermath of the 1956 events. Although by 1957 every communist candidate 
elected to Stepney Borough Council was Jewish, this situation was confined to 
Stepney.123 Although Jewish support for communism still existed in 1967, with 
Jews making up around ten per cent of the party’s membership, the new crisis 
further undermined the link between Jews and communism.124 While the CP 
recognised the political advantages of adopting a pro-zionist platform in the 
immediate postwar period, it did not appeal to Jewish opinion again until the late 
1980s. In contrast, the relationship between Labour and the Jews, despite a couple 
of hiccups, remained significant until the 1970s. Unlike the CP, Labour’s 
integration into formal politics and its continuing links with Jews meant that it 
continued to appeal to Jewish opinion in the postwar period. In 1956, Gaitskell 
was worried that Labour’s anti-war stance would jeopardise the party’s ties with 
the Jews and he tried to reassure Jewish opinion about Labour’s continuing 
identification with Israel.125 In a period of some unpopularity, members of the 
Wilson government were aware of the weight of popular and Jewish sympathy 
behind Israel during the 1967 hostilities and realised that sympathy for Israel
I 9Awould do its image no harm.
The parties’ different approaches to the Israel/Arab conflict also reflected the 
rivalries between them in the postwar period. Relations between the CP and 
Labour deteriorated after the war as a result of the cold war, the communist
I ">7leadership’s pro-Stalinism and the Labour leadership’s anti-communism. “ The
postwar Labour government was strongly anti-communist, believing that
128 •communist infiltration into the unions would damage government policy. With
1 ">9the start of the cold war and communist opposition to the Marshall Plan, “ the 
government began to clamp down on communists, with Attlee refusing to allow 
communist civil servants to handle sensitive documents. Attlee, Morrison,
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Dalton, Shinwell and Morgan Phillips saw people like Platts Mills and Konni 
Zilliacus as subversive elements130 and initiated a policy to purge the party of such 
‘fellow-travellers’, expelling Platts-Mills and his colleagues for their pro-Soviet 
sympathies.131
The rivalry between Labour and the CP in the 1940s expressed itself in the 
parties’ respective attitudes towards the Palestine conflict. Believing that the 
Middle East was critical to Britain’s economic and strategic needs, the Labour 
government began to regard communism as a threat to its interests in this region 
and Russia’s support for the Jewish state reinforced Bevin’s fears.132 Thinking 
that Israel could ‘turn red’ as a result of an influx of Jews from eastern Europe,133 
Bevin became obsessed with preventing the Soviet Union from gaining strength in 
the Middle East.134 In contrast, having decided to join the anti-imperialist side, 
the CP thought that a pro-Soviet Jewish state would undermine Britain’s 
imperialist interests in the region. Many of Israel’s founders were Russian Jews 
who sympathised with the Soviet Union. The Yishuv contained people like 
Moshe Sneh, who led the Haganah, between 1940 and 1946, and who believed 
that the Yishuv should support Russia’s struggle against British imperialism. 
Left-wing Zionists in the Palmach, the Haganah’s elite force, and Mapam shared 
this view.135 Moreover, the CP believed that in Palestine, as well as India, the 
eradication of colonialism would end local conflicts.136
Gaitskell was as opposed to communist links with Labour as his
1 ^ 7predecessors, denouncing communist activism in the constituency parties. ~ He 
belonged to the revisionist right, a faction that was notoriously suspicious of 
Soviet foreign policy.138 Labour’s opposition to the war arose from a number of 
factors, but anti-imperialist politics did not play a part in the leadership’s stance. 
Gaitskell took an anti-war line because he feared that Britain’s action would 
jeopardise the Anglo-American alliance. His faith in the UN’s authority also led
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him to oppose the war on the grounds that it breached international law, because 
the UN had not sanctioned the tripartite attack on Egypt.139 The motivation 
behind Gaitskell’s opposition to the war contrasted sharply with the communists’. 
By now, having made the defeat of imperialism its overriding priority, the CP 
supported anti-imperialist nationalist movements irrespective of their character 
arguing that even bourgeois nationalist movements were progressive,140 an 
outlook that informed the communists’ attitude towards Nasser. The party had 
little in common with the Labour leadership, saying that:
‘The battle for a socialist foreign policy has not yet 
been won in the Labour Party and the trade unions: 
and that showed itself in...November 1956, in spite 
of the wonderful and heartening protests against the 
attack on Egypt.’141
In 1967, the two parties’ different allegiances in the cold war and the 
rivalries between them displayed themselves in their positions on the war. 
Wilson’s pro-Israel orientation sprang from his commitment to the Atlantic 
alliance. The CP’s pro-Arab position stemmed from its pro-Soviet orientation. In 
the 1960s, the communists’ commitment to anti-imperialist nationalist movements 
had intensified,142 justifying their support for non-communist movements such as 
Nasser’s on the grounds that imperialism had prevented the growth of a working 
class in colonial regions by preventing industrial development.143 The 
communists’ opposition to Labour’s attitude towards the hostilities was part of its 
wider disillusion with Wilson’s foreign policies, especially the Labour leader’s 
refusal explicitly to condemn America’s involvement in Vietnam and his failure to 
prevent the unilateral declaration of independence from Britain in Southern 
Rhodesia. The CP supported a Labour back-bench rebellion over this issue.144
However, there were some similarities between the CP and Labour, 
especially between the communists and the Labour left. In the 1940s, both parties
139 Chapter three.
140 H ow e, 1993:290.
141 L abour M onthly, D ecem ber 1956:564.
142 H ow e, 1993:290-293.
143 Ram elson, 1967:17.
144 M orning Star, 16 June 1967:1.
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adopted a pro-zionist platform in the campaign to the 1945 general election. The 
CP’s attempts to forge links with Labour and integrate into the political system 
made it subject to some of the same constraints as Labour, including an 
appreciation of popular and Jewish opinion. Aware of the political advantages of 
adopting a pro-zionist stance, both parties did so for electoral gain. Once Labour 
won power, the CP allied with the Labour left in protesting against Bevin’s 
Palestine policy, a unity that stemmed from a shared disappointment with the 
government’s approach to foreign policy. Both the Labour left and the CP 
believed that the government had jeopardised its commitment to a socialist foreign 
policy. The communists’ protests against Bevin’s Palestine policy were part of a 
campaign against other aspects of the government’s policies abroad, including, 
most notably, the government’s response to the insurgency in Malaya.145
There were also some similarities between the two parties in 1956. The CP 
joined the anti-war demonstration in Trafalgar Square along with the Labour 
Party, the TUC and other Labour organisations such as Labour Women from 
Scotland.146 It particularly sympathised with the Labour left, portraying this 
faction as responsible for Gaitskell’s decision to oppose the British government’s 
policy.147 The party presented Bevan as the hero of the anti-war movement and 
described the demonstration as ‘the most united’, where ‘Labour and Communist, 
trade unionist, Ministers of religion and students stood side by side’.148 This unity 
reflected the CP’s links with Labour left-wingers, especially with people like 
Maurice Orbach and William Warbey. Prominent communists like Idris Cox, Kay 
Beauchamp and Jack Woddis, worked with Labour anti-colonialists in the 
MCF.149 Partly under the influence of the MCF, the Labour left began to support 
national liberation movements in the Third World, putting pressure on the 
leadership to pursue a more radical approach to foreign and colonial affairs.150 It 
was Labour members of the MCF, including Orbach, who protested against the 
war for anti-colonialist reasons, like the CP.151
14:> See H ow e, 1993:159-160.
146 D aily W orker, 17 Septem ber 1956:1.
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There were also parallels between the CP’s position and the Labour left’s in 
1967. The CP’s opposition to the government’s pro-Israel orientation stemmed 
from its view that the war could not be understood outside America’s neo­
colonialist agenda in the Third World. It supported left-wing MPs like James 
Dickens, who opposed Israel’s occupation of the territories.152 Labour’s left-wing 
dissenters from the party’s pro-Israeli tradition similarly began to show some 
sympathy for the Arab countries because of their hostility towards American neo­
colonialism. Having been influenced by the rise of Third World nationalism and 
new left politics, which centred on anti-colonialist politics, the Labour left started 
to see Israeli politics as helping to force through America’s agenda in the Third 
World.153
There were even stronger parallels in the 1980s and these were twofold. 
First, in the early part of the decade Labour contained a small group of far left 
people, such as Ted Knight, which espoused anti-zionist ideas, condemning Israel 
for being a racist, imperialist state and calling for its dissolution. Some of this 
anti-zionism was anti-semitic.154 The CP’s traditionalist strand articulated 
identical themes, making links between zionism and racism, comparing zionism 
and Nazism and elaborating anti-Jewish themes. This faction differed from 
Labour’s far left only in so far as it did not call for Israel’s abolition, in line with 
communist orthodoxy. Both the Labour far left’s anti-zionism and the CP’s 
traditionalists’ reflected their unwillingness to adapt their basic ideological 
assumptions to changing situations. The orthodox communists were reluctant to 
depart from classical class analysis.155 Labour’s far left was unwilling to abandon 
conventional Trotskyist formulas.
The second similarity turned on that between Labour’s soft left and the CP’s 
reformers. By the late 1980s, both of these factions in the respective parties 
adopted an even-handed approach to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, recognising 
Palestinian and Israeli nationalism. Both parties ended up in this position for 
similar reasons, including intra-party changes and decisions to make the parties
152 M orning Star, 13 June 1967:1.
153 Chapter four.
154 Chapter five.
155 Callaghan in Seldon, ed., 1990:74.
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more accountable to popular opinion. The entry of a younger generation of 
activists, influenced by the new left movements of the 1960s and anti-racist and 
anti-colonialist politics, led Labour to take on board non-class issues such as 
national identity. This new current favoured recognition of Palestinian as well as 
Israeli national rights. Moreover, under Neil Kinnock, Labour embarked on a 
policy review process designed to make the party more attractive by eradicating 
what the leadership saw as unpopular policies like unilateralism. By the late 
1980s, this aim underpinned Kinnock’s attempts to remove some of the more 
extreme aspects of the pro-Palestinian campaign, especially the far left’s demands 
for the dissolution of the Jewish state. The leadership wanted to rebuild the 
bridges that had been broken in the late 1970s and early 1980s between Labour 
and the Jews.156
Similarly, it was the rise of a younger generation of communists, people like 
Martin Jacques, which forced the CP to take on board non-class issues like gender, 
ethnic and national identities, and to depart from communism’s emphasis on class. 
This co-incidence of ideas between the soft left and the, by now dominant, 
communist reformers, reflected the links between these two groups. In the 
aftermath of Labour’s 1983 election defeat, Neil Kinnock’s supporters and the 
Labour Co-Ordinating Committee (LCC) worked with Marxism Today to push for 
policy changes157 in order to combat Thatcherism. Like the Labour Party under 
Kinnock, the CP embarked on a policy review process, re-evaluating its position
I
on questions like public ownership and nuclear disarmament. ~ Also like the new 
Labour leadership, the CP’s reformers began to purge their party of what they 
thought of as Stalinists,159 in order to rid the party of unpopular ideas. The CP’s 
efforts to make the party into a more effective political force and to re-connect 
with socialist members of the Jewish community triggered this shift towards a 
more moderate approach to the Israel/Palestinian conflict.
This review has shown that the CP’s policies towards Israel and the 
Arab/Israel conflict were more ideologically driven than Labour’s. Communism’s
l'16 Chapter five.
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principled hostility towards zionism frequently surfaced in the party’s position on 
the various conflicts in the Middle East in the postwar period. This situation 
stemmed from the CP’s subordination to the CPSU and its greater distance from 
the formal political system than Labour, leading it simply to repeat the Soviet line 
and to ignore popular or Jewish opinion. However, it is not the case that the 
party’s stance was monolithic and unchanging. In this respect, it is important to 
distinguish between the leadership and the activists. Until the 1980s, there was far 
more stasis on the part of the leadership than the activists. While Palme Dutt and 
Harry Pollitt were happy to conform to the communist line, party intellectuals and 
activists were not. People who were disillusioned with the party’s refusal to be 
flexible over policies and its lack of internal democracy, also challenged its 
automatic anti-zionist stand. However, the party’s authoritarian structure made it 
very difficult for dissenters to affect its policy positions, especially at the height of 
the cold war. The leadership’s rigidity forced those who questioned communist 
anti-zionism to take a highly oppositional position. This sometimes led opponents 
to go too far in the other direction and to ignore Arab nationalist feeling.
Nor is it the case that the CP’s stance was unchanging and that it was entirely 
unresponsive to external and internal developments. The rise of Eurocommunism 
and the introduction of Gramscian ideas into the party dovetailed with Labour’s 
electoral defeat in 1979 and the rise of Thatcherism to introduce a whole new set 
of values into the CP. The reformers, or the Eurocommunists, were particularly 
willing to embrace the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s and to take 
on board a range of issues including feminism, environmentalism and ethnicity. 
After a bitter struggle with the party’s traditionalists in the mid-1980s, the 
reformers gained control of the party.160 These developments produced significant 
changes in the revamped party’s attitude towards the Israel/Palestinian conflict. 
With the new times faction in the ascendant, the CP dropped its traditional 
hostility to Jewish nationalism, but without losing its commitment to Palestinian 
national rights.
Having considered the similarities and differences between the British 
Labour Party and the British Communist Party’s policy towards Israel, the next
160 Callaghan in W aller and Fennema, 1988:227-241.
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thing is to see how these parties’ positions compared with the French left. To 
what extent did the French left reproduce these patterns of policy change? Did 
factors peculiar to French history and its political system produce different policy 
outcomes? In the following chapter I shall provide an account of the way the 
social democratic and communist left in France conceptualised the Israel/Arab 
conflict in the postwar period.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE FRENCH LEFT AND ISRAEL: FROM THE CREATION OF THE 
JEWISH STATE TO THE INVASION OF LEBANON
France’s history of colonialism in the Middle East and North Africa combined 
with Germany’s wartime occupation of France and its consequences for French 
Jews, made the rival Jewish and Arab nationalist movements a problem for 
French socialists. The Suez war highlighted the dilemmas by the
Israel/Arab conflict because it occurred when Arab nationalism was high on the 
French political agenda.1 The 1967 hostilities further tested the French left’s 
commitment to anti-colonialist politics and finally, the 1982 war in Lebanon 
challenged the apparently pro-Israel government led by Francois Mitterrand. This 
chapter looks at the evolution of the French left’s attitude towards Israel and how 
its approach compared with the British left’s. In section one I consider changes in 
the Socialist Party’s perceptions of Israel. In section two, I examine the PCF’s 
attitude towards Israel and in the third section, I compare the French and British 
left.
7.1 The French Socialist Party
The French Socialist Party’s attitude towards Israel and the Arab/Israel conflict 
evolved in much the same way as Labour’s. In the 1940s, the SFIO was strongly 
committed to Zionist goals, supporting the establishment of a Jewish state in 
Palestine. Leon Blum, head of the 1936-38 Popular Front government and the 
party’s leader until 1946, was generally on good terms with the British Labour 
leadership. However, Blum’s sympathy for Zionism put him at odds with 
Britain’s postwar government.2 He regarded Bevin’s Palestine policy as one of 
appeasement to ‘pan-Arab fanaticism’ and compared Arab nationalism with 
Spanish fascism.3 Drawing on customary anti-Arab stereotypes, the SFIO thought
1 Johnson, 1981:42.
2 Birnbaum, 1992:55.
2 Le P opu la ire , 6 July 1946.
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that the Arabs should give up their ‘feudalistic ways’ in favour of solidarity with 
the Jews.4 The SFIO leadership condemned Britain’s restrictions on Jewish 
immigration as morally corrupt and explained the rise of Jewish terrorism in the 
activities of Irgun and the Stern Gang as a direct consequence of British policy.5 
In May 1948 Blum urged immediate recognition of the new state and opposed the 
UN’s decision to put Jerusalem under international control.6 Under the leadership 
of Guy Mollet, Blum’s successor, the party welcomed the establishment of the 
Jewish state as an ‘historic moment’ and as a symbol of the world’s recognition of 
the Jews’ right to live as a nation and not a minority.7
The SFIO’s pro-Israel and anti-Arab stance was maintained in 1956. 
Whereas the British Labour Party campaigned vigorously against the war, the 
socialist-led government in France allied with Israel against Egypt. The party 
drew on traditional stereotypes of Arab nationalism, comparing it with fascism 
and Nazism, and depicted Nasser as a reactionary dictator intent on expansion. 
Mollet compared the Egyptian president with Hitler,8 participating in the ‘Munich 
syndrome’, whereby politicians and journalists competed in making comparisons 
between Hitler and Nasser and between the 1930s and 1940s.9 The government’s 
policy attracted little internal dissent. The National Assembly and the Senate 
overwhelmingly supported Mollet’s action. Despite the fact that a number of 
socialist deputies were concerned about breaches of international law and the 
conflict with the British Labour Party, few were willing to criticise the 
government. Although, a group of Paris socialists including Robert Verdier, chair 
of the parliamentary party, showed some signs of dissent over the war.10 '|h8n a i- 
*Vr«(k iavm the Force-Ouvriere, was also reluctant to condemn the war 
because of its links with the party.11 Pierre Mendes France, leader of the centre- 
left Radical Party and former Prime Minister, stood virtually alone in his 
condemnation of the government’s stand. Although Jewish, Mendes France’s
4 Le P opu la ire , 2 May 1947:4.
Le P opu la ire , 6 July 1946; Le P opu la ire, 18 March 1947:4.
6 Birnbaum, 1992:56.
7 Le P opu la ire, 15 May 1948:1.
8 See Le P opu la ire, 27 N ovem ber 1956.
9 V aisse in Louis and O wen, eds., 1989:134.
10 Tribune, 16 N ovem ber 1956:3.
11 Tribune, 9 N ovem ber 1956:3.
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attachment to Israel did not affect his policy positions.12 Known for having firm 
beliefs, Mendes France displayed a consistently anti-colonialist stance, having 
campaigned in favour of Algerian independence in the pre-1956 election 
campaign.13
During the 1967 hostilities, the SFIO’s pro-Israel tradition remained strong. 
Immediately before the outbreak of the war, Mollet sent a telegram to Golda Meir 
expressing the SFIO’s solidarity with Mapai. The socialist leader said that he 
would do his utmost at the ‘heart of the Socialist International’ to rally 
international support for Israel.14 In the parliamentary debate on the Middle East 
in mid-June, Mollet put forward the Israeli case and at the SFIO’s National 
Congress at the end of June, all the key figures in the socialist party expressed 
their unswerving identification with Israel, including Mollet, Pineau and Gaston 
Deferre.15 The Federation de la Gauche Democrate et Socialiste (FGDS) set up a 
‘Committee for Israel’s right to exist’, with the aim of mobilising support for 
Israel.16 Formed in 1965, the FGDS included the SFIO, the Radicals and the CIR 
(Convention des Institutions Republicans), headed by Mitterrand, but not the 
PCF.17
However, the 1967 war did generate some dissent from the social
democratic left’s pro-Israel tradition. The PSU (Parti Socialiste Unifie) departed
from the conventional approach to Israel, strongly criticising Israeli policy and
adopting a pro-Arab stand.18 Created in 1960, the party consisted of disillusioned
members of the SFIO who felt that Mollet had become too right-wing, manifest in
his Algerian policy, including sanctioning the torture of Algerian nationalists19
and in his support for de Gaulle’s new constitution in 1958.20 The intellectual left
also adopted a more pro-Arab position. Le Nouvel Observateur criticised Israel
• 21for engaging in expansionist policies and advocated a moderate postwar policy.
12 Bim baum , 1992:52-57.
13 W illiam s, 1970:30; 154.
14 Le P opu la ire , 1-2 June 1967:1.
15 C odding and Safran, 1979:194.
16 Le P opu la ire , 3-4 June 1967.
17 Safran, 1977:88.
18 Codding and Safran, 1979:193.
19 Hazareesingh, 1994:238.
20 Johnson, 1981:53.
_l Le N ouvel O bservateur, 4 October 1967.
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Whereas the SFIO paid little attention to the Palestinians, this journal carried 
articles on the Palestinian refugee crisis. Defending Israel’s right to exist, it also 
argued in favour of Palestinian national rights.22 In response to critical reactions 
to its coverage, the journal maintained that acknowledgement of Israel’s right to 
exist implied recognition of the Palestinians’ right to their country. It suggested 
that there was an urgent need to move beyond the racisms of extreme nationalist 
sentiment on both sides: anti-semitism on the one and anti-Arab racism on the 
other .23
The split in the social democratic left reflected the rise of the radical left. 
People like Frantz Fanon and Regis Debray, whom Johnson described as 
‘prophets of Third World revolution, had captured the younger generation of 
socialists’ imagination,24 generating a sensitivity to Third World nationalist 
movements. The PSU consisted of activists who were alienated from both the 
SFIO and the communist party. Its outlook included opposition to the Algerian 
war, Gaullism and to the ideological stasis of the two left parties, and it shared the 
ideals that informed the May 1968 events.25 The PSU’s position reflected the 
younger generation of socialists’ greater sensitivity towards the Third World. Its 
values made it more aware of the Palestinian crisis than the wartime experiences 
of the Jews and Israel’s increasing identification with America reinforced the 
PSU’s support for the Palestinian cause.
However, it was not until the early 1980s that the socialists’ pro-Israel 
tradition collapsed and gave way to a pro-Palestinian position. When the Parti 
Socialiste (PS) won its landslide victory in 1981, there were grounds for believing 
that the government would continue to adopt a pro-Israel stance. Mitterrand was 
sympathetic to Jewish concerns, encouraging Jewish ethnic and cultural projects 
and subsidising Jewish schools.26 He condemned inadequate responses to anti- 
semitic attacks on the Jewish community such as the explosion on the rue de 
Copernic in Paris in October 1980. The new president was personally committed 
to Israel, having connections with the Israeli Labour Party through the Socialist
22 Le N ouvel O bserva teu r, 28 June 1967.
23 Le N ouvel O bserva teu r, 1 June 1967
24 Johnson, 1981 :ix.
25 Hazareesingh, 1994:238.
26 Safran, 1985:52-53.
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International and immediately after his election, being the first European head of 
state to visit the Jewish state. The Hebrew University congratulated Mitterrand 
for his work on behalf of Jewish issues, including his involvement in the 
resistance and his recognition of Soviet Jewry’s right to emigrate to Israel.27
However, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 stimulated a clear break 
from socialist tradition. Responding to a journalist’s questions in Budapest, 
Mitterrand said that Israel’s military intervention reminded him of the Nazi 
massacre of over six hundred people in June 1944 at Oradour-sur-Glane. 
Mitterrand’s comparison between Israel’s action in Beirut and the Oradour 
massacre exacerbated relations between France and Israel,28 his statement having 
provoked outrage in the Jewish state and the Israeli government’s 
condemnation.29 The Foreign Minister, Claude Cheysson, condemned Israel’s 
entry into Beirut on 15 September as a violation of the ‘Habib plan’,30 which 
referred to the evacuation of the PLO, saying that Israel acted against international 
norms. Cheysson demanded Israel’s immediate withdrawal from Beirut.31
France stood alone in western Europe in the level of support it gave the 
PLO, providing the organisation with military protection for its departure from 
Beirut and constructing a peace plan with Egypt based on the need to recognise 
Palestinian national rights and to allow the PLO to participate directly in peace 
negotiations with Israel.32 After the massacres at Sabra and Chatila, Yasser 
Arafat asked Mitterrand for help.33 In the European community, Mitterrand 
mobilised opposition to the ‘annihilation of the Palestinian people’. Other key 
left-wing figures, such as the former Prime Minister Mendes France, called for 
negotiations with the PLO.34 France’s identification with the Palestinians in 1982 
led to a deterioration in its relations with Israel. Ariel Sharon, Israel’s defence 
Minister, accused Mitterrand of having prolonged the war by protecting the PLO 
and asked ‘why, given the president’s sympathy for Israel and the Jewish people,
27 Marrus in M alino and W asserstein, eds., 1985:227.
28 M oisi, 1981-82:76.
29 Le M onde, 13 July 1982.
20 Philip Charles Habib, Special U S Presidential Envoy to the M iddle East, 1981-83 (O vendale, 
1992:163).
31 Le M onde, 21 Septem ber 1982.
22 M oisi, 1981-82:76-77.
22 Le M atin, 20  Septem ber 1982:14.
24 Marrus in M alino and W asserstein, eds., 1985:227-228.
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has Mitterrand done his utmost to save the PLO, a terrorist and murderous 
organization?’.35
The PSU was even more forthright in its support for the Palestinians and its 
condemnation of Israel’s involvement in Lebanon. Along with other left-wing 
organisations such as the PCF and the Confederation Generate du Travail (CGT), 
the PSU participated in mass demonstrations protesting against the massacres of 
the refugees and demanding Israel’s immediate withdrawal from Beirut.36 In 
common with the anti-zionist left, the PSU drew on historical examples of Israeli 
massacres of Palestinians. Huguette Bouchardeau, its national secretary, said 
that:
‘words cannot describe the horror and barbarity of 
the Beirut massacres. After Deir Yassin, Black 
September, Tell-el-Zaatar and the bombardments of 
Beirut, the Palestinian people are once again the 
victims’.37
She suggested that the massacres were carried out with the ‘complicity of the 
Begin government’.38 Anti-racist groups like MRAP (Mouvement contre le 
Racisme et pour l’Amitie entre les Peuples) also condemned the invasion and 
called for a two-state solution to the conflict.39 So, the 1980s saw the social 
democratic left break with its traditional pro-Israeli stance. What accounted for, 
first, the socialists’ support for the Jewish state throughout the 1940s, 1950s and 
1960s and then the break-down in this support?
Like the British left, French socialism was not completely free from the 
legacy of colonialism, despite its stated commitment to anti-colonialist politics. 
Traditionally, the SFIO adopted a paternalistic attitude towards the colonies and 
prioritised the maintenance of French interests abroad. Although the SFIO 
opposed colonialism, it believed that the colonies’ freedom depended on France’s 
lead.40 Moreover, French colonial history in the Middle East and North Africa led
35 Le M on de, 1 October 1982.
36 Le M onde, 21 Septem ber 1982.
37 Le M onde, 23 Septem ber 1982.
38 Le M onde, 23 Septem ber 1982.
39 Le M onde, 11-12 July 1982.
40 Shennan, 1989:159-164.
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French politics as a whole to contain a strong fear of Arab nationalism on the 
grounds that Arab nationalism threatened national interests in Syria, Lebanon and 
North Africa. So, despite its anti-colonialist principles, the social democratic left 
had little time for Arab nationalist aspirations. Prior to the Second World War, 
the Blum government objected to British policy initiatives perceived as 
appeasement of the Arabs, including the Peel Commission’s recommendation for 
partition.41
The SFIO’s ambivalent attitude towards national independence movements 
informed the socialist government’s attitude towards Nasser during the Suez 
conflict. The government’s concern to protect French interests overrode its 
principled support for anti-colonialism. While the party defended movements for 
national self-determination that did not pose a great threat to France’s economic 
and political interests, it refused to back movements considered dangerous. 
Mollet’s aim to win the war against the Algerian Front de la Liberation Nationale 
(FLN) and to punish Egypt for supporting the FLN was the principal motivation 
for his alliance with Israel and Britain.42 Christian Pineau, the Foreign Minister, 
believed that if France did not defeat Nasser then Europe’s influence and control 
across other parts of Africa would be jeopardised.43 Mollet’s decision to invade 
also arose out of his conviction that the canal’s closure would badly affect 
France’s supply of oil,44 claiming that the economies of a number of countries in 
Europe and Asia depended upon free passage through the canal.45
During the 1967 hostilities, too, the perception of Arab nationalism as 
threatening remained entrenched. The socialists derided left-wing groups that 
equated the Arab cause with socialism,46 making comparisons between Nasser 
and Hitler and saying that the only socialism in Egypt was ‘national socialism’.47 
In his discussion of ‘Israel and the French tradition’ Pineau spoke of Nasser’s 
‘hatred’ and ‘envy’ of Israel’s achievements and asserted that ‘civilization, culture 
and democracy are on Israel’s side...we want nothing more than for Arab leaders
41 Abitbol, 1989:173; 277 note 22.
42 Codding and Safran, 1979:32; 140; V aisse in Louis and O w en eds., 1989:137.
43 V aisse in Louis and Owen, eds., 1989:137.
44 Le P opu la ire , 6 N ovem ber 1956.
43 Le P opu la ire , 13 Septem ber 1956:1.
46 Codding and Safran, 1979:194.
47 Le P opu la ire , 13 June 1967.
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to make an effort to achieve comparable results’,48 signalling his adherence to 
traditional stereotypes of Arabs as backward and reactionary.
In contrast, the SFIO had a deeply rooted tradition of support for Zionism 
for ideological reasons, viewing it as a progressive and democratic nationalist 
movement. Leon Blum was actively pro-zionist, being as committed to Zionism 
as he was to socialism.49 He supported Zionism because he thought it was a non- 
aggressive form of nationalism and that a Jewish Palestine would be a new 
democracy founded on the principle of social justice.50 Like many social 
democratic socialists, Blum believed that Zionism could be ‘reconciled with 
international socialism’ because it was ‘popular, just and humane’.51 The SFIO 
was particularly impressed by the socialist orientation of the Jewish community in 
Palestine and the Histadrut’s role in developing the country.52 The socialists 
thought that a Jewish state would facilitate co-operation between the Arabs and 
the Jewish workers and bring the Arabs out of ‘feudalism’ and into the modern 
world.53
The fact that Mapai, later the Israeli Labour Party, dominated Israel for 
decades after the state’s formation further buoyed the left’s perception of Israel as 
the only progressive democratic state in the Middle East. In 1956, government 
supporters of Israel viewed it as a major source of stability in an otherwise 
unstable region. They saw Egypt as a serious threat to the Jewish state and 
wanted to arm Israel in preparation for war.54 During the 1967 war, the SFIO 
referred to the connections between Israel and social democracy, appealing to the 
common traditions between France and Israel based on a shared attachment to 
‘civilisation, culture and democracy’.55 Even in 1982, the PS appealed to Israel’s 
essentially democratic nature, with the Prime Minister, Pierre Mauroy, claiming 
that France had not lost faith in the democratic values of the state of Israel and 
that it identified closely with progressive elements in the Jewish state.56
48 Le P opu la ire , 1-2 June 1967:4.
49 Birnbaum, 1992:52.
50 Abitbol, 1989:94; 107.
51 Birnbaum, 1992:55.
52 Le P o p u la ire , 7 May 1947:4.
51 Le P o p u la ire , 2 M ay 1947:4.
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55 Le Populaire, 1-2 June 1967:4.
56 Le M on de , 23 Septem ber 1982.
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This perception of Zionism stemmed partly from linkages between the SFIO 
and the Zionist movement. As a result of the high level of Jewish integration into 
French life, the Jewish community historically tended not to be attracted to 
zionism and identified strongly with the French nation.57 Nevertheless, a number 
of Zionist organisations of various political persuasions and with strong links with 
the Palestine Jewish community began to flourish after the First World War.58 
Blum had been a member of the Comite France-Palestine since the 1920s.59 Poale 
Zion, formed by Marc Jarblum,60 was also a major influence on the SFIO. Blum 
enjoyed a close friendship with Jarblum and it was through him that he met 
Chaim Weizmann. Like Laski in Britain, Blum mediated between Weizmann and 
the French government on particular issues, such as partition in 1947.61 The 
SFIO’s support for Israel in 1956 and 1967 reflected continuing links between the 
Socialist Party and the Israeli Labour Party. Both parties belonged to the Socialist 
International (SI) which was an important arena for creating alliances between 
democratic socialist parties. Mollet was closely involved in the SI62 and he was 
close to David Ben Gurion in the 1950s, and later, Golda Meir.
A significant political link between Jews and the left was a further source of 
the SFIO’s support for Israel. Although French Jews were politically 
heterogeneous, the popular conception of Jews as predominantly left-wing was 
not totally unfounded.63 In the 1920s France had opened its doors to immigrants 
from Russia, Poland, Romania and Lithuania. Immigrants from these countries 
tended to have sympathy for socialist politics and became involved in left-wing 
organisations.64 Germany’s occupation of France and the deportation of French 
Jews meant that the Jewish community in France was relatively small during the 
war, standing at about three hundred thousand in 1940.65 Nevertheless, as a 
member of the postwar government, the SFIO could not ignore the fact that
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popular sympathy, especially in liberal circles, was with Jewish national 
aspirations.
France’s Jewish community grew considerably from the early 1950s as a 
result of immigration from North Africa, eventually turning into one of the largest 
in western Europe.66 Studies of Jewish voting patterns in France have tended to 
conclude that there is no specifically Jewish vote because Jews vote according to 
their socio-economic status. However, French Jews have a specific interest in 
issues relating to their identity, including anti-semitism and Israel. In the 
postwar period, they continued to show a preference for socialist politicians.68 
Mollet’s pro-Israeli stance in 1956 and his decision to invade Egypt could only 
have gone down well with the Jewish population. Moreover, it did not risk 
alienating popular opinion generally because polls showed that 44 per cent of 
those questioned supported the invasion compared with 37 per cent who opposed 
it.69
Political considerations also played a part in the SFiO’s pro-Israel stance in 
1967. In the 1960s, the party had suffered from a sharp decline in its membership 
and electoral base.70 The Gaullists had won overall parliamentary majorities in 
the 1962 and 1967 elections. So, out of government and powerless in the 
National Assembly, the SFIO decided to replace its ‘constructive opposition’
7  iphase with outright opposition to de Gaulle’s government. In the post-Suez 
period de Gaulle initiated a policy of decolonisation as a way of strengthening 
France’s influence in the Middle East.72 This outlook informed his position on 
the Arab/Israeli hostilities, leading him explicitly to condemn Israel’s postwar 
policies in the occupied territories and to sympathise with the Palestinians.73 De 
Gaulle’s contention that Jews were an ‘elite and dominating people’ created an 
uproar.74 Although French Jews identified with France, they were interested in 
Israel and reacted negatively to the government’s pro-Arab policy, especially
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resulting anti-semitic incidents.75 The SFIO knew that a pro-Israel position would 
go down well with French Jews.
National interest considerations also determined the SFiO’s pro-Israel 
position. As a member of the tripartite government in the 1940s, the SFIO 
leadership had to assess the advantages to France of adopting a pro-zionist stance. 
Eager to forge an alliance with American in order to attract postwar aid, the 
party’s pro-zionist position reflected this need. Under President Truman, America 
was one of the first countries to recognise the new state. Subsidised by the 
American Federation of Labour (AFL),76 Le Populaire consistently mirrored 
America’s pro-zionist stance. Blum’s desire not to offend American public 
opinion was one reason why he recommended immediate recognition of the 
Jewish state.77 In office again during the 1956 hostilities, the socialists adopted 
the cold war consensus to the extent that anti-communism almost became its 
‘raison d'etre’.78 Despite the party’s pre-election commitment to decolonisation, 
Guy Mollet’s government ended up opposing the Algerian nationalist 
movement,79 displaying continuity with Antoine Pinay’s former right-wing 
government whose Middle East policy aimed to undermine potential alliances 
between Egypt and the Soviet Union.80 Despite the fact that Russian influence in
Q I
Egypt was negligible and that Nasser adopted a neutralist position, the socialist 
leadership thought that the Egyptian president was pro-communist and compared 
him with Stalin.82 The government’s alliance with Israel was rooted in the fact 
that by the time of the war, the Jewish state had revealed its pro-western 
orientation.
France’s wartime experiences also significantly influenced the socialists’ 
attitude towards Israel. The Nazis’ anti-Jewish practices undermined anti-semitic 
tendencies in the left. In the period of appeasement just before the Second World 
War, the SFIO and the communists alone opposed the Daladier government’s
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restrictive refugee policies.83 The deportation of Jews from France under Vichy 
critically affected the left’s thinking on Zionism. Blum himself was incarcerated 
in the Buchenwald concentration camp,84 and although the socialist leader had 
been sympathetic to Zionist aims since the 1920s, the war sharpened his 
convictions. Blum was an assimilated Jew but he claimed that Hitler had made 
the Jews into a ‘race’ and believed that Israel should rescue Jews persecuted by 
Nazism.85 It was the ‘collective memory’ of Munich and the resistance that 
contributed to the SFiO’s pro-Israel policy in 1956.86 Memories of the war and of 
France’s withdrawal from Lebanon and Syria struck a chord with French 
politicians, motivating them to act against Egypt.87 The period between the 
Second World War and Suez was not enough for socialists to forget the 
persecution of the Jews. Reflecting on the government’s policy, Christian Pineau, 
the Foreign Minister, said that when confronted with the Israeli view that Egypt 
threatened the state’s existence, the government remembered the horror of 
‘thousands of Jews who perished in the concentration camps’ and wanted to avoid 
another Nazi ‘pogrom’.88
French guilt about the past and ordinary citizens’ complicity with Vichy 
policies did not start to diminish until the late 1970s.89 In 1967 Sartre noted how 
the left experienced the Israel/Arab war as a ‘personal tragedy’ because people old 
enough to have experienced the German occupation knew that the systematic 
extermination of the Jews resulted from the French people’s ‘passive complicity’ 
as much as Nazi policy.90 The social democratic left’s overwhelming support for 
Israel in 1967 sprang partly from this sense of guilt. The sight of hostile countries 
surrounding the Jewish state played on wartime memories. Pineau commented, in 
a way calculated to appeal to the older generation party members, that:
‘when you have seen thousands of Jews die in
concentration camps, victims of the most horrific
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genocide that history has known, you do 
not...become an accomplice in a new form of 
Hitlerism’.91
The SFIO therefore remained committed to the Jewish state during the 
various crises in most of the postwar period. There were a number of reasons for 
this stasis, including: ideological ones such as the legacy of colonialism and a 
sense of shared purpose with the Zionist enterprise; political ones, such as the 
linkages between the Zionist movement and the SFIO and appeals to popular and 
Jewish opinion; economic ones, including the view that French interests were best 
maintained through opposing Arab nationalism and historical ones, mainly, the 
effect of France’s wartime experience. What then accounted for the break-down 
in the socialists’ pro-Israel consensus in the 1980s?
As with the British Labour Party, in the early 1980s the PS shifted to the 
left, taking on board issues such as feminism, environmentalism and anti-racism 
as a result of the entry into the party of people who had identified with the 1968 
movement.92 Under the PS’s control from the mid-1970s, the PSU brought into 
the party a younger generation of socialists who had protested against the Algerian 
war, people like Michel Rocard who had a radical perspective on Third World 
questions. This new current informed the Mitterrand government’s efforts to 
improve relations with the Third World.93 Mitterrand’s outlook on foreign policy 
differed considerably from previous presidents’. In particular, he was highly 
critical of a whole series of Reaganite policies, protesting against American 
support for El Salvador and the Contras in Nicaragua.94 The Foreign Minister 
during the Lebanon war, Claude Cheysson95 came from this background, being 
‘pro-Arab, pro-Third World, anti-American, pacifist’ and he significantly affected 
Mitterrand’s attitude towards the Middle East.96
These changes in the party’s approach to international affairs dovetailed 
with converse developments in Israel. The PS’s distaste for Reagan’s policies in
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the Third World coincided with Israel’s strong identification, under Likud, with 
America. During the 1980s, Israel helped to further the US’s agenda in the Third 
World by supplying arms and counter-insurgency skills to countries like El 
Salvador and Guatemala and the state provided the South African apartheid
• 07regime with arms. The party’s response to the invasion reflected its growing 
disillusion with the policies of the right-wing government in Israel. The French 
socialists’ past support for Israel was linked with the fact that the Israeli Labour 
Party had dominated the Jewish state for decades. The PS viewed the political 
changes in Israel and the country’s links with America as a departure from its 
social democratic tradition.
The socialists’ break from its pro-Israeli tradition also sprang from the
government’s need to take account of the rise of ethnic politics within the
Maghrebi community. During the 1980s the socialists embarked on a series of
policy initiatives designed to accommodate ethnic sentiment in the face of
increased ethnic diversity resulting from the entry of Muslims and Jews from
North Africa.98 At the same time, the Maghrebi population began to organise
itself into a significant pressure group. In particular, a ‘shared Arab identity’
*
arose as a result of demands for Mosques, the emergence of a ‘Beur vote’ and 
collective action that centred on Islam. Organisations such as SOS Racisme took 
up the goals of this new force in French politics.99 During the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon, France’s Muslims minorities were key protesters against Israeli policies 
in Lebanon. The ‘Convention Nationale des Fran^ais Musulmans’ called for a 
break in diplomatic relations between France and Israel and the ‘Association 
France-Palestine’ wanted France to recall its ambassador in Israel and for an 
international tribunal to ‘judge those guilty of the horrific crime’ committed 
against the Palestinian refugees.100
This new activism countered the history of Jewish political activism in the 
shape of organisations like CRIF (Conseil Representatif des Institutions Juives de 
France), a key political representative of French Jewry centring principally on
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questions relating to Israel.101 In 1982 it condemned prominent left-wing Jews, 
like Mendes France, for calling for peace negotiations between Israel and the 
PLO, saying that the PLO was the enemy of peace. L’Alliance France-Israel also 
opposed Mitterrand’s and Cheysson’s calls for a Palestinian state.102 Some 
Jewish groups accused the president of being an assassin when six people were 
killed on the rue de Rosiers in August 1982.103 Moreover, some zionist groups 
tried to sabotage peaceful Jewish protests against the invasion.104
However, the war in Lebanon split French Jews in an unprecedented way. 
Whereas in the past, French Jewry believed that Israel was fighting for its 
survival, in 1982 significant elements believed that the war was not legitimate 
because Israel’s survival was not at risk.105 A number of left-wing and liberal 
Jewish organisations demonstrated against the massacre of the Palestinians. In 
September the ‘Association des Juifs de Gauche’, ‘Hashomer Hatzir’, ‘Identite et 
Dialogue’, and the ‘Mouvement des Juifs Progressistes’ demanded a commission 
of inquiry into the massacres and Begin’s and Sharon’s resignation. They chose a 
demonstration date to coincide with a ‘Peace Now’ protest in Israel to show that a 
number of Jewish groups rejected a military solution to a political problem which, 
they believed, jeopardised the original values of the Jewish state.106 This made 
the government’s decision to ally with the Palestinians much easier in terms of 
domestic political considerations, because it did not risk alienating Jewish opinion 
to the extent that de Gaulle had done in 1967.
Finally, the constraints of office influenced the government’s policy, forcing 
Mitterrand to end his series of pro-Israel gestures. As president, Mitterrand had 
considerable control over foreign policy, but political and diplomatic factors or 
external contingencies, such as France’s world interests, bound policy options.107 
France’s membership of the European community influenced the PS’s position on 
Israel. Mitterrand was fully committed to Europe, saying that ‘France is my
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country, but Europe is my future’.108 In the 1980s the community tried to 
accommodate Palestinian national aspirations, putting the question of Palestinian 
self-determination at the centre of its Middle East policy as a result of a series of 
negotiations between Arab countries and the EC. Various international 
organisations such as UNESCO, numerous NGOs and the Socialist International 
itself did similarly.109 These developments both affected and reflected the 
government’s attitude, especially as Claude Cheysson himself had been EC 
Commissioner for external affairs.
Moreover, Mitterrand wanted to restore France’s political, economic and 
strategic interests in the Arab countries by adopting a pro-Palestinian policy after 
a first year of presidency when the president pursued a pro-Israel line.110 France 
had previously been a major arms supplier to Israel.111 Mitterrand himself 
decided not to sell arms to Israel and contributed French troops to an international 
peacekeeping force in Lebanon.112 The socialist government’s policy towards the 
Israel/Palestinian conflict in the 1980s expressed part of a wider approach to 
foreign policy which, in a contradictory way, united a progressive attitude towards 
human rights issues and Third World nationalism with an instrumental attitude 
based on furthering French interests.113
The socialists’ pro-Israeli tradition therefore collapsed in the early 1980s, 
giving way to a pro-Palestinian position. Again, a combination of ideological and 
non-ideological factors contributed to this situation, including: the rise of a 
younger generation of socialists with a radical, pro-Third World outlook; national 
interest considerations; and political considerations. How did the PCF’s positions 
compare with the socialists’?
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7.2 The French Communist Party
As a member of the international communist movement the PCF’s (Parti 
Communiste Fran9ais) internationalism was more sharply defined than the 
socialists’. This ideological orientation shaped the party’s stand on Zionism. Like 
other members of the international communist movement, the PCF was 
ideologically opposed to Jewish nationalism, favouring assimilation and 
portraying Zionism as a divisive and reactionary movement.114 Nevertheless, in 
the immediate postwar period, the communists joined the socialists in supporting 
the new Jewish state and the party urged the Arabs to join the Jews in the struggle 
against imperialism.115 In the National Assembly, communist deputies stated that 
the west’s aim was to secure oil resources and military bases in the Middle 
East,116 and that Bevin’s Palestine policy was part of this goal.117 Towards the 
end of the British mandate, French communists protested against British policy, 
opposing restrictions on Jewish immigration into Palestine. In July 1947 the PCF 
and the CGT (Confederation Generate du Travail) joined various Jewish 
organisations in Marseilles to protest against the British treatment of Jewish 
immigrants.118 On Israel’s establishment the party’s central committee offered the 
new state its ‘warmest greetings’.119
The agreement between the socialists and the communists over Palestine, 
when both parties favoured Zionist aims, collapsed in 1956 when the PCF adopted 
an overtly pro-Arab position, supporting Nasser’s nationalisation of the canal. At 
the start of the crisis, four hundred and twenty-two members of the National 
Assembly supported a vote that called for France to react firmly to Egypt and one 
hundred and fifty communist members opposed it.120 The party argued that 
France and Britain were engaged in an imperialist struggle, designed to secure oil 
reserves for western capitalism. It described measures to protect the right of 
passage through the canal as a breach of Egyptian sovereignty. The communists
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attacked the Mollet government for engaging in an anti-socialist position and for 
allying with ‘international capitalism’s exploitation of the Egyptian people’.121 
They condemned Mollet and Pineau for putting national interests before socialist 
principles, which demanded recognition of Egypt’s rights over the canal.122
The SFIO retaliated by criticising Thorez for supporting a dictator and for 
acting as the Soviet Union’s lackey.123 The party accused Nasser and Khrushchev 
of confusing ‘independence’ with ‘sovereignty’, arguing that although it 
supported independence, defined as a nation’s right to develop freely inside its 
borders, Egypt’s nationalisation of the canal was not a quest for independence.124 
In response, the PCF restated the communist line on nationalism, with Thorez 
claiming that:
‘Marxist-Leninists have been...well aware of the 
fact that the progressive nature of a national 
movement does not necessarily imply that this 
movement will have a progressive programme.
When the Egyptian bourgeoisie were fighting for 
independence... it was a bourgeois nationalist 
movement, and yet it objectively favoured the 
overthrow of imperialist forces and the progress of 
socialism throughout the world.’125
With respect to Israel’s part in the war, the communist party was relatively 
silent.126 Whenever the communists did mention Israel, it was in a fairly 
uncritical way. They argued that although Israel was guilty of aggression, it was 
far less responsible for the war than France and Britain. Communist theorists 
contended that Israel could be criticised for providing Britain and France with a 
pretext for the war, but that both the Israeli government and people bitterly 
regretted the episode. The party stated that France and Britain had used the 
Jewish state for their purposes and that peace in the Middle East and Israel’s
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survival depended upon negotiation between Israel and the Arab countries.127 
This moderate tone on Israel contrasted sharply with the anti-zionist campaign of 
the early 1950s.128 Then, at the height of the cold war, the PCF joined the Soviet 
anti-zionist campaign, bringing out Jewish members like Annie Kriegel to defend 
its record on anti-semitism. During this period it was difficult for Jews to get 
promotion in the PCF and a number of Egyptian Jews were excluded.129
The divisions over Suez reflected the political gulf between the two parties. 
The relationship between the SFIO (and later the PS) and the PCF has been 
characterised by bitter rivalry and conflict, with each party struggling to maintain 
a distinctive identity, even when ostensibly forging political alliances.130 
However, in the 1950s, the socialists’ hostility towards the communists was so 
great that they preferred political obscurity than to accept opportunities for unity. 
Between 1951 and 1956 the SFIO used its period of opposition to compete with 
the PCF which had won almost twice as many votes as the socialists at the 1951
i  ^|
election. ' In the cold war period the two parties fought principally over foreign 
policy questions, with the communists supporting the Soviet Union’s ‘anti­
imperialist camp’ and the SFIO adopting an unyieldingly pro-American and anti­
communist position.132
During the 1967 hostilities, the PCF’s anti-Israel and pro-Arab policy 
remained in place. The communists maintained that Israel was a pawn for 
American imperialism and that America used Israel for strategic purposes. They 
claimed that the west viewed the rise of Arab nationalism as a threat to its oil 
supply.133 At the start of the war, Waldeck Rochet, the party’s general secretary, 
blamed Israel for initiating the hostilities, arguing that the country’s attack on 
Syria violated the armistice agreements and proved that Israel’s leaders were the 
instruments of American imperialism. He drew a parallel with Vietnam, 
maintaining that American imperialists were behind both wars, the only difference 
being that whereas the Americans intervened directly in Vietnam, they used
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Israel’s leaders to do the work for them in the Middle East.134 The PCF also drew 
attention to the Palestinian refugee crisis, claiming that peace in the area depended 
upon finding a solution to the Palestinian question.135
The party’s press returned to the extreme anti-zionism of the early cold war 
period, lapsing into anti-semitism with a conspiracy theory of Zionism. It 
maintained that ‘“zionist agents” had orchestrated the anti-Arab campaign along 
with the most reactionary forces, including fanatical anti-semites and the most 
relentless supporters of American imperialism’. In an article entitled ‘An 
American Agent’, the PCF contended that General Dayan acted as an American 
agent in the war against Vietnam.137 L ’Humanite's depiction of the Rothschilds at 
the Wailing Wall after the war was highly insensitive. It said that:
T he presence of certain personalities of high 
finance conferred on the event another meaning 
than religious fervor...The spectacle made one think 
that, as in Faust, it was the Devil who was “leading 
the ball”’,138
drawing on customary anti-Jewish themes including the association of Jews with 
finance and the anti-Christ.
The war again highlighted the differences between the socialists and 
communists and threatened the parties’ attempts at unity. The former Minister, 
Pineau, derided the communists for assuming that any ally of the Soviet Union 
was left-wing and suggesting that far from being a socialist, Nasser was a
I O Q
reactionary racist. ' Pineau further commented that ‘we are back to the time 
when...one could correctly describe the PCF as a mere branch of the Soviet 
Communist party’. The anti-communist Deferre held the same view and Mollet 
began to doubt the potential for unity. Aware of the damage the different attitudes 
could do to the left-wing alliance, the PCF showed some restraint in the 
parliamentary debates on the Middle East and both parties refrained from
134 L ’H um anite, 13 June 1967.
135 L ’H um anite, 5 June 1967; L ’H um anite, 11 July 1967.
136 C ahiers du Com m unism e, July-August 1967:6.
137 L ’H um anite, 6 June 1967.
138 Quoted by Cohen and W all in M alino and W asserstein, eds, 1985:95.
139 Le M onde, 13 June 1967.
191
discussing the issue for some time.140 The Arab/Israel war revealed the fragility 
of the democratic-communist alliance, drawing attention to the parties’ different 
allegiances and the PCF’s loyalty to the Soviet Union.
During Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the PCF adopted an anti-Israel 
and pro-Palestinian stance, attacking the Begin government for using Lebanon to 
bolster the ‘greater Israel’ movement and stating that:
‘too many Palestinians, Lebanese, Syrians and 
Israelis have been sacrificed in the name of an 
archaic colonialism supported militarily, 
economically and financially by the USA’.141
George Marchais, the party’s leader, emphasised his ‘complete agreement’ with 
Mitterrand on the question of imposing an international UN force in Lebanon.142 
After the massacres, the PCF’s political bureau criticised the Americans, the 
Italians and the French for leaving Beirut without having achieved the withdrawal 
of Israeli forces from Beirut and stated that Israel was ‘fundamentally responsible’ 
for the ‘pogrom’ committed against the refugees.143 The party’s press carried 
articles on Palestinians in the occupied territories and Israel’s repressive policies, 
especially forms of collective punishment such as the demolition of houses.144 
Rene Andrieu, deputy editor of L ’Humanite, and Pierre Juquin, member of the 
communist party’s political bureau, refused to take part in a press conference 
given by Ariel Sharon, saying that to interview Sharon when the victims of the 
massacre had yet to be taken from Beirut was ‘obscene and dangerous’.145 
Nevertheless, the PCF’s past extreme anti-zionism was largely absent, with the 
party confining its hostility to the Begin government and distinguishing between 
the Israeli government’s policies and the Jewish people’s views.
For most of the postwar period, the PCF’s position on Israel reflected its 
loyalty to the CPSU. After being forced out of Ramadier’s (SFIO) Cabinet in 
1947, this subordination increased. Repaying Stalin’s patronage with undivided
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loyalty, Thorez, the party’s leader from 1930 to 1964, earned the reputation for 
being ‘the best Stalinist in France’.146 At the start of the cold war, the CPSU 
jettisoned its anti-zionist policy in favour of the creation of a Jewish state in its 
effort to undermine Britain’s role in the Middle East. The French party, like the 
other national CPs, followed suit, arguing that western economic and strategic 
interests caused the first Israel/Arab war and attacking Bevin’s Palestine policy as 
imperialistic. The PCF’s shift to a pro-Arab policy in 1956 also reflected 
developments in the USSR’s foreign policy. In the cold war period, the west and 
the Soviet Union competed for influence in the Middle East. Distracted by 
Hungary and lacking strong relations with countries like Egypt, Moscow did not 
play an active part in the crisis, 147 but it did express support for Nasser and the 
PCF did likewise.
By the time of the 1967 war the PCF had dropped its simple loyalty to the 
CPSU, with Waldeck Rochet, Thorez’s successor, initiating liberalising 
initiatives.148 Yet despite its greater independence from the Soviet Union, the 
party’s language reflected its inability to break free from orthodox communist 
themes. The PCF’s collapse into a conspiracy theory of Zionism indicated an 
unwillingness to move away from a deeply held belief system. The 1967 
hostilities set off an aggressive anti-zionist campaign in the Soviet Union,149 and 
the PCF’s extremist views reflected this development. Under Marchais the party 
dropped its Stalinist image. However, its short-lived Eurocommunist spell in the 
late 1970s gave way to a new alignment with Soviet policy, most obviously when 
it sanctioned Russia’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1980.150 This identity between 
the PCF and the Soviet Union was evident in its treatment of the 
Palestinian/Israeli conflict in 1982 when it repeated commonplace communist 
formulas and put forward a traditional class analysis of the hostilities. Moreover, 
the PCF identified with the Palestinian Communist Party, believing that its revival 
in the early 1980s expressed the Palestinian working class’s increasing influence
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on the nationalist movement. It called for an alliance between the Palestinian and 
Jewish working class.151
However, to understand the party’s attitude towards Israel and the 
Arab/Israel conflict, it is not enough simply to trace it back to Soviet policy. 
While the party had to heed the CPSU’s line, it also had to take account of the 
domestic situation because of its institutionalisation in the political system.152 As 
a member of the tripartite government from 1944 to 1947, the PCF was subject to 
domestic circumstances and internal pressures such as public opinion. The PCF 
enjoyed a close tie with Jews of east European origin, presenting itself as the 
‘natural defender’ of the Jewish workers, to the extent that Poale Zion and Marc
I ^Jarblum were worried about Jewish support for communism. Although the 
Soviet Union’s entry into the war precipitated the party’s resistance activities,154 
ordinary activists were genuinely moved by the Jews’ situation.155 After the war, 
there was a good deal of popular support for Zionist goals, and as a member of the 
government, the PCF was responsive to this.
In 1956 the PCF refrained from the anti-zionist sloganising of the early 
1950s, and its uncritical attitude towards Israel reflected the contradictions facing 
the communists. The furore in France that resulted from the anti-zionist 
campaigns in 1953 had left its mark. Moreover, when Jewish communists 
returned from the Soviet Union with evidence of widespread anti-semitism under 
Stalin after the Khrushchev revelations, Jewish membership of the party 
dropped.156 This happened when the other political parties had marginalised the 
PCF and when it was outside government.157 Israel enjoyed considerable popular 
support and the PCF could not afford to alienate public opinion too greatly. These 
political factors forced the communists to adopt a more moderate stance on 
politically sensitive issues such as the Israel/Arab conflict.
The 1967 war occurred when the rival left-wing parties were trying to 
undermine de Gaulle’s dominance through political alliance. De Gaulle’s
151 La P ensee, July-August 1982:11.
152 Tarrow in Blackm er and Tarrow, eds. 1975:579-595.
153 A bitbol, 1989:206-208.
154 W ingeate Pike, 1993:465-485.
1551 got this im pression from a conversation with a long-tim e member o f  the PCF.
156 Caute, 1964:205.
157 See Johnson, 1981:40-43.
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overwhelming electoral victories in the 1960s forced the SFIO and the PCF 
towards a new phase of left-wing unity.158 Starting in 1962, this unity was later 
expressed during the 1965 presidential elections when both the SFIO and the 
communists supported Mitterrand and again during the 1967 and 1968 legislative 
elections when the two parties entered a second ballot electoral agreement.159 In 
this context, the PCF was forced to tone down its anti-Israel comments in the 
National Assembly debates and the two parties agreed not to debate the war 
openly, ending up with Mitterrand commenting that ‘we have passed the Mideast 
crisis with the requisite serenity’.160
The PCF further moderated its anti-zionist stance during its brief 
Eurocommunist phase in 1976 to 1977, making a series of gestures towards 
specifically Jewish interests. These included an appeal to the Jewish vote in 1978 
and a celebration of the 45th anniversary of the Paris Yiddish communist 
newspaper, Naie Presse, in 1979. The party also made joint declarations with the 
Israeli Communist Party, claiming that its position on Jewish nationalism had 
been misread and stating that the PCF accepted a Jewish community and culture 
based on shared history. It even sent a delegation to demonstrate against anti­
semitism in response to the bombing of the synagogue in the rue Copernic in 
1981. Kriegel believed that Jews played a greater part in the party during its 
Eurocommunist phase, which was initiated by the Jewish Jean Kanapa.161
The party’s moderate position on the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, its lack of 
anti-zionist sloganising characteristic of earlier periods and its agreement with the 
Mitterrand policy also stemmed from internal political considerations. By the 
early 1980s, the communist party had suffered massive electoral decline, with 
Marchais winning about 15 per cent of the vote in the presidential election and the 
party obtaining around 16 per cent of the vote in the legislative election in 
1981.162 This meant that the party had lost two-thirds of its postwar electorate.163 
Even so, the new Mitterrand government contained four communist Ministers,
158 Johnson, 1981:54.
159 W right, 1989:215.
160 Codding and Safran, 1977:194.
161 Cohen and W all in M alino and W asserstein, eds., 1985:97-100.
162 W right, 1989:241.
163 B ell and Criddle, 1989:516.
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entering government for the first time since 1947. As an unpopular party, it could 
not use well-worn and outmoded communist formulas and as a minority member 
of government, it had to co-operate with the president’s policy.
In 1982 then the two left-wing parties came together in their attitudes 
towards the Israel/Palestinian conflict, both protesting against Israel’s invasion of 
Lebanon and both promoting recognition of Palestinian national rights. The 
PCF’s position was continuous with its former pro-Arab stance but differed from 
past policy in the absence of extreme anti-zionism. The PS’s policy represented a 
sharp break with the past. The left’s pro-Palestinian stand in 1982 generated 
accusations of left-wing anti-semitism. Alain de Rothschild, president of CRIF, 
complained about the way political commentaries held Israel responsible for the 
massacres before the results of an inquiry and argued that statements about 
Israel’s role in the massacres were dangerous and would produce a climate of 
anti-semitism and racism.164 Was the French left’s stand a new form of anti- 
Jewish hostility? Mitterrand’s comments about Oradour were insensitive and 
offensive to Jews, but the remark was not necessarily anti-semitic. The PCF’s 
characterisation of the massacre of the Palestinians as a pogrom could have upset 
Jews. However, as Marrus has commented, the ‘misuse of Nazi references’ 
reflects the way in which major historical reference points are used to encapsulate 
feeling about significant contemporary events and is not necessarily anti- 
Jewish.165 The PCF defended itself rigorously against accusations of anti­
semitism on the grounds that it had never faltered in its efforts to combat anti­
semitism. This defence was spurious since historically the party has used anti- 
Jewish stereotypes in its treatment of the Arab/Israel conflict. For instance, in the 
early 1950s the PCF drew heavily on the dual loyalty theme, arguing that 
according to zionist ideology:
‘A French Jew would not be French. He would be, 
by right, Israeli, that is a citizen of another 
state...the French Jew would be a stranger in his 
own country. Just like Marras, leading Zionists say
164 Le M onde , 23 Septem ber 1982.
165 Marrus in Curtis, ed., 1986:174.
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to the Jews “Go to Palestine! You are not welcome 
here.’166
Moreover, the party’s treatment of the 1967 war overtly used anti-Jewish themes, 
including the association between Jews and usury and making connections 
between Jews and the devil. In the following section, I shall look at how the 
French left’s views compared with the British left’s.
7.3 Conclusion: Comparing the British and French Left
There were important similarities between British and French left-wing attitudes 
towards Israel in the postwar period. The social democratic parties in the two 
countries moved from a consensus of support for Israel in the 1940s to a 
consensus of support for the Palestinians in the 1980s, maintaining (with the 
exception of Bevin’s Palestine policy) a more or less pro-Israel stance in the 
intervening period. In both cases, the history of colonialism led the parties to 
underestimate the strength of Arab nationalist sentiment, and to believe that the 
modernising potential of a Jewish state would eradicate nationalist tensions. Both 
parties had strong connections with the socialist Zionist movement and later, with 
the Israeli Labour Party. The networking between Zionist and Israeli political 
groups and the British Labour Party and the French Socialist Party, especially 
through the Socialist International, helped to create a strong sense of mutual 
identity. Moreover, both Britain and France contained politically articulate 
Jewish communities that identified closely with the social democratic left until the 
1970s, and, in this context, the two parties believed that it was politically 
advantageous to identify with Israel. Finally, the Holocaust led Labour and the 
SFIO to exonerate Israel for policies which anti-colonialist parties would normally 
condemn, such as Israel’s role in the 1956 war and its occupation of Arab 
territories in 1967.
The break-down in this consensus of support for Israel within Labour and 
the PS also stemmed from a similar set of dynamics. In the 1980s, both parties 
came under the influence of a younger generation of left-wing activists who
166 La N ouvelle C ritique , March 1953:21.
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introduced a radical perspective on international affairs. Israel’s shift to the right 
and its close relationship with America alienated the social democratic left in 
Britain and France which, by the 1980s, opposed American neo-colonialism. 
Moreover, western Jewry’s move to the political right and the left’s new interest 
in other ethnic minorities, including Afro-Caribbeans and Asians in Britain and 
the Maghrebi community in France, also played a part in the parties’ adoption of a 
pro-Palestinian policy. Finally, the rise of the PLO and its impact on international 
organisations like the UN and organisations closer to home such as the EC, 
affected Labour’s and the PS’s outlook.
Nevertheless, there were differences between the British and French 
democratic left. The SFIO and the Labour government came into conflict over 
Palestine in the 1940s. Whereas Labour could not maintain its pro-zionist policy 
once in government because it believed that to do so would threaten British 
interests, the SFIO was free to continue with tradition because first, it did not 
have direct links with Palestine and second, by the time of Israel’s creation, 
France had withdrawn from Syria and Lebanon. There were differences in 1956 
too. Mollet’s policy isolated the SFIO from democratic socialist parties in the rest 
of Europe.167 The French socialists took a more anti-Arab line than Labour, 
despite Gaitskell’s hostility towards Nasser. The Labour left in Britain 
condemned Mollet for engaging in war against Egypt in order to create a ‘second 
front in the war against Algerian freedom’.168 The SFIO’s more explicit pro- 
Israel and anti-Arab line was linked to the fact that France’s continuing role in 
Algeria served to maintain a deeply rooted fear of Arab nationalism even in the 
left. Moreover, the socialist government had directly to deal with the Algerian 
crisis and to balance French people’s views against the national liberation 
movement. Whereas in Britain, Labour was in opposition and its priority had 
been to oppose the government’s policy. Furthermore, its leadership was subject 
to pressure from the Labour left whereas in France the major left-wing force, the 
PCF, was discredited at the time of the crisis.
Although the SFIO and Labour both adopted a pro-Israel stand in 1967, 
there were differences between them. The French party was again more overtly
167 Le M onde , 21 September 1956.
I6K Tribune, 7 September 1956:1.
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pro-Israel and anti-Arab than the Labour government. Whereas the Labour 
leadership tried to appear neutral in order to sustain Britain’s status in the Arab 
countries and to avoid negative economic repercussions, the SFIO was out of 
office and trying to win public favour by distinguishing its Middle East policy 
from de Gaulle’s. The apparent similarities in the 1980s also obscured significant 
differences. The principal factor behind Labour’s pro-Palestinian stand was the 
rise of the Labour left. While such intra-party dynamics also played a part in 
Mitterrand’s pro-Palestinian policy, the leadership’s interest in enhancing 
France’s image in the Middle East was more important. Moreover, unlike 
Labour, Mitterrand had to appease internal Muslim opinion, which in the 1980s 
became politicised, centring on the idea of an Arab identity.
The British and French communist parties’ attitudes to Israel also evolved in 
a similar way. Both parties jettisoned their anti-zionist ideology in the 1940s in 
order to oppose Bevin’s Palestine policy and to support the formation of a Jewish 
state. Both parties reverted to a pro-Arab stance in the 19d 0s and maintained this 
during the 1967 hostilities. While recognising Palestinian national rights in the 
1980s, both parties moderated their criticism of Israel and refrained from using 
anti-zionist slogans. This similarity between the British and French communists’ 
position reflected their subordination to Soviet policy, which for most of the 
period in question, was considerable. However, there were differences. The 
PCF’s attitude towards Israel in 1956 was more exonerating than the CPGB’s. 
Furthermore, the PCF attempted to moderate its criticism of Israel in 1967 
whereas the CPGB did not. These differences stemmed from the fact that the 
PCF was a more significant political force in France than the CPGB was in 
Britain, attracting a substantial part of the electorate until its decline in the 1980s 
and periodically engaging in political alliances with the Socialist Party. Whereas 
these political factors sometimes forced the French communists to moderate its 
views on Israel, the British communists’ marginal role in mainstream politics 
allowed them freely to articulate unpopular themes. Moreover, it was the rise of 
Eurocommunist politics, translated into the new times current, which led the 
CPGB to drop its anti-zionist orthodoxy in the 1980s. In contrast, the French 
communists’ moderation during the Lebanon war reflected the fact that it was
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eager to enhance its public image in a period of unprecedented unpopularity. 
Furthermore, the party’s participation in the Mitterrand government imposed 
some constraint on its views and co-operation with the president’s policy.
There was then a clear pattern of policy change associated with the social 
democratic and communist left in Britain and France, with the former moving 
from a general consensus of support for Zionism to a pro-Palestinian position in 
the 1980s and with the latter jettisoning its orthodox anti-zionism in favour of a 
more accommodating approach to Jewish nationalism. These similarities do not 
mean that the dynamics underpinning the parties’ shifting policies were the same 
in the two countries. Historical and political factors unique to France, including 
its continuing links with North Africa, the presence of a significant Maghrebi 
population and the nature of its political system which allowed the PCF to have a 
mainstream role, did not operate in the British case. Nevertheless, there are 
sufficient continuities to make qualified generalisations about the policy changes. 
In the following chapter I shall look consider some possibilities for theorising 
these changes.
200
CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION
Israel’s formation forced the left to choose between Jewish and Arab nationalism. 
Since the state’s establishment, the disputes between it, the Arab countries, and 
later, Palestinian nationalism, tested the left’s loyalties. In 1956, Israel allied with 
the west in a war against Egypt aimed at undermining Nasser’s anti-colonialist 
movement. In 1967, Israel’s victory over the Arab states ended with an 
occupation of Arab land and the annexation of Arab East Jerusalem. In the 1980s, 
Israel’s incursions into Lebanon, especially in 1982, pitted Israeli nationalism 
against Palestinian nationalism in a particularly stark way. For socialists, few 
other international issues have been as taxing and divisive as the Israel/Arab 
conflict.1 In this chapter I shall briefly describe the way the left’s attitude towards 
Israel has evolved and then go on to consider the theoretical implications of this 
study for policy change and political parties.
8 . 1 Shifting Perceptions of Israel
Generally speaking, the social democratic left moved from a consensus of support 
for Zionism and Israel in the 1940s to a consensus of support for Palestinian 
national rights in the 1980s, although without dropping its commitment to Israel’s 
right to exist. Both Labour and the SFIO unanimously favoured Zionist aims over 
Arab ones in the 1940s.2 Both parties maintained a pro-Israeli stance during the 
1956 hostilities, with Gaitskell exonerating Israel and condemning Arab 
nationalism3 and with Mollet’s socialist government allying with Israel in a war 
against Egypt.4 In 1967, Wilson and the rest of the Labour Cabinet, the PLP and 
most of the extra-parliamentary party, overwhelmingly supported Israel over the 
Arab states.5 Similarly, the French socialists consistently expressed their
1 H ow e, 1993:148.
2 Chapter two; Chapter seven.
3 Chapter three.
4 Chapter seven.
5 Chapter four.
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solidarity with the Jewish state, with the party’s leadership, including Guy Mollet, 
Christian Pineau and Gaston Deferre, taking up a pro-Israel position in the 
National Assembly and with the FGDS organising a campaign in favour of the 
Jewish state.6
There were signs of dissent in both parties as early as 1956 with some of 
Labour’s left-wingers, such as Barbara Castle and Tony Benn, explicitly 
sympathising with Nasser and others, such as David Ennals, challenging the 
party’s unquestioning support for the Jewish state.7 In the French case, a small 
minority began to challenge the leadership’s position, including the chair of the 
parliamentary party, Robert Verdier, and Pierre Mendes France, the former 
Radical Prime Minister.8 In 1967, there was a more significant level of dissent 
from the parties’ previous consensus, with a small group in the PLP and some 
members of the Labour left refusing to exonerate Israel for its actions after the 
war.9 In the French case too, some elements of the social democratic left, 
especially the PSU, departed significantly from the SFIG's position, siding with 
the Arab countries and condemning Israel’s postwar policies.10
It was not until the early 1980s that Labour’s pro-Israeli feeling broke down, 
giving way to a movement in favour of Palestinian national rights. Led by the 
constituency parties and the local councils, especially in London and Scotland, this 
movement affected all the party’s sections, including the NEC, the trade unions, 
Labour Women and the PLP. However, by the late 1980s, some of the extreme 
aspects of the pro-Palestinian campaign gave way to a more moderate approach, 
accommodating both Israeli and Palestinian nationalism. The end result for 
Labour was the creation of a new consensus based on a compromise between the 
competing strands and recognition of both Jewish and Palestinian national rights. 
This compromise included three explicit principles. First, there was agreement 
over the need to have a policy that formally recognised Israel’s right to exist. 
Second, there was consensus over the need for a UN-sponsored peace conference 
and third, there was agreement over the need for a policy that formally supported
6 Chapter seven.
7 Chapter three.
8 Chapter seven.
9 Chapter four.
10 Chapter seven.
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the principle of Palestinian self-determination. An informal consensus also 
emerged over recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people, with key spokespeople like Gerald Kaufman, claiming that it 
was the Palestinians’ right to choose their own representatives.11
Like Labour, the French socialists’ pro-Israel tradition collapsed in the 
1980s. The newly elected socialist president in 1981 showed definite signs of 
continuing with the party’s past support for Israel by visiting the Knesset and by 
implementing domestic policies favourable to Jewish cultural activities. However, 
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon put an end to this period of rapprochement. Under 
the Mitterrand government, France gave the PLO moral and practical help. 
Mitterrand’s comments about the massacre of the Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila 
antagonised the Israeli leadership. The PSU, by now incorporated into the PS, 
demonstrated against the Israeli invasion, calling for the country’s immediate 
withdrawal and drawing parallels between the Palestinians’ position with the 
Jews’ position under Nazism.12
The evolution of the communist parties’ attitudes differed from the social 
democratic left’s and internal forces for change pushed in an opposite direction. 
Despite the two parties’ support for the formation of Israel, they basically adopted 
a pro-Arab and anti-Israel position throughout most of the postwar period, 
condemning Zionism as a reactionary movement that divided the working class 
and supporting Arab nationalism on anti-imperialist grounds. In 1956 the CPGB 
supported Nasser’s anti-imperialism.13 Although the PCF’s criticism of Israel’s 
part in the Suez war was more muted than the CPGB’s, it too reverted to pro-Arab 
position, standing almost alone in the National Assembly in its condemnation of 
the socialist government’s involvement in the war against Egypt.14 In 1967 the 
CPGB rallied to the Arab states’ side, arguing that the Arabs’ role in the war 
represented a struggle against western imperialism and condemning the Jewish 
state for siding with imperialism against the movement for Arab liberation and 
unleashing a new wave of anti-zionist propaganda, with members of the National
11 Chapter five.
12 Chapter seven.
13 Chapter six.
14 Chapter seven.
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Jewish Committee, such as Bert Ramelson and Solly Kaye, restating anti-zionist 
slogans.15 The PCF similarly supported the Arab states blaming Israel for 
initiating the hostilities and portraying the Jewish state as a pawn for American 
imperialism. The war precipitated a new and extreme attack on Zionism, with the 
party’s press depicting the nationalist movement in conspiratorial terms and 
exploiting anti-Jewish themes by making links between Jews with high finance.16
Dissent from the communists’ anti-zionist consensus also started as early as 
1956. In the CPGB there was an unprecedented challenge to the party’s anti- 
zionist orthodoxy. In response to revelations about Soviet anti-semitism, leading 
Jewish members of the pro-democracy movement, such as Chimen Abramsky and 
Hyman Levy, began to challenge anti-zionism, arguing for a re-evaluation of 
communism’s approach to Jewish nationalism. The 1967 hostilities provoked a 
second wave of dissent, with some Jewish members questioning the communists’ 
automatic anti-Israel and pro-Arab line.17 In the French case too, prominent 
former communists such as Annie Kriegel challenged the party’s orthodoxy, 
accusing it of being anti-semitic18 and even people like Maxime Rodinson began 
to reevaluate the party’s traditional policy towards Zionism.
However, significant changes took place in communist policy in the 1980s. 
During this decade, the CPGB split between the traditional strand and the 
reformist, new times strand, with the latter coming eventually to dominate. This 
division played itself out over the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. While both strands 
supported Palestinian national rights, the traditionalists maintained an orthodox 
anti-zionist position, describing Israel as a racist state and drawing analogies 
between Zionists and Nazis. In contrast, while objecting to Israeli human rights 
abuses in the occupied territories, the reformists rejected anti-zionist slogans, 
maintaining that the party needed to recognise Jewish nationalism and the Jews’ 
historical identity. In this respect, there was a significant convergence between 
communist reformists and Labour’s soft left, with both recognising Jewish and 
Palestinian national rights and calling for a two-state solution to the conflict.19
15 Chapter six.
16 Chapter seven.
17 Chapter six.
18 Chapter seven.
19 Chapter six.
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Maintaining its basic pro-Arab position in the early 1980s, the PCF condemned 
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon as an expansionist policy and supported the PLO. 
Marchais, the party’s leader, generally supported Mitterrand’s policy, disagreeing 
only over the way France, amongst other western countries, had not managed to 
secure Israel’s withdrawal. However, as in the British case, the party’s past anti- 
zionism was largely absent, with the communist leadership seeking to distinguish 
Begin’s policy from Israeli and Jewish opinion.20
So, by the late 1980s, the social democratic left’s pro-Israel consensus broke 
down and the communist left’s anti-zionist consensus broke down. Both elements 
contained some anti-zionist and anti-semitic strands, with the Labour far left 
calling for the dissolution of the Jewish state and with the communist 
traditionalists maintaining an orthodox anti-zionist stand. However, for the most 
part, Labour’s and the French Socialist Party’s departure from an uncritical 
attitude towards Israel was confined to a critique of Israeli policy and was not anti- 
zionist. Moreover, in an unprecedented way, the communist left began to accept 
the legitimacy of Jewish nationalism. Nevertheless, a new consensus of support 
for Palestinian nationalism was established.
8.2 Theorising Policy Change
This study begs a particular theoretical question: how does policy change occur in 
political parties? What forces underpinned the parties’ general consensus of 
support for Palestinian national rights in the 1980s? The answer to this question is 
necessarily tentative. However illuminating it is to look at party attitudes towards 
a single issue for intrinsic reasons, it is not possible to make general claims about 
party formulation from one case alone. Furthermore, the particular case, Israel and 
the Arab/Israel conflict is an especially idiosyncratic one, cutting across party 
factions and dividing loyalties in a way other issues have not done. Second, there 
are clear methodological difficulties associated with seeking to make theoretical 
generalisations from historical reconstruction because sources are ambiguous and 
memories are partial.21 As I mentioned in the introduction, the sensitivity of the
20 Chapter seven.
21 Cornford, 197 |:235 .
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topic gave rise to particular problems relating to the collection of evidence, with 
the researcher coming up against suspicion and blank walls on a
number of occasions.22 Confronted with inadequate documentary sources, 
researchers tend to go for interviews with key political actors, but this step is itself 
problematic precisely because members of the political elite cannot be relied upon 
to present an unbiased account,"' raising the question of representativeness. 
Nevertheless, it is worth making qualified conclusions about how policy change 
comes about, if only to provide a sense of what could be done in future research.
Some of the most interesting material on policy change focuses on 
government rather than party policy. Polsby’s study of policy innovation, for 
example, centres on American national politics, and policy change in three areas: 
scientific policy, foreign policy and domestic policy.24 Allison’s study of policy 
change deals with the American government’s reaction to the Cuban missile 
crisis.25 Dunleavy has taken up some of Allison’s insights and applied them to the 
British government’s handling of the Westland affair.2^  However, there is no 
reason why their theoretical insights cannot be applied to parties. Political parties 
aim to take control over government and fulfil a number of functions, including 
the construction of a distinctive set of ideas and policies out of which the 
electorate makes choices.27 Moreover, parties can be understood in terms of their 
internal structure because they are based on an organisation of groups of people 
who aim to govern the nation either alone or in alliance with other parties and who 
are in a sense training for government.28
In his discussion of how policy innovation occurs in American national 
politics, Polsby introduced a distinction between acute innovation and incubated 
innovation. Acute innovation refers to the situation where a policy decision is 
taken in a relatively short space of time and the period between the raising of an 
idea and decision makers taking it up and implementing it is brief and based on
22 Chapter one.
22 Lawson, 1990:107.
24 Polsby, 1984.
25 A llison , 1971.
26 D unleavy, 1990:29-60.
27 See Schonfeld, 1983:477-478;489.
28 Schonfeld, 1983:489-490. These com m ents do not apply to all the parties in this study. The 
CPGB has never taken a part in government and, presumably, its leadership and m em bers were 
aware that it had little chance o f doing so.
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99little research/ In this situation, the policy outcome does not reflect so much the 
range of alternatives facing the government as the first solution that appears to 
solve the immediate problem. Hence, Polsby has characterised this form of policy 
making process as ‘organized anarchy’, so that a particular policy outcome may 
depend on purely arbitrary factors such as whoever came to the right meeting at 
the right time with the right dunotwrtof work done. Furthermore, the speed at 
which decisions are reached means that a low level of partisan conflict is typically 
associated with acute change.30
Incubated change, on the other hand, refers to the situation where innovation 
takes place slowly, often over a number of years. Unlike the acute type of change, 
it is frequently based on considerable research and pressure for innovation comes 
not so much from the actual decision makers as the work of people relatively 
distant from the central decision making authority, both physically and socially, 
including academics, interest groups or researchers. During the period of 
incubation, political actors take up ideas, moderate them and publicise them, 
putting them on to the mainstream political agenda. This type of change is often 
the focus of partisan conflict and taken up on party platforms. As the movement 
for change builds up, controversy grows and attracts rivalry and counter claims. In 
contrast to the first type of innovation, there is a lag between the proposal of 
alternatives and the search for solutions, with policy proposals being ‘aired’ long 
before being implemented.31
What about the actual mechanisms of change? In his study of how national 
governments construct policies, Allison adopted a threefold approach to policy 
formulation. His starting point was that in order to understand why governments 
take up particular positions, it is necessary ‘to identify the games and players, to 
display the coalitions, bargains and compromises...’,32 on the premise that policy 
decisions result from an ‘elaborate game between a number of political actors 
pursuing their own institutional or personal interests’." Conceptualising 
governments as unitary, purposive actors, Allison outlined three models aimed at
29 Polsby, 1984:150. 
20 Ibid: 151.
31 Ibid: 153-154.
32 A llison, 1971:146.
33 D unleavy, 1990:35.
207
understanding policy change, applying them to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In 
the first model, the rational policy model, he compared government with a rational 
person, suggesting that the analyst needs to think in terms of how a rational person 
would act in order to achieve her/his goals in order to understand why a 
government adopts a particular policy, a model which is based on the idea of 
governments acting in the national interest.34 According to Allison, both specialist 
and lay analyses of international events such as the Cuban missile confrontation 
typically depend upon a common sense understanding of decisions in terms of 
governments’ aims and calculations.35 From this perspective, governmental 
behaviour is ‘action chosen by unitary, rational decision makers: centrally 
controlled, completely informed and value maximizing’.36
However, in the belief that the rational policy model neglects the more 
humdrum aspects of policy construction, Allison proposed a second model, the 
organisational process model. This model is based on the way governments are 
made up of a number of linked organisations, each having ‘a substantial life of its 
own’.37 According to this framework, governmental behaviour stems from the 
‘outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of
*2 O
behaviour’.' The idea here is to examine decision making in terms of the 
procedures of governmental organisations on the grounds that organisations tend 
to come up with policies that reflect ways of thinking characteristic of the 
organisation itself.39
Allison’s third model, the governmental politics model, contrasts sharply 
with the first. Instead of stressing the idea of government as unitary actor, it takes 
individual political actors as central. According to this view, policy positions 
emerge out of a game between various players who make bargains with each 
other. Decisions reflect not so much rational choices as the nature of the political 
game itself.40 This model examines policy outcomes in terms of the personalities 
and political interests of the individual participants, maintaining that people will
34 Cornford, 1974:233;236.
35 A llison, 1971:10.
36 Ibid:67.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Cornford, 1974:233.
40 Allison, 1971:144.
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act to further their own career, their party’s or bureaucracy’s interests, and that any 
given policy will emerge from a conflict between rival views and aims, reflecting 
such arbitrary factors as the relative strength of individual politicians.41 Although 
personal career ambitions may be a key source of motivation, the way people 
behave also reflects sources of socialisation, including organisational ones and 
peer group influences.42
In the following sections I shall consider the relevance of these analyses to 
understanding the way the left’s policy towards Israel changed in the postwar 
period. I shall look first at the pertinence of Polsby’s concepts of incubated and 
acute policy change and then at the applicability of Allison’s threefold conception 
of policy making.
8.3 Incubated and Acute Policy Change
Reflecting first on Labour’s movement away from a pro-Israel policy to a pro- 
Palestinian one, Polsby’s classification has obvious relevance. For the most part, 
the shift fits closely into the pattern associated with incubated change, but it also 
shares some of the features associated with acute innovation. In the first place, 
there was a long time lapse between the initial awareness of the Arab/Palestinian 
case and its incorporation into party policy. As early as the 1956 crisis, some 
Labour officials, for instance, David Ennals, raised the Palestinian refugee 
question and the matter of Labour making alliances with Arab nationalist 
movements such as Ba’athism. Gradually, over time, the demand for change built 
up with people like Michael Foot, Christopher Mayhew, and later, Ken 
Livingstone, Clare Short and Ernie Ross, campaigning increasingly strongly for 
Labour to include Palestinian national rights into its official policy. Although a 
simple majority in the annual conference voted in favour of Palestinian 
nationalism in 1982, it was not until the policy review process in 1989 that Labour 
officially called for a two-state solution to the conflict. Similarly, in the case of 
the French left, parts of the social democratic left called for changes in the party’s 
overwhelmingly pro-Israel consensus as early 1967. After the June war, for
r
41 Cornford, 1974:233-234.
42 Dunleavy, 1990:35.
209
instance, the Parti Socialiste Unifie (PSU) diverged from the SFIO’s pro-Israeli 
consensus. However, its views had very little impact until the late 1970s and early 
1980s when the PS began to take on board Palestinian nationalist demands.43
Moreover, during the early stages, the people or groups pushing for change 
were relatively distant from the actual decision making process. Academics and 
journalists played an important part in pressurising for change at a distance. 
People like Edward Said, in particular, made an impact on perceptions of the 
Israel/Arab conflict. The media also played an important role in airing the 
Palestinian cause, with journalists such as David Hirst for the Guardian 
condemning Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and calling for a 
solution to the Palestinian refugee crisis and later publishing a book detailing 
Israeli policy towards the Palestinians from the formation of the Jewish state to the 
1980s.44 Later still, Robert Fisk from the Independent published a book called 
Pity The Nation,45 criticising Israel’s involvement in Lebanon. A further source of 
pressure was the Palestinian nationalist movement itself. Set up in 1964, the PLO 
became an important political force in the international arena in the 1970s and 
1980s, especially when it replaced its terrorist tactics with a strategy to win over 
the diplomatic argument. It made an impact on organisations like the UN, with 
this body consistently calling for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. 
At the same time, Palestinian activists began to campaign within Labour’s 
constituency parties and, eventually, with frontbench Labour MPs like Gerald 
Kaufman, who was shadow Foreign Secretary between 1987 and 1992.
As the parties started to shift away from a consensus of support for Israeli 
nationalism towards a consensus of support for Palestinian nationalism and the 
PLO, controversy broke out both inside the parties and between the parties and 
interested groups outside, especially Jewish groups. In this respect, the movement 
shared a characteristic associated with incubated change, namely, the tendency to 
generate controversy and a counter movement. In the case of the Labour Party, for 
example, organisations like Poale Zion and LFI began to copy some of the tactics 
employed by the campaign for recognition of Palestinian national rights, such as
43 Chapter seven.
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those used by LMEC and TUFP, by organising in the constituencies and the trade 
unions and abandoning their, especially LFI’s, concentration on the PLP. The 
shift also stimulated controversy within the wider Jewish community, with 
organisations like the BOD making representations to leading Labour members 
about their concerns about developments in the party towards favouring the PLO. 
In France, too, bodies such as CRIF began to counter the trend within the left 
towards sympathy for the PLO, claiming that left-wing Jews like Pierre Mendes 
France were encouraging an anti-semitic climate by criticising Israel.46
Although the cases fit most closely with incubated innovation, they also had 
an acute aspect. In the Labour Party, for example, there had been a significant 
growth of pro-Palestinian activism throughout the 1970s, but there was a sudden 
swing against Israel and in favour of the PLO in 1982. At the party’s annual 
conference, an unprecedented number of constituency party submitted resolutions 
condemning Israeli action and there were two emergency resolutions 47 Similarly 
in the PS, the Mitterrand government very quickly abandoned its earlier attempts 
at rapprochement with Israel during the 1982 events. The speed at which he 
turned, after a year of implementing policies favourable to the Jewish community 
in France and to the Jewish state, was reflected in the clumsy comments he made 
equating the Israeli invasion with the Nazi massacre of the Jews. This sudden 
change reflected the immediacy of the crisis arising out of Israel’s invasion of 
Lebanon and the subsequent massacre of Palestinian refugees which created an 
unparalleled level of international condemnation.48
The pattern of policy change in the communist parties was different from that 
associated with the social democratic parties. Unlike the social democratic left, 
the communist parties’ support for Palestinian national rights in the 1980s was 
continuous with their previous pro-Arab policies. The innovative aspect, 
therefore, turned on the way they combined this position with a less hostile 
attitude towards Israeli nationalism, abandoning the extreme anti-zionism 
characteristic of communist orthodoxy. This shift too can best be understood in 
terms of incubated change. As early as 1956 elements inside the CPGB, including
46 Chapter seven.
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Hyman Levy and Chimen Abramsky, began to suggest that the party adopt a more 
accommodating approach to Jewish nationalism. This move was repeated again in 
1967 but those who dissented from the anti-zionist orthodoxy had no affect on 
party policy until the 1980s.49 Similarly, in the case of the PCF, Jewish members 
like Annie Kriegel began early on to question the party’s position, but the 
leadership resolutely refused to moderate its stand until the late 1970s and early 
1980s.50
8.4 Policy Change and the Party as Unitary Actor
Using the idea of the party as a unitary, purposive actor, we can see that Labour’s
policy shift was rational in terms of its foreign policy aims and attitude. For most
of the postwar period, the party’s pro-Israel stance stemmed from the successive
leadership’s approach to international affairs. Bevin, Gaitskell and Wilson all
accepted the cold war consensus and the western alliance, a position that informed
their attitude towards Israel. From the start, the new Jewish state signalled its
support for the western alliance.51 However, from the late 1970s there was a
movement away from consensus politics to a more intense phase of party
competition.52 During this period Labour broke away from the postwar agreement
follovnntj
over international affairs. Under the leadership of Michael Foot and^the rise of 
the Labour left, the party adopted an ideological hostility towards American neo­
colonialism and in favour of movements of national self-determination. From this 
perspective, it was entirely rational to switch from a pro-Israel position to a pro- 
Palestinian one. Labour’s new opposition to American policy in the Third World 
led it to gravitate towards the Palestinian cause.53 Starting in the 1960s, Israel and 
America became increasingly close and by the early 1980s the two countries 
enjoyed a particularly strong relationship, with the American government seeing
49 r-iiChapter six. 
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the Jewish state as an important strategic ally and strongly opposing the PLO as a 
result.54
Furthermore, for most of the postwar period it was politically advantageous 
for Labour to adopt a pro-Israel policy. Until the 1970s, the party had 
considerable support from the Jewish community. However, from this time, Jews 
turned increasingly towards Conservative politics and, in a number of London 
constituencies, started to indicate a significantly greater tendency to support the 
Conservatives than non-Jews.55 Jews no longer identified Labour as the party that 
served Jewish interests, and their representation within the PLP began to decline 
in favour of the Conservatives and Social Democrats.56 The Conservative Party 
began to portray itself as the party of the Jews, with Thatcher appointing them in 
an unprecedented way as Cabinet Ministers and distancing herself from the party’s 
pro-Arab tradition.57
Having lost Jewish support and, as a result of demographic developments, 
Labour’s new ethnic constituency comprised Afro-Caribbeans and Asians. In the 
early 1980s, at local and national level, the party began to make efforts to attract
• c oethnic minority votes, focusing on Afro-Caribbean and Asian voters.' Although 
it failed to agree over the question of black sections, it overwhelmingly supported 
the formation of a Black and Asian Advisory Committee in 1985.59 Black and 
Asian communities tended to be less interested in international issues than 
immediately relevant concerns such as policing and immigration and nationality 
policy.60 Nevertheless, this trend was significant because there was tension 
between Jews and Afro-Caribbean and Asian groups, with politically orientated 
Asians and Afro-Caribbeans adopting an anti-zionist and pro-Palestinian 
outlook.61 In this new context, it became more politically rewarding to adopt a 
sympathetic position on Palestinian nationalism.
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The French Socialist Party’s shift in favour of the Palestinians in the 1980s 
can also be understood in terms of the party’s efforts to.further its interests. 
Unlike Labour, the socialists were in government in the early 1980s and had to act 
according to the perceived national interest. Despite Mitterrand’s efforts during 
the first year of his presidency to form friendly relations with the Israeli 
government, he found that he had to abandon this when faced with Israel’s 
invasion of Lebanon. Mitterrand’s policy reflected both external and domestic 
considerations. In the past, despite de Gaulle’s pro-Arab policy, France had been 
a major supplier of arms to Israel. This changed in the 1980s when Israel started 
to buy hardware from the USA, alienating the French government. Moreover, the 
socialists’ pro-PLO stance stemmed from a concern to improve relations with the 
Maghreb, an area that accounted for the majority of France’s economic 
transactions with the Arab world.62
The government’s interest in appeasing domestic ethnic opinion also played 
a part in determining its position. By the 1980s France had a sizeable Muslim 
community of North African origin that was actively hostile towards Israel and 
pro-Palestinian. In order to avoid a potentially explosive internal situation with 
respect to France’s Maghrebi population, it was rational for Mitterrand to adopt an 
anti-Israel policy. During the 1980s, organisations such as the Convention 
Nationale des Frant^ais Musulmans (CNFM) and the Association France-Palestine 
(AFP) and anti-racist groups like SOS Racism strongly condemned Israeli policy 
and supported the PLO. This orientation later emerged during the Gulf war when 
French Muslims maintained that France would become a base for civil military 
action if Israel entered the war.63 Although Mitterrand risked alienating the 
Jewish community, this was not so much of a problem because left-wing Jewish 
groups condemned Israeli policy in Lebanon in an unprecedented way, believing 
that it reflected the state’s shift away from its socialist roots.64
Turning to the communist left, it is equally possible to understand the two 
parties’ policy change in terms of their goals and calculations of how to optimise 
their interests. For most of the postwar period, the national parties’ main priority
62Howorth, 1991:4.
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was to support Soviet policy. From the start of the cold war, the CPSU 
increasingly demanded conformity from the national communist parties. The 
British party’s leadership, including Palme Dutt, Harry Pollitt and John Golan, 
tended to comply with Moscow’s policy. Like the British CP, the PCF’s 
relationship with the Soviet Union principally determined its positions. From 
1947 until the late 1970s, the party was entirely predisposed towards Russian 
policy.65 The CPSU’s original support for Israel quickly evaporated when it 
realised that the Jewish state intended to ally with the west. In the 1950s, Russia 
supported Nasser and in 1967 it backed the Arab states, breaking off diplomatic 
relations with Israel. Given the national parties’ priority to support the Soviet 
Union, it was rational to adopt an anti-zionist perspective, even when it clearly did 
not fit easily with national politics and public opinion.66
However, the decline of the national communist parties made it irrational for 
them simply to follow the CPSU line. In Britain, both communist MPs lost their 
seats in 1950 and from that point the party’s electoral fortunes never recovered, 
either nationally or locally. During the 1950s and 1960s, the party’s membership 
also dropped and by the 1980s, its influence in the trade union movement 
collapsed, partly because of the decline of its industrial base and partly because of 
internal divisions over ideology.67 During the postwar period, the PCF was in a 
stronger position electorally than the CPGB. However, by the 1980s, it too had 
suffered a major blow to its electoral position, having lost out to the PS in the 
1978 legislative elections and having failed to stem a drop in membership rates or 
to prevent a collapse in its popular image.
In this context, it was rational for the parties to become more responsive to 
their own political systems and to reject orthodox communist positions, an aim 
captured in the Eurocommunist movement. Under the influence of these 
developments, the British new times faction refused blindly to follow the Soviet 
line, rejecting the traditionalists’ emphasis on class and embarking on a major 
revision of communist policy.69 Challenging the indiscriminate use of class
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analysis, the revisionists argued for recognition of a multitude of identities, 
including ethnic and national ones, enabling it to recognise the legitimacy of both 
Israeli and Palestinian nationalist identities.70 Seeking to enhance its political 
viability but being unable electorally to compete with Labour, the party’s 
reformers forged links with Labour’s soft left, such as the Labour Co-ordinating 
Committee. It became irrational to hold on to past orthodoxies such as anti- 
zionism even if, paradoxically, other left-wing groups had began to adopt this 
stand. Acknowledging that the party’s anti-zionist perspective had alienated the 
Jews, it tried to appeal again to Jewish opinion by rejecting anti-zionist slogans.71
Similarly, the PCF’s electoral and membership decline meant that it could no 
longer ignore the public’s alienation from traditional communist positions. In the 
1980s the communists continued to be ideologically hostile to ethnic and national 
identities, with Marchais declaring that France was not multi-ethnic but one 
nation.72 Even so, it began explicitly to condemn anti-semitic and terrorist attacks 
on Jews and even started to make appeals to the Jewish vote. Moreover, its new 
position in the early 1980s made it untenable simply to repeat customary formulas. 
The PCF leadership allied with the PS in 1981 in the belief that its participation in 
government would prevent further marginalisation. As a result of Mitterrand’s 
victory in 1981, the party entered government for the first time in thirty-four years 
and Pierre Mauroy’s second government included four Cabinet Ministers.73 Given 
its pro-Palestinian orientation, it was not too difficult for the party to agree with 
Mitterrand. Nevertheless, it diluted its previous anti-zionist rhetoric to fit in with 
its new status as government member.
8.5 Policy Change and Party Organisation
It is also illuminating to consider the policy changes in terms of internal 
organisational developments. In principle, Labour has a high level of internal 
democracy. Composed of a direct membership, that is, individual constituency
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party members, and an indirect membership, including affiliated bodies like the 
trade unions, both sections have a say on conference decisions.74 As far as policy 
formulation is concerned, the NEC formulates policy and submits resolutions to 
the annual conference and later holds a meeting with the (shadow) Cabinet to 
choose policies to be included in the manifesto. Nonetheless, even those 
conference decisions that achieve a two thirds majority are not necessarily 
included.75 Moreover, it has traditionally been the case that the leadership and the 
PLP, often with the support of the unions’ block vote, have tended to control 
policy outcomes.76
Organisational changes in the 1980s provided the framework for a policy 
change. As a result of the activities of the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy 
(CLPD) and the Labour Co-ordinating Committee (LCC), Labour became more 
internally democratic. The CLPD’s principal aim was to get the PLP to implement 
policy decisions taken by the annual conference and it believed that the 
compulsory reselection of MPs would facilitate this, making MPs more 
accountable to the party’s membership and so forcing them to take conference
7 7decisions more seriously. The LCC differed from the CLPD in so far as it 
concentrated on getting the party to debate policy options more widely and to 
enhance its general campaigning role. Its policy agenda was distinctively left- 
wing and it even published an alternative party manifesto.78 These organisations’ 
efforts paid off, with conference voting in favour of automatic reselection of MPs 
in 1980,79 and in 1981 accepting a constitutional change that broadened the vote 
for the party leader to include the constituency parties and the trade unions as well
on
as the PLP. From this year the leader was chosen by an electoral college 
consisting of MPs with 30 per cent of the vote, constituency parties with 30 per 
cent of the vote and affiliated trade unions with 40 per cent of the vote.81
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The left began to dominate the NEC and other important policy making 
bodies such as the organisation committee, the home policy committee and the 
international affairs committee.82 This development was partly responsible for the 
shift away from automatic support for Israel towards the Palestinian cause. The 
formation of the Middle East Sub-Committee (MESC) under the authority of the 
International Committee in 1978, for example, played a significant role. Although 
this body contained members of the old left who were highly sympathetic to Israel, 
it also included external commentators on the Middle East like Fred Halliday and 
Christopher Hitchens, both of whom were critical of Israeli policy towards the 
Palestinians. MESC put pressure on the NEC in the early 1980s to adopt a policy 
recognising the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. 
Moreover, at the time of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Michael Foot was 
the party’s leader. Coming from a left-wing background and as a member of 
LMEC, Foot was already involved in pro-Palestinian politics. The fact that he 
sponsored an EDM condemning Israeli policy accounted partly for the level of 
support for the motion. '
Moreover, in the past organisational links between the Zionist movement and 
Labour affected its pro-Israeli tendency. Poale Zion affiliated to the party in 1920. 
After the Suez war, when Jewish opinion was concerned about Labour’s anti-war 
stance, LFI was established. As a non-affiliated organisation, it acted as a 
significant lobbying group, influencing the PLP and the extra-parliamentary 
parties. By 1967 the majority of the PLP were LFI members.84 Furthermore, there 
were long-standing links between the Israeli trade union organisation, the 
Histadrut, and the TUC, based on mutual exchange visits and even financial 
support. Given the unions’ block vote at the party conference, these ties were 
important.
The formation of equivalent groups campaigning for the Palestinians further 
accounted for Labour’s policy shift. In the 1970s and 1980s, Palestinian groups 
formed a series of networks with Labour, countering those between Jews and the 
party. Organisations like LMEC, although not allowed to affiliate to the party,
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acted in a similar way to Poale Zion and LFI. CAABU tried to lobby in favour of 
the Arab cause among Labour MPs. Friends of Palestine groups began to operate 
at the party’s annual conference. PLO representatives based in London made links 
with Labour MPs such as Claire Short and Ernie Ross, who went on actively to 
campaign on behalf of the Palestinian cause. In the 1980s, TUFP developed ties 
between the trade union movement in Britain and the Palestinians, providing a 
balance to Labour’s relationship with the Israeli Histadrut.85
Intra-party developments also applied in the French case. Unlike the Labour 
Party, the PS does not have formal links with trade unions. Based solely on direct 
membership organised into sections, section representatives attend the Federal 
Congress in order to debate policies that go on to the biennial National Congress. 
The National Congress elects the Directing Committee which goes on to elect the
o r
Executive Bureau and the National Secretariat. In principle, the PS is pluralistic 
and committed to the mass membership having a say in policy formulation.87
Nevertheless, policy debates tend to reflect the distribution of power between the
88competing currents.
The PS’s move from a pro-Israel to pro-Palestinian position in the early 
1980s stemmed from a leftwards shift. The party’s alliance with the PCF partly 
accounted for the direction of political change. However, other groups played a 
part, including the marxist group, CERES (Centre d ’Etudes, de Recherches et 
d’Education Socialiste), led by Jean-Pierre Chevenement. CERES supported the 
PCF,89 and, in terms of foreign policy, was particularly critical of American neo­
colonialism in the Third World.90 The trend also reflected the PSU’s inclusion in 
the PS from 1974,91 a new left group associated with people like Michel Rocard. 
Rocard was one of Mitterrand’s five socialist Prime Ministers between the years 
1981 and 1993.92 Under Mitterrand, the government consisted principally of the 
professional classes, including academics, journalists and doctors,93 a group that
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typically leaned towards liberal attitudes towards the Third World. The rise of 
these groups clearly influenced the President’s approach to foreign policy which 
was basically pro-Third World.94
In contrast to the social democratic left, the communist parties’ organisation 
militated against policy change. Both the CPGB and the PCF were organised 
according to the principle of democratic centralism. In the case of the British 
party, this entailed a highly centralised organisation with power located principally 
in the Political Committee.95 With respect to the PCF, internal debate is 
permitted, but the higher bodies’ decisions take precedent over lower ones.96 
Referring to the PCF, Criddle has suggested that democratic centralism means that 
the base is subordinated to the elite and that ‘elections are not elections and 
debates are not debates’. Dissidents either have to leave or are forced to leave so 
that, in the end, a ‘small professional elite decides and imposes policy’.97
For most of the postwar period, democratic centralism was deeply entrenched 
and was responsible for the leadership’s refusal to take on board internal pressure 
for the party to reconsider its position on Zionism. The British party did not 
contain overt rivalries like Labour because its priority was to present a united 
front, so the leadership dealt harshly with dissent.98 This lack of internal 
democracy led Palme Dutt to denounce calls for a re-evaluation of the 
communists’ attitude towards Israel and its decision to reorganise the NJC, forcing 
it to put forward an anti-zionist line. In 1967, too, the leadership dealt with a new
99demand for a more sympathetic approach to Jewish nationalism by repressing it.
In the PCF’s case too, the leadership had no patience with people who challenged 
its views on Zionism and for most of the postwar period, the dissidents’ only 
option was to leave the party.100
However, in the 1980s there were significant organisational changes in the 
British case, with the reformers coming to dominate the party. This faction gained 
ground as a result of recruiting from new social movement political activists such
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as students and feminists.101 More importantly, Thatcher’s victory in 1979 and 
1983 ensured that the new times faction won the party’s leadership support.102 To 
some extent, this group was as authoritarian as the party’s former leaders, purging 
the party of traditionalists such as Ken Gill, TUC chair in 1985, and Bert 
Ramelson amongst others.103 Nevertheless, it allowed a wider variety of views to 
be expressed in the pages of its journal, Marxism Today. With respect to Israel 
and the Palestinian conflict, for example, the journal opened its pages to a 
diversity of views, including those of social democratic left Israelis.104
The PCF also contained a reformist faction, affecting its policy positions. 
After a damaging performance in the 1978 legislative elections, the PCF’s 
leadership faced a growing challenge to the party’s organisational structure. 
Prominent left-wing intellectuals, such as Louis Althusser, joined the dissenters in 
demanding the demise of democratic centralism and greater internal democracy 
over policy formulation. Despite Marchais’ success in stemming dissent, he was 
clearly on the defensive in the context of increasingly poor electoral fortunes, a 
drop in membership and an increasingly hostile public.105 This situation provided 
circumstances amenable to policy moderation and partly accounted for the party 
abandoning its traditional anti-zionist and anti-Jewish rhetoric.106
8.6 Policy Change and Individuals
In addition to understanding the parties’ policy change in organisational terms, it 
is useful to consider the roles played by particular individuals. During most of the 
postwar period, certain individuals played a notable part in sustaining Labour’s 
pro-Israel tradition. People such as Hugh Dalton, Hugh Gaitskell, Aneurin Bevan 
and Harold Wilson all shared strong sympathies with the Jewish state. Gaitskell 
and Dalton were on close terms with members of Israel’s Labour elite, including 
Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett. Wilson was close to people like Golda Meir,
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Abba Eban and Yigal Allon. In the 1940s, there were numerous meetings between 
the socialist Zionist movement and people like Bevin, Dalton and Morrison.107 In 
1956, Israeli political representatives lobbied the Labour leader and other party 
members108 and in 1967, Abba Eban visited Wilson with the aim of mobilising 
support for Israel.109
It is not possible to understand Labour’s policy shift without recognising the 
role of certain individuals who decided to focus a considerable amount of attention 
on getting the party to take on board the Arab and later, the Palestinian cause. 
After the Suez war, David Ennals was notable in his efforts to get the internal
\ t>
policy making bodies jforge links with Arab socialist groups.110 In the period 
immediately following the 1967 conflict, Christopher Mayhew was central to the 
campaign for recognition of the Arab case. Mayhew was instrumental in the 
formation of the Labour Middle East Council (LMEC) and he repeatedly tried to 
get this body affiliated to the party, although without success. Other members of 
the PLP, including Margaret McKay and Andrew Faulds, also campaigned against 
Israeli policy with respect to the Arab countries and the occupied territories.111
It is unlikely that career motivations lay behind these individuals’ activities. 
Mayhew’s Ministerial role was in the past,112 and he went on to resign from 
Labour in favour of the Liberal Party. Moreover, McKay’s involvement in the 
Arab cause was detrimental to her career prospects because it resulted in her 
constituency party seeking to deselect her. Nor was it politically rewarding for 
Andrew Faulds to take up the Arab cause because he lost his frontbench position 
under Wilson’s leadership for describing Jewish MPs as having dual loyalty.113 
From the data, it is difficult to understand the motivations behind these people’s 
activities. As members of Labour’s right wing they were interested in getting the 
party to adopt policies which, when in government, would best serve the national 
interests in economic terms. However, they were clearly ‘true believers’ in the
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Arab cause, with Mayhew writing conspiratorially about a cover-up on views on 
the Middle East and McKay retiring to Abu Dhabi.114
Other political actors, mainly from the left, began to take an especially active 
role. As Labour leader, Michael Foot condemned Israeli policy in Lebanon. Tony 
Benn and Eric Heffer publicly showed where their sympathies lay by resigning 
from LFI. Ken Livingstone, Clare Short and Ernie Ross were closely involved in 
the campaign, with the GLC funding the Palestinian nationalist campaign and with 
the others organising constituency party meetings with PLO representatives and 
taking part in conferences on the Israel/Palestinian conflict. Later still, Gerald 
Kaufman, as shadow Foreign Secretary, began publicly to commit the party to a 
policy that was based on a two-state solution to the conflict.115
Kaufman’s institutionalised role as shadow Foreign Secretary compelled him 
to take a stand. At the end of the 1980s his role involved steering the party away 
from the anti-zionist politics of the far left to a policy that recognised Palestinian 
national rights without abandoning support for Israeli nationalism. However, 
Kaufman also had personal reasons for being interested in the case, being Jewish 
and feeling disillusioned with the way Israeli politics had gone since the state’s 
establishment. Involvement in the campaign did not damage Ernie Ross’s career 
in the way it did his predecessors, as he ended up as a member of the 
parliamentary party’s foreign affairs sub-committee in the early 1990s and maybe 
he foresaw personal opportunities for taking up the Palestinian campaign so 
assiduously.
However, the most appropriate way to understand these individuals’ role in 
changing the party’s policy is in terms of socialisation. Discounting Kaufman, 
many of them came from the party’s left, a faction traditionally committed to 
socialist foreign policy. Whereas in the 1940s Zionism was associated with 
socialist foreign policy, during the 1970s and 1980s the left began increasingly to 
identify with Third World politics and the Palestinian cause began to appeal to 
socialist principles. Although Foot, Benn and Heffer had all previously supported 
zionism, they came under the influence of the new left movements in the 1970s, 
supporting the anti-apartheid movement and the campaign for nuclear
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disarmament. The others, including Clare Short, Ernie Ross and Ken Livingstone, 
were clearly socialised into the Palestinian cause through their association with the 
new left, pro-Third World agenda. Being too young to have witnessed the effects 
of Nazism on the Jews, their political background included the new left’s 
opposition to American neo-colonialism.116
Similar dynamics took place in the French Socialist Party. Indeed, the 
presidentialism of the French political system enhanced the role of individuals to 
the extent that intra-party currents tended to be defined in terms of particular 
individuals, such as Mitterrandists or Rocardians.117 Under Mitterrand, the PS 
appointed Ministers almost exclusively from middle class professions such as 
journalism and university teaching, with a succession of highly educated Prime 
Ministers.118 Michel Rocard, who left the PSU to join the PS in 1974, was a 
member of the Executive Bureau between 1975 and 1981 and eventually became 
Prime Minister in 1988. Rocard’s background led him to sympathise with Third 
World nationalism. More significantly, Claude Cheysson, who was Foreign 
Secretary between 1981 and 1984, was clearly socialised into Third World 
politics. Between 1973 and 1981, Cheysson was a member of the European 
Community Commission in Brussels and his past included considerable 
involvement in overseas affairs.119 This was at a time when the EC was starting to 
take the Palestinian nationalist movement seriously and to move towards a policy 
based on the formation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.
Particular individuals also helped to determine the communist parties’ policy 
change. In the British case, the rise of activists, such as Martin Jacques and 
Beatrix Campbell, predisposed the party towards accommodating both Palestinian 
and Israeli nationalism. These people were committed to recognising a diversity 
of identities, national, ethnic and gender, inducing them to reject orthodox anti- 
zionist slogans and to argue for recognition of both Palestinian and Israeli national 
rights.120 Julia Pascall played a more direct part, specifically calling on the party
116 Ibid.
117 Gaffney in C ole, ed., 1990:63.
118 Morgan, 1992:12.
119 See W ho’s W ho in European Politics, 1993:146.
120 Chapter six.
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to reject crude anti-zionism in Marxism Today.121 In the French case too, specific 
personalities played a part in getting the PCF to take a more sympathetic attitude 
towards Jewish interests. The Jewish Eurocommunist, Jean Kanapa, significantly 
influenced Marchais’ views on the Israel/Palestinian question.122
8.7 Conclusion
This study can only shed partial light on the way policy change takes place in 
political parties. The difficulties involved in using documentary sources which are 
either biased or unavailable means that any interpretation is limited. Nevertheless, 
it does show that it is not enough to read particular policies off basic ideological 
premises within the left. The existing literature on the left and zionism 
overwhelmingly suggests that the contemporary left’s views are continuous with 
the left’s fundamental antagonism towards nationalism generally and Jewish 
nationalism in particular.123 However, this starting point makes it difficult to 
understand the variety of views within the left and the changes in policy positions. 
In the case of the Labour Party and the French Socialist Party, both of which 
espoused a commitment to internationalism, there was very little evidence of 
hostility towards Jewish nationalism throughout most of the postwar period until 
the 1980s and, even then, the mainstream view was not anti-zionist. It is true that 
internationalist and communist principles played a greater role in shaping the 
communist parties’ positions, but even in these cases, there was evidence of 
dissent and fluctuation and their ideological hostility towards zionism did not 
always determine policy positions.
It is more useful, therefore, to take a contingent approach to understanding 
policy shifts. Policy decisions reflected a mixture of rational, organisational and 
personal factors. The parties’ positions in the 1980s stemmed from a 
consideration of how best to maximise their interests both domestically and 
externally and from organisational changes, in particular, the rise of the left in 
both the Labour Party and the PS and the rise of the reformist factions in the
™ Ibid'
Chapter seven.
123 Chapter one.
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communist left. Finally, it is impossible to understand how policy change 
occurred without taking account of the role of individual members of the parties 
personally committed to forcing through a change in direction, a factor which 
gives the decisions an almost arbitrary aspect. If this thesis shows anything, it 
shows that there is a need to look beyond basic ideological principles to 
understand particular policies and to consider the way structural factors, such as 
intra-organisational structures, combine with personal ones to produce particular 
outcomes.
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EPILOGUE
It is at first perhaps surprising that the heated controversies over the left’s attitude 
towards Israel and zionism in the 1970s and 1980s have now given way to a period of 
relative calm. Accusations of left-wing anti-semitism, such as those associated with 
the Perdition affair, have subsided and there is general acceptance of the need to 
recognise both Israeli and Palestinian national rights encapsulated in the 1992 peace 
agreements. There are two main reasons for this decline in controversy. First, the left 
has been put on to the defensive. In response to a loss of its natural constituency1 
resulting from the decline of the industrial sector, the left has been weakened and is 
seeking to forge a new identity. Having suffered four successive electoral defeats, 
Labour has embarked on a major modernisation programme. Jacques Chirac’s 
resounding defeat of the Parti Socialiste in 1995 has forced the latter also to rethink its 
identity, a process that had in any case begun in the Mitterrand era. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the pro-democracy movements in Eastern Europe pressurised 
the national communist parties into a period of introspection, with the CPGB turning 
into the Democratic Left in 1992.2 Few in the left are confident enough to espouse 
ideals and policies that hint of the Labour left’s rise in the 1980s or orthodox 
communism. In the 1990s, Labour has left behind its traditional concerns in favour of 
so-called ‘post-materialist’ issues such as political participation,3 and the communist 
left has dropped its loyalty to marxism. In this new context, there is little room for 
controversial criticism of Israeli policy or calls for the dissolution of the Jewish state 
on the grounds that it prioritises national interests over class ones.
The second important factor is the end of the cold war and its implications for 
the Middle East. A number of internal considerations, including an exhaustion on the 
part of both sides and the commitment of certain people, such as Shimon Peres, 
provided the impetus for the Israel/PLO peace agreements. However, the new 
international climate and the need for stability in the Middle East, made the peace 
process inescapable. In an unprecedented way, the US under the Clinton 
administration moved from a rejectionist position to an accommodationist one,
1 See Seyd and W hitely, 1992:17.
2 See Hunt in R obins et al. eds., 1994:191-192.
3 Seyd and W hiteley, 1992:137.
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abandoning its previous objection to any relations with the PLO. The Israeli Labour 
government under Yitzhak Rabin and then Shimon Peres, began to forge relations 
with the PLO. The movement towards mutual recognition on the part of the Israelis 
and the PLO made divisions within the left over the conflict redundant and a 
continuing attachment to extremism on either side appear out of date.
Even so, this new consensus could easily collapse again. The current conflict 
between Hamas, Hizbollah and Israel indicates the difficulties in actually putting 
peace into practice. Furthermore, the recent electoral victory of the right-wing Likud 
Party under Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership provides a significant threat to the 
achievements made under Peres’s and his predecessor’s government. Although 
Netanyahu says that he will continue to work towards peace, he still supports the 
formation of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and refuses to accept the need for 
Palestinian statehood. So far, there has been little international disquiet over these 
policies. However, by raising the stakes in this way, Netanyahu’s approach could 
revive the old dilemmas and precipitate a new series of debates. New Labour will 
have to deal with the difficulties raised by a growing tension between the Israeli 
leadership and the PLO, exacerbated by the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in 
response to the slowness of improvements in Palestinian lives. Faced with Likud’s 
hard-line approach to peace, Tony Blair and the rest of the leadership might be forced 
to take account of the kind of views that divided the party in the 1980s, that is, the 
very ideas that the modernisers wanted to remove.
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Appendix 1.1 Sources
Newspapers and Journals
Cahiers du Communisme* 
Comment*
Daily Herald*
Daily Mail*
Daily Worker 
France Nouvelle*
The Guardian*
Horizons*
L'Humanite 
Israel Labour News*
Jewish Chronicle 
Jewish Clarion*
Jewish Vanguard* (Poale Zion) 
Labour Herald*
Labour Israel*
Labour Leader*
Labour Monthly*
Labour Woman*
LFI News*
Marxism Today 
Le Matin*
Le Monde 
Morning Star 
New Socialist*
New Statesman (and Nation)* 
La Nouvelle Critique*
Le Nouvel Observateur*
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Paris-Presse*
La Pensee*
Le Populaire 
Quotidien de Paris*
The Spectator*
The Times
Les Temps Modemes*
Tribune
Twentieth Century*
Vanguard* (Poale Zion)
World News (and Views)*
Zionist Review*
Labour Party Published Documents
Agenda for the Annual Conference
Labour Party Annual Conference Report (LPACR)
Agenda for the National Conference of Labour Women (NCLW) 
NCLW Reports 
Resolutions 
TUC Reports
Problems of Foreign Policy, 1952, Labour Party discussion 
document
Labour Party Foreign Affairs, 1946/47
Labour's Foreign Policy, 1958, LPAC
Britain in the Modem World, 1959, Labour Party discussion
document
Notes For Speakers, 1974, Foreign Policy
A Socialist Foreign Policy, 1981, Labour Party discussion
document
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Parliamentary Documents
Early Day Motions (EDMs)
Parliamentary Reports (Hansard)
Labour Party Internal Documents
NEC
International Department/Committee 
Middle East Sub-Committee (MESC)
Parliamentary Group, LFI
Communist Party o f Great Britain Internal Documents
International Department*
Private Papers
Hugh Dalton (British Library of Political and Economic Science) 
Pamphlets
Labour Looks at Israel, 1967-1971, LFI
The EEC Initiative on the Middle East, 1980, LFI conference literature 
30 Years of LFI (1957-1987)
Palestine: An End To The Silence, 1988/89, Labour Middle East Council 
A Cry for Justice, 1990/91, National Union Briefing for Trade 
Unionists, NUCPS
European Jewry and the Palestine Problem, 1946, CPGB 
A Land With People, May 1982, Morning Star 
Manifesto for New Times, 1988, CPGB
231
Interviews
Michael Foot, Labour MP
Ian Mikardo, Labour MP
Ernie Ross, Labour MP
Richard Clements, Tribune
Phil Kelly, Tribune
Jack Elliot, LFI
Peter Grunberger, LFI
Yousef Allen (Medical Aid for Palestine)
Bridget Gilchrist, LMEC
John Gee, CAABU
Solly Kaye, CPGB
Phil Piratin, CPGB
* = occasional
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Appendix 3.1 Pro-Israel Labour MPs,1 1956
Edward Short (Newcastle Upon Tyne, Central)
Marcus Lipton (Lambeth, Brixton)
J. Dickson Mabon (Labour and Co-op, Greenock)
Barnett Janner (Leicester, North West)
Mark Hewitson (Kingston Upon Hull, West)
William Owen (Northumberland, Morpeth)
John McKay (Wallsend)
Alice Bacon (Leeds, South East)
Horace Holmes (Yorkshire, W.R., Hemsworth)
R.J. Mellish (Bermondsey)
Arthur Lewis (West Ham, North)
William Reid (Glasgow, Provan)
James Hutchinson Hoy (Edinburgh, Leith)
Charles Frederick Grey (Durham, Durham)
Roy Mason (Barnsley)
William Reid Blyton (Durham, Houghton-le-Spring)
Leslie Lever (Manchester, Ardwick)
David Rhys Grenfell (Glamorgan, Gower)
Arthur Moody (Gateshead, East)
John Ainsley (Durham, North West)
Arthur Blenkinsop (Newcastle Upon Tyne, East)
George Jeger (Yorkshire W.R., Goole)
Emanuel Shinwell (Durham, Easington)
Alfred Broughton (Batley and Morley)
Alice Cullen (Glasgow, Gorbals)
Frank Anderson (Cumberland, Whitehaven)
William Stones (Durham, Consett)
Charles Simmons (Staffordshire, Brierley Hill)
1 This list is based on signatories to the pro-Israel EDM .
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Benjamin Parkin (Paddington, North)
Lynn Ungoed-Thomas (Leicester, North East)
Albert Roberts (Yorkshire W.R., Normanton)
Simon Mahon (Bootle)
Elizabeth Braddock (Liverpool, Exchange)
Harold Neal (Derbyshire, Bolsover)
Percy Daines (Labour and Co-op, East Ham, North) 
Morgan Philips Price (Gloucestershire, West)
Eric Fletcher (Islington, East)
Stephen Davies (Merthyr Tydfil)
David Logan (Liverpool, Scotland)
Thomas Oswald (Edinburgh, Central)
John Paton (Norwich, North)
David Jones (The Hartlepools)
Elwyn Jones (West Ham, South)
Harold Finch (Monmouthshire, Bedwellty)
Percy Morris (Swansea, West)
Eustace George (Edinburgh, East)
Hector Hughes (Aberdeen, North)
Lena Jeger (Holbom and St. Pancras)
Cyril Bence (Dunbartonshire, East)
John Edwards (Brighouse and Spenborough)
David Weitzman (Stoke Newington and Hackney North) 
Frederick Willey (Sunderland, North)
Maurice Orbach (Willesden, East)
Michael Stewart (Fulham)
Samuel Philip Viant (Willesden, West)
Joseph Reeves (Greenwich)
Henry Usborne (Birmingham, Yardley)
Thomas Hubbard (Kirkcaldy)
Ernest Davies (Enfield, East)
Leslie Plummer (Deptford)
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Roy Jenkins (Birmingham, Stechford)
Julius Silverman (Birmingham, Aston)
George Alfred Isaacs (Southwark)
Edward Redhead (Walthamstow, West)
George Darling (Labour and Co-op, Sheffield, Hillsborough) 
M.K. MacMillan (Western Isles)
Norman Dodds (Erith and Crayford)
J. Harrison (Nottingham, North)
Daniel Granville West (Monmouthshire, Pontypool)
John Forman (Labour and Co-op, Glasgow, Springbum) 
Charles Hobson (Keighley)
Stephen Swingler (Newcastle Under Lyme)
George Albert Pargiter (Southall)
G.R. Chetwynd (Stockton-On-Tees)
Bernard Taylor (Nottinghamshire, Mansfield)
George Craddock (Bradford, South)
Charles Royle (Salford, West)
W.J. Edwards (Stepney)
M. Herbison (Lanarkshire, North)
Hugh Dalton (Bishop Auckland)
Frank Allaun (Salford, East)
235
Appendix 4.1 Pro-Israel Labour MPs,1 1967
David Weitzman (Stoke Newington and Hackney North) 
John Dunwoody (Falmouth and Camborne)
Ian Mikardo (Poplar)
Sydney Silverman (Nelson and Colne)
Mr. Winterbottom (Sheffield, Brightside)
Renee Short (Wolverhampton, North East)
James Tinn (Cleveland)
E.M. Braddock (Liverpool, Exchange)
Donald Chapman (Birmingham, Northfield)
Robert Sheldon (Ashton-Under-Lyne)
David Winnick (Croydon, South)
Maurice Miller (Glasgow, Kelvingrove)
William Hamling (Woolwich, West)
Edward Lyons (Bradford, East)
John Lee (Reading)
Eric Moonman (Billericay)
Elystan Morgan (Cardigan)
Arthur Davidson (Accrington)
Alfred Morris (Manchester, Wythenshawe)
Raphael Tuck (Watford)
Maurice Orbach (Stockport, South)
Archie Manuel (Ayrshire and Bute, Central Ayrshire) 
Arnold Shaw (Ilford, South)
Hector Hughes (Aberdeen, North)
Hugh Gray (Norfolk, Yarmouth)
Peter Jackson (Derbyshire, High Peak)
Raymond Fletcher (Derbyshire, Ilkeston)
Arthur Lewis (West Ham, North)
Joel Bamett (Lancashire, Heywood and Royton)
1 This list is based on signatories to the top-scoring pro-Israel EDM .
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Edwin Brooks (Bebington)
William S. Hilton (Bethnal Green)
Edward Rowlands (Cardiff, North)
Bert Hazell (Norfolk, North)
William Hamilton (Fife, West)
James Griffiths (Carmarthenshire, Llanelly)
G.R. Strauss (Lambeth, Vauxhall)
Paul Rose (Manchester, Blackley)
Dennis Hobden (Brighton, Kemp Town)
Eric Varley (Chesterfield)
David Ginsburg (Dewsbury)
David Kerr (Wandsworth, Central)
William Price (Warwickshire, Rugby)
Roland Moyle (Lewisham, North)
Arnold Gregory (Stockport, North)
Desmond Donnelly (Pembroke)
John Rankin (Labour and Co-op, Glasgow, Govan)
Ben Whitaker (Hampstead)
Denis Walter Coe (Lancashire, Middleton and Prestwich) 
John Parker (Dagenham)
Alan Lee Williams (Hornchurch)
Robert Maxwell (Buckinghamshire, Buckingham)
George Rogers (Kensington, North)
Stanley Henig (Lancashire, Lancaster)
George Henry Perry (Nottingham, South)
Herbert Butler (Hackney, Central)
Leo Abse (Monmouthshire, Pontypool)
Gwilym Roberts (Bedfordshire South)
Will Owen (Labour and Co-op, Northumberland, Morpeth) 
Tony Gardner (Nottingham, Rushcliffe)
Robert Woof (Durham, Blaydon)
Hugh Delargy (Essex, Thurrock)
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Richard Crawshaw (Liverpool, Toxteth)
James Dempsey (Coatbridge and Airdrie)
Julius Silverman (Birmingham, Aston)
Cyril Bence (Dunbartonshire, East)
James Johnson (Kingston-Upon-Hull)
Peter Archer (Rowley Regis and Tipton)
Edward Stanley Bishop (Nottingham, Newark) 
Laurence Pavitt (Labour and Co-op, West Willesden) 
Roy Roebuck (Harrow, East)
Gwyneth Dunwoody (Exeter)
Leslie Lever (Manchester, Ardwick)
Lena Jeger (Holborn and St. Pancras, South)
Simon Mahon (Bootle)
Alice Cullen (Glasgow, Gorbals)
Michael Barnes (Brentford and Chiswick)
Ivor Richard (Barons Court)
Edwin Wainwright (Yorkshire W.R., Deame Valley) 
Albert Roberts (Yorkshire W.R., Normanton)
Arthur Pearson (Glamorganshire, Pontypridd)
Daniel Jones (Burnley)
Alistair Macdonald (Kent, Chislehurst)
James A. Dunn (Liverpool, Kirkdale)
Eric Ogden (Liverpool, West Derby)
Thomas Steele (Dunbartonshire, West)
William Wilson (Coventry, South)
Neil Carmichael (Glasgow, Woodside)
Leslie Huckfield (Nuneaton)
Peter Mahon (Preston, South)
Arthur Probert (Aberdare)
Arthur Palmer (Labour and Co-op, Bristol, Central) 
James Hamilton (Lanarkshire, Bothwell)
Samuel Charles Silkin (Camberwell, Dulwich)
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Idwal Jones (Denbighshire, Wrexham)
Maurice Edelman (Coventry, North)
John Binns (Keighley)
John Forrester (Stoke-On-Trent, North)
John Homer (Oldbury and Halesowen)
Geoffrey Rhodes (Labour and Co-op, Newcastle, East) 
Charles Mapp (Oldham, East)
Malcolm MacMillan (Western Isles)
John Ellis (Bristol, North-West)
Robert Edwards (Bilston)
John Robertson (Paisley)
Shirley Summersill (Halifax)
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Appendix 4.2 Pro-Arab Labour MPs,1 1967
Margaret McKay (Wandsworth, Clapham)
Derek Page (Norfold, Kings Lynn)
John Ryan (Middlesex, Uxbridge)
Will Owen* (Labour and Co-op, Northumberland, Morpeth) 
William Molloy* (Ealing, North)
James Dickens (Lewisham, West)
Christopher Mayhew (Woolwich, East)
David Watkins (Durham, Consett)
George Lawson (Lanarkshire, Motherwell)
Alan Beaney (Hemsworth, Yorks)
Evan Luard (Oxford)
Thomas Urwin (Durham, Houghton-le-Spring)
Sydney Bidwell (Southall)
Michael McGuire (Lancashire, Ince)
Roy Hughes (Newport)
Andrew Faulds (Smethwick)
Will Griffiths (Manchester, Exchange)
Brian Parkyn (Bedfordshire, Bedford)
* MPs who signed both pro-Israel and pro-Arab EDMs
1 This list is based on signatories to a top-scoring pro-Arab EDM .
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Appendix 5.1 Pro-Palestinian Labour MPs,1 1982
Michael Foot (Gwent, Ebbw Vale)
Denis Healey (Leeds, East)
John Silkin (Lewisham, Deptford)
Royland Moyle (Lewisham, East)
Jack Dormand (Durham, Easington) 
loan Evans (Labour and Co-op, Aberdare) 
Alexander Lyon (York)
Dennis Skinner (Derbyshire, Bolsover)
Tony Benn (Bristol, South East)
Frank Haynes (Ashfield)
A.W. Stallard (Camden, St. Pancras North)
Peter Snape (West Bromwich, East)
David Stoddart (Swindon)
Ray Powell (Ogmore)
Robin F. Cook (Edinburgh, Central)
Frank Dobson (Holbom and St. Pancras South) 
Don Dixon (Jarrow)
Robert C. Brown (Newcastle Upon Tyne)
John Home Robertson (Berwich and East Lothian) 
Laurence Pavitt (Labour and Co-op, Brent South) 
Stanley Newens (Labour and Co-op, Harlow) 
David Watkins (Durham, Consett)
Lewis Carter-Jones (Eccles)
Roger Stott (Westhoughton)
David Winnick (Walsall, North)
Frank Hooley (Sheffield, Heeley)
Neil Carmichael (Glasgow, Kelvingrove)
Neil Kinnock (Bedwellty)
Allan Roberts (Bootle)
1 This list is based on signatories to the top-scoring pro-Palestinian EDM .
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Ernie Roberts (Hackney North and Stoke Newington) 
Ken Woolmer (Batley and Morley)
John Max ton (Glasgow, Cathcart)
Stanley Orme (Salford, West)
Roy Hughes (Newport)
Allen McKay (Yorkshire, W.R., Penistone)
Joan Maynard (Sheffield, Brightside)
Bruce Millan (Glasgow, Craigton)
Ted Fletcher (Darlington)
Ernie Ross (Dundee, West)
Norman Hogg (Dunbartonshire, East)
Robert Parry (Liverpool, Scotland Exchange)
William McKelvey (Kilmarnock)
Harold Walker (Doncaster)
Guy Barnett (Greenwich)
George Morton (Manchester, Moss Side)
Martin O'Neil (Clackmannan and East Stirlingshire) 
Stan Thome (Preston, South)
John Sever (Birmingham, Ladywood)
Reg Race (Haringey, Wood Green)
J.D. Concannon (Nottinghamshire, Mansfield)
David Ennals (Norwich, North)
Clive Soley (Hammersmith North)
Dick Douglas (Dunfermline)
Sheila Wright (Birmingham, Handsworth)
Andrew Faulds (Warley, East)
JW . Rooker (Birmingham, Perry Bar)
Martin Flannery (Sheffield, Hillsborough)
Tom Urwin (Durham, Houghton-le-Spring)
Terry Davis (Birmingham, Stechford)
Roger Thomas (Carmarthen)
George Park (Coventry, North East)
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Hugh McCartney (Dunbartonshire, Central)
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Appendix 5.2 Pro-Palestinian Labour Activists,1 1982
Albert Booth (Barrow-in-Furness)
Dale Campbell-Savours (Workington)
J.D. Concannon (Nottinghamshire, Mansfield) 
Andrew Faulds (Warley, East)
Martin Flannery (Sheffield, Hillsborough)
Norman Hogg (Dunbartonshire, East)
John Home Robertson (Berwich and East Lothian) 
Roy Hughes (Newport)
David Lambie (Ayrshire, Central)
Joan Maynard (Sheffield, Brightside)
Hugh McCartney (Dunbartonshire, Central)
William McKelvey (Kilmarnock)
Robert McTaggart (Glasgow, Central)
Stanley Newens (Labour and Co-op., Harlow) 
Martin O'Neil (Clackmannan and East Stirlingshire) 
Robert Parry (Liverpool, Scotland Exchange)
Allan Roberts (Bootle)
Leslie Spriggs (St. Helens)
Roger Stott (Westhoughton)
Roger Thomas (Carmarthen)
James Tinn (Teesside, Redcar)
Stan Thome (Preston, South)
Tom Urwin (Durham, Houghton-le-Spring)
David Watkins (Durham, Consett)
Ken Weetch (Ipswich)
‘i have defined as activists those Labour MPs who signed two or more EDM s which were critical o f  Israel 
and pro-Palestinian in orientation.
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